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In these famous essays, "The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious" and "On the Psychology of the Unconscious," the Swiss psychologist Jung sets out the essential core of his system. The present edition comprises the latest version of two works which have taken over thirty years to mature and whose successive editions reflect the changes in Jung's thought over the intervening years. Historically they mark the end of Jung's intimate association with Freud and sum up his attempt to integrate the psychological schools of Freud and Adler into a comprehensive framework.

The original English translation has long been out of print, and in consequence this new translation of *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* will be especially welcomed not only by the expert but by all those who wish to profit from the best introduction to the work of this psychologist. It is the second volume to be published in what is the first complete collected edition, in English, of Jung's works.

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BOLLINGEN SERIES XX

THE COLLECTED WORKS

OF

C. G. JUNG

VOLUME 7

EDITORS

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TWO ESSAYS ON ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Carl Gustav

C. G. JUNG, 1875-1961

TRANSLATED BY R. F. C. HULL

BOLLINGEN SERIES XX

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The two principal works in this volume were originally published in German as *Über die Psychologie des Unbewussten* (1943) and *Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten* (1945) by Rascher Verlag, Zurich.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

"The Structure of the Unconscious" and "New Paths in Psychology" together marked a turning point in the history of analytical psychology, for they revealed the foundations upon which the greater part of Professor Jung's later work was built.

Both these essays were considerably revised and expanded for the successive editions mentioned in the Prefaces to the present volume. These Prefaces indicate the extent of the changes which were made on each occasion. As C. F. and H. G. Baynes say in the introduction to their English translation of an intermediate version, where the title *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* was used for the first time: "Of the first essay only the framework of its earlier form can be recognized, and so much new material has been added to the second essay that both works start afresh, so to speak, full of the amazing vitality of Jung's mind." The essays are indeed remarkable for the number of revisions to which they have been subjected, each reflecting a new development of thought based upon increasingly fruitful researches into the unconscious.

However interesting the intermediate versions may be in themselves, the original drafts of these essays are undoubtedly far more significant to the student of analytical psychology. They contain the first tentative formulations of Jung's concept of archetypes and the collective unconscious, as well as his germinating theory of types. This theory was put forward, partially at least, as an attempt to explain the conflicts within the psychoanalytic school, of which he had been so prominent a member and from which he had so recently seceded.

With these considerations in mind the Editors decided to include the original drafts of these two essays in separate Appendices. It was felt that their historical interest fully justified the duplication of reading matter which comparison of the texts would involve.

Acknowledgment is gratefully made of the kindness of Faber and Faber, Ltd., London, and the Oxford University Press, New York, in permitting quotation from the Louis MacNeice translation of Goethe's *Faust*.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

I am greatly indebted to Mrs. Cary F. Baynes for allowing me to make full use of the English version of these two essays which she translated in collaboration with the late H. G. Baynes, under the title *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (London and New York, 1928). The present translation is made from the revised Swiss editions of the two works, entitled *Über die Psychologie des Unbewussten* (Zurich, 1943), and *Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten* (Zurich, 1945).

"The Structure of the Unconscious," in the Appendix of this volume, was translated by Philip Mairet from the French version of the original paper, now lost. Slight alterations of terminology have been made by me with Mr. Mairet's consent.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF
THE UNCONSCIOUS

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

This essay* is the result of my attempt to revise, at the publisher's request, the paper which appeared in the Rascher Yearbook for 1912 under the title "Neue Bahnen der Psychologie."† The present work thus reproduces that earlier essay, though in altered and enlarged form. In my earlier paper I confined myself to the exposition of one essential aspect of the psychological views inaugurated by Freud. The many and important changes which recent years have brought in the psychology of the unconscious have required me to broaden considerably the framework of my earlier paper. On the one hand a number of passages on Freud were shortened, while on the other hand Adler's psychology was taken into account, and, so far as was possible within the limits of this essay, a general survey of my own views was given.

I must warn the reader at the outset that he will be dealing with a study which, on account of its rather complicated subject-matter, will make considerable demands on his patience and attention. Nor can I associate this work with the idea that it is in any sense conclusive or adequately convincing. This requirement could only be met by copious scientific treatises on each separate problem touched upon in the essay. The reader who wishes to probe more deeply into the questions at issue must therefore be referred to the specialist literature. My intention is simply to give a broad survey of the most recent views on the nature and psychology of the unconscious. I regard the problem of the unconscious as so important and so topical that it would in my opinion be a great loss if this question, which touches each one of us so closely, were to disappear from the purview of the educated lay public and to lead a shadowy paper existence in the stacks of libraries or in the pages of inaccessible technical journals.

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* *Die Psychologie der unbewussten Prozesse* (Zurich, 1917); trans. by Dora Hecht as "The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes," in *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (2nd edn., London, 1917; New York, 1920).

† Cf. below, pars. 407ff., "New Paths in Psychology."

The psychological accompaniments of the present war*—above all the incredible brutalization of common judgments, the mutual slanderings, the unprecedented fury of destruction, the unheard-of lying, and the inability of men to call a halt to the bloody demon—are uniquely fitted to force upon the attention of every thinking person the problem of the chaotic unconscious which slumbers uneasily beneath the ordered world of consciousness. This war has pitilessly revealed to civilized man that he is still a barbarian, and has at the same time shown what an iron scourge lies in store for him if ever again he should be tempted to make his neighbour responsible for his own evil qualities. The psychology of the individual is reflected in the psychology of the nation. What the nation does is done also by each individual, and so long as the individual continues to do it, the nation will do likewise. Only a change in the attitude of the individual can initiate a change in the psychology of the nation. The great problems of humanity were never yet solved by general laws, but only through regeneration of the attitudes of individuals. If ever there was a time when self-reflection was the absolutely necessary and only right thing, it is now, in our present catastrophic epoch. Yet whoever reflects upon himself is bound to strike upon the frontiers of the unconscious, which contains what above all else he needs to know.

Küsnacht, Zurich, December, 1916 C. G. JUNG

From PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

I am glad that it has been the lot of this little book to pass into a second edition in so short a time, despite the difficulties it must have presented to many readers.

From the many communications I received after the publication of the first edition I have discovered that even among the wider public interest in the problems of the human psyche is very much keener than I expected. This interest may be due in no small measure to the profound shock which our consciousness sustained through the World War. The spectacle of this catastrophe threw man back upon himself by making him feel his complete impotence; it turned his gaze inwards, and, with everything rocking about him, he must needs seek something that guarantees him a hold. Too many still look outwards, some believing in the illusion of victory and of victorious power, others in treaties and laws, and others again in the overthrow of the existing order. But still too few look inwards, to their own selves, and still too few ask themselves whether the ends of human society might not best be served if each man tried to abolish the old order in himself, and to practise in his own person and in his own inward state those precepts and victories which he preaches at every street-corner, instead of always expecting these things of his fellow men. Every individual needs revolution, inner division, overthrow of the existing order, and renewal, but not by forcing these things upon his neighbours under the hypocritical cloak of Christian love or the sense of social responsibility or any of the other beautiful euphemisms for unconscious urges to personal power. Individual self-reflection, return of the individual to the ground of human nature, to his own deepest being with its individual and social destiny—here is the beginning of a cure for that blindness which reigns at the present hour.

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* [That of 1914–18.—Editors.]

Interest in the problem of the human psyche is a symptom of this instinctive return to oneself. It is to serve this interest that the present book is written.

Küsnacht, Zurich, October 1918 C. G. J.

From PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION*

In view of the fact that seven years have elapsed since the publication of the first edition, I have deemed it necessary to undertake fairly extensive alterations and improvements, particularly in the chapters on types and on the unconscious. The chapter on the conception of types in the analytical process I have omitted entirely, as this question has since received comprehensive treatment in my book *Psychological Types* to which I must refer the interested reader.

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* Zurich, 1926, title changed to *Das Unbewusste im normalen und kranken Seelenleben*. Trans. by H. G. and C. F. Baynes as "The Unconscious in the Normal and Pathological Mind," in *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (London and New York, 1928).)

C. G. J.

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION *

Since the last unchanged edition six years have gone by, hence it seemed to me advisable to submit the present new edition of the book to a thoroughgoing revision. On this occasion a number of intricacies could be eliminated or improved, and superfluous material deleted. A difficult and complicated matter like the psychology of the unconscious gives rise not only to many new discoveries but to errors as well. It is still a boundless expanse of virgin territory into which we make experimental incursions, and only by going the long way round do we strike the direct road. Accordingly I have tried to introduce as many new viewpoints as possible into the text. My reader should not expect anything like a complete survey of all the main items of contemporary psychological knowledge in this domain. In this popular account I am giving only a few of the most essential aspects of modern psychology and also of my own researches, and this only by way of an introduction. A solid knowledge cannot be acquired except through the study of the literature on the one hand and through practical experience on the other. In particular I would like to recommend to those readers who are desirous of gaining a detailed knowledge of these matters that they should furthermore peruse the main works of medical psychology and psychopathology. They should also thoroughly digest the psychological textbooks. So doing, they will acquire the requisite knowledge of the position and general significance of medical psychology in the most direct way.

From such a comparative study the reader will be able to judge how far Freud's standpoint about the unpopularity of his psychoanalysis, and my own feeling that I occupy an isolated outpost, are justified. Although there have been a few notable exceptions, I do not think I exaggerate when I say that the views of modern medical psychology have still not penetrated far enough into the strongholds of academic science. New ideas, if they are not just a flash in the pan, generally require at least a generation to take root. Psychological innovations probably take much longer, since in this field more than in any other practically everybody sets himself up as an authority.

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* Zurich, 1943. The changed title *Über die Psychologie des Unbewussten*. It is this edition which is translated in the present volume.

Küsnacht-Zurich, April, 1942 C. G. J.

I

PSYCHOANALYSIS

1 If he wants to help his patient the doctor and above all the specialist for nervous diseases must have psychological knowledge; for nervous disorders and all that is connoted by the terms "nervousness," hysteria, etc. are of psychic origin and therefore logically require psychic treatment. Cold water, light, fresh air, electricity, and so forth have at best a transitory effect and sometimes none at all. The patient is sick in mind, in the highest and most complex of the mind's functions, and these can hardly be said to belong any more to the province of medicine. Here the doctor must also be a psychologist, which means that he must have knowledge of the human psyche.

2 In the past, that is to say up to fifty years ago, the doctor's psychological training was still very bad. His psychiatric text books were wholly confined to clinical descriptions and the systematization of the diseases, and the psychology taught in the universities was either philosophy or the so-called experimental psychology inaugurated by Wundt.[1] Later, new stimuli towards a psychotherapeutic psychology came from the Charcot school at the Salpêtrière in Paris. Pierre Janet[2] began his epoch-making researches into the psychology of neurotic states, and Bernheim[3] in Nancy took up with great success Liébeault's[4] old and forgotten idea of treating the neuroses by suggestion.

---

[1] Wilhelm Wundt, *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie* (Leipzig, 1874; trans. from 5th German edn. (1902) as *Principles of Physiological Psychology*, London, 1904).

[2] *L'Automatisme psychologique* (Paris, 1889); *Névroses et idées fixes* (Paris, 1898).

[3] Hippolyte Bernheim, *De la suggestion et de ses applications à la thérapeutique* (Paris, 1886; trans. by S. Freud as *Die Suggestion und ihre Heilwirkung*, Leipzig and Vienna, 1888).

[4] A. A. Liébeault, *Du Sommeil et des états analogues considérés au point de vue de l'action du moral sur le physique* (Paris, 1866).

Sigmund Freud translated Bernheim's book and also derived valuable inspiration from it. At that time there was no psychology of the neuroses and psychoses. To Freud belongs the undying merit of having laid the foundations of a psychology of the neuroses. His teachings sprang from his experience in the practical treatment of the neuroses, that is, from the application of a method which he called *psychoanalysis.*

3 Before we enter upon a closer discussion of our subject, something must be said about its relation to science as known hitherto. Here we encounter a curious spectacle which proves yet again the truth of Anatole France's remark: "Les savants ne sont pas curieux." The first work of any magnitude[5] in this field awakened only the faintest echo, in spite of the fact that it introduced an entirely new conception of the neuroses. A few writers spoke of it appreciatively and then, on the next page, proceeded to explain their hysterical cases in the same old way. They behaved very much like a man who, having eulogized the idea or fact that the earth was a sphere, calmly continues to represent it as flat. Freud's next publications remained absolutely unnoticed, although they put forward observations which were of incalculable importance for psychiatry. When in the year 1900 Freud wrote the first real psychology of dreams[6] (a proper Stygian darkness had hitherto reigned over this field), people began to laugh, and when he actually started to throw light on the psychology of sexuality in 1905,[7] laughter turned to insult. And this storm of learned indignation was not behindhand in giving Freud and psychoanalysis an unwelcome publicity, a notoriety which extended far beyond the confines of scientific interest.

4 Accordingly we must look more closely at this new psychology. Already in Charcot's time it was known that the neurotic symptom is "psychogenic," i.e., originates in the psyche. It was also known, thanks mainly to the work of the Nancy school, that all hysterical symptoms can be produced through sugges-

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[5] Josef Breuer and Freud, *Studien über Hysterie* (Leipzig and Vienna, 1895; trans. as *Studies on Hysteria*, New York, 1936, and 1957).

[6] Freud, *Die Traumdeutung* (Leipzig and Vienna, 1900); trans. by A. A. Brill as *The Interpretation of Dreams* (London, 1913; more recent, enlarged version, London, 1937).

[7] Idem, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* (Vienna, 1905); trans. by A. A. Brill as *Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory* (New York, 1910).

tion. Equally, something was known, thanks to the researches of Janet, about the psychological mechanisms that produce such hysterical phenomena as anaesthesia, paresis, paralysis, and amnesia. But it was not known how an hysterical symptom derives from the psyche; the psychic causal connections were completely unknown. In the early eighties Dr. Breuer, an old Viennese practitioner, made a discovery which became the real starting-point for the new psychology. He had a young, very intelligent woman patient suffering from hysteria, who manifested the following symptoms among others: she had a spastic (rigid) paralysis of the right arm, and occasional fits of absent-mindedness or twilight states; she had also lost the power of speech inasmuch as she could no longer command her mother tongue but could only express herself in English (systematic aphasia). They tried at that time to account for these disorders with anatomical theories, although the cortical centre for the arm function was as little disturbed here as with a normal person. The symptomatology of hysteria is full of anatomical impossibilities. One lady, who had completely lost her hearing because of an hysterical affection, often used to sing. Once, when she was singing, her doctor seated himself unobserved at the piano and softly accompanied her. In passing from one stanza to the next he made a sudden change of key, whereupon the patient, without noticing it, went on singing in the changed key. Thus she hears—and does not hear. The various forms of systematic blindness offer similar phenomena: a man suffering from total hysterical blindness recovered his power of sight in the course of treatment, but it was only partial at first and remained so for a long time. He could see everything with the exception of people's heads. He saw all the people round him without any heads. Thus he sees—and does not see. From a large number of like experiences it had been concluded that only the conscious mind of the patient does not see and hear, but that the sense function is otherwise in working order. This state of affairs directly contradicts the nature of an organic disorder, which always affects the actual function as well.

5 After this digression, let us come back to the Breuer case. There were no organic causes for the disorder, so it had to be regarded as hysterical, i.e., psychogenic. Breuer had observed that if, during her twilight states (whether spontaneous or

artificially induced. He got the patient to tell him of the reminiscences and fantasies that thronged in upon her; her condition was eased for several hours afterwards. He made systematic use of this discovery for further treatment. The patient devised the name 'talking cure' for it or, jokingly, 'chimney sweeping'.

5 The patient had become ill when nursing her father in his fatal illness. Naturally her fantasies were chiefly concerned with these disturbing days. Reminiscences of this period came to the surface during her twilight states with photographic fidelity; so vivid were they, down to the last detail, that we can hardly assume the waking memory to have been capable of such plastic and exact reproductions. The name 'hypermnesia' has been given to this intensification of the powers of memory which not infrequently occurs in restricted states of consciousness. Remarkable things now came to light. One of the many stories told ran somewhat as follows.

One night, watching by the sick man, who had a high fever, she was tense with anxiety because a surgeon was expected from Vienna to perform an operation. Her mother had left the room for a while, and Anna, the patient, sat by the sick bed with her right arm hanging over the back of the chair. She fell into a sort of waking dream in which she saw a black snake coming, apparently out of the wall, towards the sick man as though to bite him. (It is quite likely that there really were snakes in the meadow at the back of the house, which had already given the girl a fright and which now provided the material for the hallucination.) She wanted to drive the creature away but felt paralysed; her right arm, hanging over the back of the chair, had 'gone to sleep'; it had become anaesthetic and paretic, and as she looked at it the fingers changed into little serpents with death's heads. Probably she made efforts to drive away the snake with her paralysed right hand, so that the anaesthesia and paralysis became associated with the snake hallucination. When the snake had disappeared she was so frightened that she wanted to pray, but all speech failed her; she could not utter a word until finally she remembered an English nursery rhyme, and then she was able to go on thinking and praying in English.

Such was the scene in which the paralysis and the speech disturbance originated, and with the narration of this scene the soon after this it was removed, and in this manner the case is said to have been finally cured.

I must confine myself to this one example. In the book I have mentioned Breuer and Freud give a wealth of similar examples. It can readily be understood that scenes of this kind make a powerful impression, and [illegible] are [illegible] the complete causal significance attributed to them in the genesis of the symptom. The view of hysteria then current, which derived from the English "nervous shock" theory, energetically [illegible] by Charcot, was well fitted to explain Breuer's discovery. Hence there arose the so-called trauma theory, which says that the hysterical symptom, and, in so far as the symptoms constitute the illness, hysteria in general, derive from psychic injuries or traumata whose imprint persists unconsciously for years. Freud, now collaborating with Breuer, was able to furnish abundant confirmation of this discovery. It turned out that none of the hundreds of hysterical symptoms came by chance—they were always caused by psychic occurrences. So far the new conception opened up an extensive field for empirical work. But Freud's inquiring mind could not long remain on this superficial level, for already deeper and more difficult problems were beginning to emerge. It is obvious enough that moments of extreme anxiety such as Breuer's patient experienced may leave an abiding impression. But how did she come to experience them at all, since they already clearly bear a morbid stamp? Could the strain of nursing have caused it? If so, there ought to be many cases of this kind, for there are unfortunately very many exhausting cases to nurse, and the nervous health of the nurse is not always of the best. To this problem medicine gives an excellent answer: "The x in the calculation is predisposition." One is just "predisposed" that way. But for Freud the problem was: what constitutes the predisposition? This question leads logically to an examination of the previous history of the psychic trauma. It is a matter of common observation that exciting scenes have quite different effects on the various persons involved, or that things which are indifferent or even agreeable to one person, arouse the greatest horror in others: witness frogs, snakes, mice, cats, etc. There are cases of women who will assist at bloody operations without turning a hair, while they tremble all over with fear and loathing at the touch of a cat. I remember a young woman who suffered from an acute hysteria following a sudden fright. She had been to an evening party and was on her way home about midnight in the company of several acquaintances when a cab came up behind at full trot. The others got out of the way, but she, as though spellbound with terror, kept to the middle of the road and ran along in front of the horses. The cabman cracked his whip and swore; it was no good, she ran down the whole length of the road, which led across a bridge. There her strength deserted her, and to avoid being trampled on by the horses she would in her desperation have leapt into the river had not the passers-by prevented it. Now, this same lady had happened to be in St. Petersburg [illegible] in the very street which was cleared by the volleys of the soldiers. All around her people were falling dead or wounded; she, however, quite calm and clear-headed, espied a gate leading into a yard through which she made her escape into another street. These dreadful moments caused her no further agitation. She felt perfectly well afterwards—indeed, rather better than usual.

9 This failure to react to an apparent shock can frequently be observed. Hence it necessarily follows that the intensity of a trauma has very little pathogenic significance in itself, but it must have a special significance for the patient. That is to say, it is not the shock as such that has a pathogenic effect under all circumstances, but, in order to have an effect, it must impinge on a special psychic disposition, which may, in certain circumstances, consist in the patient's unconsciously attributing a specific significance to the shock. Here we have a possible key to the "predisposition." We have therefore to ask ourselves: what are the special circumstances of the scene with the cab? The patient's fear began with the sound of the trotting horses; for an instant it seemed to her that this portended some terrible doom—her death, or something as dreadful; the next moment she lost all sense of what she was doing.

10 The real effect evidently comes from the horses. The patient's predisposition to react in so unreasonable a way to this unremarkable incident might therefore consist in the fact that horses have some special significance for her. We might conjecture, for instance, that she once had a dangerous accident with horses. This was actually found to be the case. As a child of

about seven she was out for a drive with her coachman, when suddenly the horses took fright and, at a wild gallop, made for the precipitous bank of a deep river-gorge. The coachman jumped down and shouted to her to do likewise, but she was in such deadly fear that she could hardly make up her mind. Nevertheless she jumped in the nick of time, while the horses crashed with the carriage into the depths below. That such an event would leave a very deep impression scarcely needs proof. Yet it does not explain why at a later date such an insensate reaction should follow the perfectly harmless hint of a similar situation. So far we only know that the later symptom had a prelude in childhood, but the pathological aspect of it still remains in the dark. In order to penetrate this mystery, further knowledge is needed. For it had become clear with increasing experience that in all the cases analysed so far there existed, apart from the traumatic experiences, another special class of disturbances which lie in the province of love. Admittedly love is an elastic concept that stretches from heaven to hell and combines in itself good and evil, high and low. With this discovery Freud's views underwent a considerable change. If, more or less under the spell of Breuer's trauma theory, he had formerly sought the cause of the neurosis in traumatic experiences, now the centre of gravity of the problem shifted to an entirely different point. This is best illustrated by our case: we can understand well enough why horses should play a special part in the life of the patient, but we do not understand the later reaction, so exaggerated and uncalled for. The pathological peculiarity of this story lies in the fact that she is frightened of quite harmless horses. Remembering the discovery that apart from the traumatic experience there is often a disturbance in the province of love, we might inquire whether perhaps there is some peculiarity in this connection.

11 The lady knows a young man to whom she thinks of becoming engaged; she loves him and hopes to be happy with him. At first nothing more is discoverable. But it would never do to be deterred from investigation by the negative results of the preliminary questioning. There are indirect ways of reaching the goal when the direct way fails. We therefore return to that singular moment when the lady ran headlong in front of the horses. We inquire about her companions and what sort of

[illegible] occasion [illegible] was [illegible] what [illegible] taken place. It had been a [illegible] party for her best friend, [illegible] was going abroad, to a [illegible] written account [illegible] [illegible] and we [illegible] [illegible]. We [illegible] take leave [illegible] the state [illegible] were [illegible] so [illegible] have no reason to be nervous and in need of a [illegible]. I learned that after her friends had [illegible] the patient went back to the house of her [illegible] was the nearest [illegible] was [illegible] in an exhausted state. At this point the patient broke off her narrative and became embarrassed [illegible] [illegible] had been overcome it appeared that [illegible] a very [illegible] [illegible] preoccupation [illegible] in the [illegible] at the house [illegible] distressing. [illegible] like a [illegible] It was now the task of [illegible] a long [illegible] at last a [illegible] picture emerged which I attempt [illegible] somewhat [illegible] as follows.

As a [illegible] the patient had been a regular [illegible] only for [illegible] of her own sex and avoiding all [illegible] ways and occasions. After puberty, when the [illegible] might have come too close, she began to [illegible] something that even [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] about her twentieth year [illegible] hopes and expectations [illegible] a girl's heart at this age. [illegible] knew [illegible] were designed to break through [illegible] up around [illegible]. Mr. A was her best friend's husband and Mr. B was his [illegible] friend. She [illegible] Nevertheless it soon [illegible] Mr. B [illegible]. And [illegible] sprang up between [illegible] and [illegible] there was [illegible] a possible engagement [illegible] her relations [illegible] Mr. B. [illegible] gathered [illegible] she [illegible] act with Mr. A. [illegible] except [illegible] later in the [illegible] accidentally was [illegible] nervous. About this time the patient went to a large party. Her friends were also present. She [illegible] was [illegible] playing with her ring when [illegible] she let it slip off her finger and [illegible] under the table. Both gentlemen [illegible] it and Mr. B. succeeded in finding it. He placed the ring on her finger with an arch smile and said [illegible] what that means. One came [illegible] strange and irresistible [illegible] it on her finger and flung [illegible] A painful argument ensued, as may be imagined, and [illegible] she [illegible] the party in deep depression. [illegible] about that she should spend her [illegible] in a health resort where Mr. and Mrs. A. were also staying. Mrs. A. then began to grow visibly nervous and [illegible] remained [illegible] The patient was thus in a position to go out for walks alone with Mr. A. One day they went boating. So boisterous was she [illegible] that she suddenly fell overboard. She could not swim, and it was only with great difficulty that Mr. A. [illegible] into the boat. And then it was that he kissed her. With this romantic episode the bonds were tied fast. But the patient would not allow the depths of this passion [illegible] consciousness, evidently because she had long [illegible] pass over such things, or better to run away from them. [illegible] pursuits [illegible] Mr. B. [illegible] Mr. B. was [illegible] and [illegible] escaped the keen [illegible] Mrs. A. [illegible] her nervous [illegible] worse. Hence [illegible] Mrs. A. [illegible] abroad for a cure. [illegible] our patient [illegible] And so [illegible] her own [illegible] she came back to the house, and thus set a [illegible] her desire.

[illegible] explanation [illegible] was [illegible] chain of circumstances and set it to work. There is no doubt about [illegible] but its [illegible] remains a [illegible] matter because I must emphasise that the [illegible] leading to this [illegible] and [illegible] were [illegible] sense [illegible]. To the patient the whole story seemed [illegible] at first [illegible] being [illegible] but the previous history makes it perfectly clear that everything was [illegible] to this end while the [illegible] was [illegible] about the engagement to Mr. B. [illegible] direction was stronger.

3 [illegible] we [illegible] to our [illegible] question, namely whence comes the pathological [illegible] peculiar or exaggerated nature of [illegible]. Or [illegible] seen drawn from [illegible] experiences [illegible] spaces [illegible] certain [illegible] and we [illegible] cause of [illegible] previous [illegible] will be an important [illegible] excessive [illegible] sive [illegible] sets [illegible] as in [illegible] conflict.

4 One often hears the question whether [illegible] be the cause [illegible] neurosis rather [illegible] many [illegible]. To this we can only answer [illegible] assert [illegible] must be [illegible] in point of fact [illegible]. In [illegible] tations to the [illegible] and [illegible] at [illegible] presence [illegible] and [illegible] suspicious.

5 [illegible] as an [illegible] the neurosis, but [illegible] as [illegible]*

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* Using the word in the wider sense [illegible] right and [illegible] more [illegible] sexual [illegible]

II

THE EROS THEORY

6 In the light of [illegible] of the trauma was solved in a most unexpected manner. [illegible] example shows [illegible] and [illegible] be compared with an [illegible] is [illegible] striking [illegible] the presence [illegible]. [illegible] the patient [illegible] from her. In this case [illegible] it is [illegible] and [illegible] entirely [illegible]. If we [illegible] these facts [illegible] we arrive at the following result: there are in a neurosis two tendencies standing in [illegible] one of which is un[illegible] purpose because I wish to stress [illegible] nature and culture within himself.

[illegible] as we know [illegible] subjug[illegible]. It is a process [illegible] on the part of the animal nature [illegible] together [illegible] frenzy [illegible] culture [illegible] experienced in the [illegible] an essential and [illegible] the spirit of [illegible] level [illegible] the immoral [illegible] sects and [illegible] of the last century [illegible] and [illegible] from the pre[illegible] [illegible] that [illegible] Victorian-ism [illegible] swept over the West at the [illegible] spirit [illegible] own [illegible] suppression [illegible] any questions [illegible] last half-century gave [illegible] was the sexual question [illegible] created a whole species of literature. In this movement we found the beginnings of psychoanalysis, on whose theories it exerted a very one-sided influence. After all, no one is [illegible] of his age. Since then the sexual question has [illegible] been thrust into the background by political and spiritual problems. [illegible] always [illegible] imposed [illegible] The [illegible] alter that [illegible] the same. We also know [illegible] is by no means [illegible] that is at odds with [illegible] very [illegible] new [illegible] are just as [illegible] as they [illegible]. For [illegible] we could easily construct a political theory [illegible] just as far as [illegible] the sexual [illegible] was only an [illegible] may turn out that [illegible] a far deeper [illegible] Without being aware of it, the neurotic participates in the dominant currents of his age and reflects them in his own conflict.

Neurosis is intimately bound up with the problem of our time and really represents an unsuccessful attempt on the part of the individual to solve the general problem in his own person. Neurosis is self-division. In most people the cause of the division is that the conscious mind wants to hang on to its moral ideal, while the unconscious strives after its [illegible] unmoral ideal [illegible]. Men of this type want to be more respectable than they really are. But the conflict can easily be the other way round: there are men who are to all appearances very disreputable and do not put the least restraint upon themselves. This is at bottom only a pose of wickedness, for in the background they have their moral side which has fallen into the unconscious just as surely [illegible] and value of the case [illegible] I attempted [illegible] as far as possible [illegible]

This general discussion was necessary in order to clarify the [illegible] of therapy. [illegible]

Obviously the great question for this technique is: How are we to arrive at the shortest and best path to a knowledge of what is happening in the [illegible] of the patient? [illegible] in a state of hypnotic concentration or else [illegible] ence of conflicts in the form [illegible] ideas [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] have been [illegible] the painful [illegible] Dreams [illegible] argues that [illegible] to be rid of [illegible] her mother. Expressed in the language of the unconscious, she wants her mother to die. But the dreamer should certainly not be saddled with this tendency, because, strictly speaking, it was not she who fabricated the dream but the unconscious. The unconscious has this tendency, most unexpected from the dreamer's point of view, to get rid of the mother. The very fact that she can dream such a thing proves that she does not consciously think it. She has no notion why her mother should be got rid of. Now we know that a certain layer of the unconscious contains everything that has passed beyond the recall of memory, including all those infantile instinctual impulses which could find no outlet in adult life. We can say that the bulk of what comes out of the unconscious is of an infantile character, as for instance this wish, which is simplicity itself: "When Mummy dies you will marry me, won't you, Daddy?" This expression of an infantile wish is the substitute for a recent desire to marry, a desire in this case painful to the dreamer for reasons still to be discovered. The idea of marriage, or rather the seriousness of the corresponding impulse, is, as we say, "repressed" into the unconscious and from there must necessarily express itself in an infantile fashion, because the material at the disposal of the unconscious consists largely of infantile reminiscences.

22 Our dream is apparently concerned with a new attack of infantile jealousy. The dreamer is more or less in love with her father, and for that reason she wants to get rid of her mother. But her real conflict lies in the fact that on the one hand she wants to marry, and on the other hand is unable to make up her mind: for one never knows what he will be like, whether he will make a suitable husband, etc. And then it is so nice at home, and what will happen when she has to part from darling Mummy and be all independent and grown up? She fails to notice that the marriage question is now a serious matter for her and that it has her in its grip, so that she can no longer creep home to father and mother without bringing the fateful question into the bosom of the family. She is no longer the child she once was; she is the woman who wants to get married. As such she comes back complete with her wish for a husband. But in the family the father is the husband, and without her being aware of it it is to him that the recently awakened desire for a husband attaches itself, and this is incest. In this way there arises a secondary incest-intrigue. Freud

assumes that the tendency to incest is primary and the real reason why the dreamer cannot make up his mind to marry. [illegible] When I regard [illegible] stated the standpoint that the occasional occurrence of incest is no proof of a universal tendency to incest any more than the fact of murder proves the existence of a universal homicidal mania productive of conflict. I would not go so far as to deny that the germs of every kind of criminality are not present in each of us. But there is a world of difference between the presence of such a germ and an actual conflict with its resulting cleavage of the personality, such as exists in a neurosis.

If we know the history of a neurosis with a certain amount of exactitude, we regularly find a critical moment when some problem emerged that was evaded. This evasion is just as natural and just as universal a reaction as the laziness, slackness, cowardice, anxiety, ignorance, and unconsciousness which are at the back of it. Whenever things are unpleasant, difficult, and dangerous, we nearly always hesitate and if possible give them a wide berth. I regard these reasons as entirely sufficient. The symptomatology of incest, which undoubtedly is there and which Freud rightly saw, is in my mind a secondary and already pathological one.

The dream often seems [illegible] senseless [illegible] even [illegible] the surface so [illegible] as to leave us thoroughly bewildered. Hence we always have to overcome a certain resistance before we can seriously set about disentangling the intricate web through patient work. But when at last we penetrate to its real meaning, we find ourselves deep in the dreamer's secrets and discover with astonishment that an apparently quite senseless dream is in the highest degree significant, and that in reality it speaks only of important and serious matters. This discovery compels rather more respect for the so-called superstition that dreams have a meaning, to which the rationalistic temper of our age has hitherto given short shrift.

As Freud says, dream-analysis is the via regia to the unconscious. It leads to the deepest personal secrets, and is therefore an invaluable instrument in the hand of the physician and educator of the soul.

26 [illegible] In the course of treatment the dreams [illegible] and in this way [illegible] people who have [illegible]

27 [illegible] morality his own, but falls into disunity [illegible] the other longs to be [illegible]

28 [illegible] fulfilment of [illegible] conflict with our moral [illegible]

[illegible] disregard [illegible] becomes [illegible] possess[illegible] [illegible] a [illegible]. [illegible] from the [illegible] of the [illegible] joy [illegible] they have become [illegible] [illegible] not [illegible] great resistances to reduce the [illegible] again. There are patients who [illegible] that [illegible] shadow side does not exist [illegible] have [illegible] they [illegible] that [illegible] things of unknown [illegible] moods, uncalled and [illegible] play on [illegible] a nervous catarrh [illegible] pains in various places, unreasonable [illegible] and a whole host of [illegible] symptoms.

18 Freudian [illegible] plans [illegible] [illegible]. The application [illegible] place in the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] any [illegible] [illegible] a view to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] where [illegible] where we are [illegible] men [illegible] [illegible] we can [illegible] understand [illegible] A [illegible] less [illegible] have [illegible] prone to [illegible] inflict upon our own natures.

19 The Freudian theory of repression [illegible] to say that there are [illegible] were [illegible] to repress their [illegible] natural [illegible]. [illegible] moral man who lives [illegible] be [illegible]. This is obviously not [illegible] as experience shows. Such a man can be just as [illegible] as any other. If we analyse him we [illegible] that [illegible] repressed. The neurotic [illegible] presents [illegible]

striking phrase, the picture of the "pale felon" who does not live up to his acts.

30 We can of course take the view that the repressed remnants of decency are in this case only a traditional hang-over from upbringing, which imposes an unnecessary check on the instinctual nature, and should therefore be eradicated. The principle of *écrasez l'infâme* would end in a theory of absolute libertinism. Naturally that would be quite fantastic and nonsensical. It should never be forgotten—and of this the Freudian school must be reminded—that morality was not brought down on tables of stone from Sinai and imposed on the people, but is a function of the human soul, as old as humanity itself. Morality is not imposed from outside; we have it in ourselves from the start—not the law, but our moral nature without which the collective life of human society would be impossible. That is why morality is found at all levels of society. It is the instinctive regulator of action which also governs the collective life of the herd. But moral laws are only valid within a compact human group. Beyond that, they cease. There the old truth runs: *Homo homini lupus*. With the growth of civilization we have succeeded in subjecting ever larger human groups to the rule of the same morality, without, however, having yet brought the moral code to prevail beyond the social frontiers, that is, in the free space between mutually independent societies. There, as of old, reign lawlessness and licence and mad immorality—though of course it is only the enemy who dares to say it out loud.

The Freudian school is so convinced of the fundamental and exclusive importance of sexuality in neurosis that it has drawn the logical conclusion and valiantly attacked the sexual morality of our day. This was beyond a doubt useful and necessary, for in this field notions were prevalent, and still prevail, which in view of the extremely complicated state of affairs are too undifferentiated. Just as in the early Middle Ages finance was held in contempt because there was as yet no differentiated financial morality, but only a mass morality, so today there is only a mass sexual morality. A girl who has an illegitimate child is condemned and nobody asks whether she is a decent human being or not. Any form of love not sanctioned by law is immoral, whether between worthwhile people or [illegible] it happened just as [illegible] was [illegible] therefore the devil.

33 [illegible] was [illegible]. It [illegible] I [illegible] I [illegible] as a [illegible] nature [illegible] consequences [illegible] but [illegible] pleasure.

35 [illegible] impudence of [illegible] with advancing years, admitted this lack of [illegible] in his [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] Jung [illegible] Vienna, 1926), Ch. V

After long doubts and vacillations we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, *Eros* and the destructive instinct. . . . The aim of the first of these basic instincts is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus—in short, to bind together; the aim of the second, on the contrary, is to undo connections and so to destroy things. . . . For this reason we also call it the *death instinct*.[5]

34 I must content myself with this passing reference, without entering more closely into the questionable nature of the conception. It is sufficiently obvious that life, like any other process, has a beginning and an end and that every beginning is also the beginning of the end. What Freud probably means is the essential fact that every process is a phenomenon of energy, and that all energy can only proceed from the tension of opposites.

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[5] *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. by James Strachey (London, 1949), pp. 5–6 (New York ed., p. 20). [Trans. from *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*, *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. XVII, London, 1941, pp. 70–71.]

III

THE OTHER POINT OF VIEW
THE WILL TO POWER

So far we have considered the problem of this new psychology essentially from the Freudian point of view. Undoubtedly it has shown us a very real truth to which our pride, our civilized consciousness may say no, though something else in us says yes. Many people find this an extremely irritating fact; it arouses their hostility or even their fear, and they are therefore unwilling to recognize the conflict. And indeed it is a frightening thought that man also has a shadow side to him, consisting not just of little weaknesses and foibles, but of a positively demonic dynamism. The individual seldom knows anything of this; to him, as an individual, it is incredible that he should ever in any circumstances go beyond himself. But let these harmless creatures form a mass, and there emerges a raging monster; and each individual is only one tiny cell in the monster's body, so that for better or worse he must accompany it on its bloody rampages and even assist it to the utmost. Having a dark suspicion of these grim possibilities, man turns a blind eye to the shadow-side of human nature. Blindly he strives against the salutary dogma of original sin, which is yet so prodigiously true. Yes, he even hesitates to admit the conflict of which he is so painfully aware. It can readily be understood that a [illegible] even if it be biased and exaggerated in this or that respect — which insists on this very side is unwelcome, not only [illegible] because it forces us to gaze into the bottomless [illegible] we cannot be whole without this negative side, that we have a body which, like all bodies, casts a shadow, and that if we deny this body we cease to be three-dimensional and become flat and without substance. Yet this body is a beast with a beast's soul, an organism that gives unquestioning obedience to instinct. To unite [illegible] that formed [illegible] ing on the [illegible]. Our [illegible] at the risk of disintegration [illegible] past [illegible].

36 This [illegible] Nietzsche [illegible] himself [illegible] the Superman [illegible] the tightrope walker [illegible] I was as Nietzsche [illegible] Zarathustra [illegible] that [illegible] a vision of the [illegible] the man [illegible] would not [illegible] dying [illegible] Zarathustra says. "Thy soul will be dead even sooner than thy body." And later the dwarf says to Zarathustra: "O Zarathustra, thou stone of wisdom! High didst thou throw thyself, but every stone that is thrown must fall! Condemned of thyself and to thine own stoning: O Zarathustra, far indeed threwest thou the stone, but upon thyself will it recoil!" And when he cried "Ecce Homo" over himself again, it was too late as before when this saying was uttered, and the crucifixion of the soul began before the body was dead.

37 We must take a very critical look at the [illegible] of a man whose [illegible] the effects of his teaching on his followers [illegible]. When we scrutinize his life with this aim in view we are bound to admit that Nietzsche [illegible] instinct, in the [illegible] heights of heroic [illegible], [illegible] he could maintain himself only with the [illegible] most careful diet, a special climate, and many doses of opiates to sleep, until the tension shattered his brain. He talks of yea-saying and lived nay-saying. His loathing for [illegible] the human animal that lived by instinct was too great. [illegible] he could not swallow the toad he so often dreamed of and which he feared had to be swallowed. The roaring of the Zarathustrian lion drove back into the cave of the unconscious all the "higher" men who were clamouring to live. Therefore his life does not convince us of his teaching. For the "higher" man wants to be able to sleep without chloral, to live in Naumburg and Basel despite "fogs and shadows." He desires wife and offspring, standing and esteem among the herd, innumerable commonplace realities, and not least those of the Philistine. Nietzsche failed to live

this [illegible] the [illegible] greatness and [illegible]

38 He was [illegible] Nietzsche [illegible] be accused of having denied his instinct [illegible] He would scarcely have agreed [illegible] He [illegible] even [illegible] without [illegible] that he lived his [illegible] sense [illegible] possible, we may ask [illegible] drive him [illegible] from [illegible] We [illegible] desires. [illegible] preserva[illegible] species [illegible] preserv[illegible]

39 [illegible] Nietzsche [illegible] What [illegible] is [illegible] that other [illegible]

40 The case [illegible] Nietzsche [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] hand the [illegible] Christianity [illegible] Nietzsche [illegible] nature very [illegible] whole[illegible]ness [illegible] good and evil [illegible] with [illegible] be- yond good and evil.[1]

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[1] Compare Jung, "The Role of the [illegible]"

41 The psychological observer knows this state as identification with the shadow, a phenomenon which occurs with great regularity at such moments of collision with the unconscious. The only thing that helps here is cautious self-criticism. Firstly, and before all else, it is exceedingly unlikely that one has just discovered a world-shattering truth, for such things happen extremely seldom in the world's history. Secondly, one must carefully inquire whether something similar might not have happened elsewhere—for instance Nietzsche, as a philologist, could have adduced a few obvious classical parallels, which would certainly have calmed his mind. Thirdly, one must reflect that a Dionysian experience may well be nothing more than a relapse into a pagan form of religion, and that in reality nothing new is discovered, but the same story only repeats itself. [illegible] the [illegible] one cannot avoid [illegible] that this [illegible] intensification [illegible] heroic and godlike heights, is [illegible] to be followed by an equally deep plunge into the abyss. These considerations would put one in a position of advantage: the whole extravaganza would then be reduced to the proportions of a somewhat exhausting mountaineering expedition, [illegible] succeeds the [illegible] commonplaces [illegible]. Just as every stream seeks the valley, and the big river hastens towards the flat lands, so [illegible] only flows along [illegible] commonplaces, but makes everything else commonplace. The [illegible] when it is not to end in catastrophe, may steal in alongside the commonplace, [illegible] often. If it [illegible] becomes [illegible] and the [illegible] leads to [illegible] or both. Nietzsche [illegible] in a state [illegible] tension. But with this [illegible] as well [illegible] up [illegible] Nietzsche's answer [illegible] the question of the [illegible] least [illegible] is a [illegible]. An [illegible] the [illegible] neither more nor less. We [illegible] other [illegible] but [illegible] passes the [illegible] own [illegible] and [illegible] from [illegible] point of view [illegible] as the ex[illegible] pre[illegible] whose [illegible] and free will can [illegible] themselves [illegible] from their [illegible]. It is the [illegible] specialist [illegible] culture that a [illegible] spirit [illegible]. Man [illegible] culture [illegible]. The [illegible] culture and

[illegible] is always a question of [illegible] more or less, never of either-or.

11 The case of Nietzsche faces us with the question: What did he [illegible] the will to power, several [illegible]. Is it to be regarded as [illegible] a symptom of repression? Is the will to power genuine or merely secondary? If the [illegible] with the shadow and let loose a flood of sexual impulses, the [illegible] would be perfectly clear. But it happened otherwise. The [illegible] was not [illegible] but the power [illegible] we would have to conclude that what was repressed was [illegible] but the will to power. There is in my opinion no ground for [illegible] genuine and the will to power [illegible]. The will to power is surely just as mighty [illegible]

45 As [illegible] Nietzsche [illegible] end with a [illegible] [illegible] for power cannot simply be explained away as bogus. Otherwise one would make [illegible] the same [illegible] judgment that Nietzsche passed in his pamphlet [illegible] Wagner: "Everything about him is false. What is genuine is hidden or decorated. He is an actor in every good and bad sense of the word." Why this prejudice? Because Wagner [illegible] that [illegible] sentimental [illegible] which Nietzsche [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of equal [illegible] [illegible] In the first part of Faust [illegible] what [illegible] to accept [illegible] and [illegible] All [illegible] and [illegible] that is [illegible] there is an [illegible] present [illegible]

but [illegible] we discover [illegible] is indeed [illegible] a [illegible] than [illegible] deeds and [illegible] the things that are disagreeable [illegible] us. In this way we can see [illegible] the beam [illegible] and declare war on him to our [illegible]. Hence those endless and [illegible] of which the history of [illegible] has preserved some fine examples. A particularly transparent example is that afforded by *Nietzsche contra Wagner* [illegible] Parsifal [illegible] By this ingenious device a man may save himself from the Faustian catastrophe before which his courage and his strength might well fail him. A whole man, however, knows that his bitterest foe, or indeed a host of enemies, does not equal that one worst adversary, the "other self" who dwells in his bosom. Nietzsche had Wagner *in himself*, and that is why he envied him *Parsifal*; but, what was worse, he, Saul, also had Paul in him. Therefore Nietzsche became one stigmatized by the spirit; like Saul he had to experience conversion when the "other" whispered the "Ecce Homo" in his ear. Who "broke down before the cross"—Wagner or Nietzsche?

44 Far [illegible] one of Freud's earliest disciples, Alfred Adler,* [illegible] built up a theory of neurosis based exclusively on the power principle. It is of no little interest, and [illegible] to see how [illegible] the same things [illegible]. To take the main contrast first: with Freud everything follows from antecedent circumstances according to a rigid causality, with Adler everything is a teleological "arrangement." Here is a simple example: A young woman begins to have attacks of anxiety. At night she wakes up from a nightmare with a blood-curdling cry, is scarcely able to calm herself, clings to her husband and implores him not to leave her, demanding assurance that he really loves her, etc. Gradually a nervous asthma develops, the attacks also coming on during the day.

45 The Freudian method at once begins burrowing into the inner causality of the illness and its symptoms. What were the first anxiety dreams about? Fierce bulls, lions, tigers, and evil men were attacking her. What are the patient's associations? A story of something that happened to her before she was married. She was staying at a health resort in the mountains. She

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* *The Neurotic Constitution* (London, 1921).

passed a good deal of time, and the usual flirtations were made. There was a young Italian who played a piano fairly well and also knew how to handle a guitar. An innocent flirtation developed, leading once to a moonlight stroll. On this occasion the Italian temperament unexpectedly broke loose, to the alarm of the unsuspecting girl. He gave her such a look as she could never forget. It follows her even in her dreams: the wild animal that pursues her looks at her just like that. But was it in fact only from the Italian that this look came? Another reminiscence is instructive. The patient had lost her father through an accident when she was about fourteen years old. Her father was a man of the world and travelled a good deal. Not long before his death he took her with him to Paris, where they visited, among other places, the Folies Bergère. There something happened that made an indelible impression on her. On leaving the theatre a painted hussy jostled her father in an incredibly brazen way. Looking in alarm to see what her father would do, she saw this same look, this animal glare, in his eyes. This inexplicable something followed her day and night. From then on her relations with her father changed. Sometimes she was irritable and subject to venomous moods, sometimes she loved him extravagantly. Then came sudden fits of weeping for no reason, and for a time, whenever her father was at home, she suffered from a horrible gulping at table, accompanied by what looked like choking fits, generally followed by loss of voice for one or two days. When the news of the sudden death of her father reached her, she was seized by uncontrollable grief, which gave way to fits of hysterical laughter. However, she soon calmed down, her condition quickly improved, and the neurotic symptoms practically vanished. A veil of forgetfulness was drawn over the past. Only the episode with the Italian stirred something in her of which she was afraid. She then abruptly broke off all connection with the young man. A few years later she married. The first appearance of her present neurosis was after the birth of her second child, just when she made the discovery that her husband had a certain tender interest in another woman.

This story gives rise to many questions: for instance, what about the mother? Concerning the mother the relevant facts are that she was very nervous and spent her time trying every kind of sanatorium and medical treatment. She too suffered from nervous asthma and anxiety symptoms. The marriage had been of a very distant kind as far back as the patient could remember. Her mother did not understand the father properly; the patient always had the feeling that she understood him much better. She was her father's confessed darling and was correspondingly cool at heart towards her mother.

47 These hints may suffice to give us an overall picture of the illness. Behind the present symptoms lie fantasies which are intimately related to the experience with the Italian, but which clearly point back to the father, whose unhappy marriage gave the little daughter an early opportunity to secure for herself the place that should properly have been filled by the mother. Behind this conquest there lies, of course, the fantasy of being the really suitable wife for the father. The first attack of neurosis broke out at a moment when this fantasy received a severe shock, probably the same shock that the mother had also received, though this would be unknown to the child. The symptoms are easily understandable as an expression of disappointed and slighted love. The choking is due to that feeling of constriction in the throat, a well-known concomitant of violent affects which cannot quite be "swallowed down." (The metaphors of common speech, as we know, frequently relate to such physiological phenomena.) When the father died, her conscious mind was grieved to death, but her shadow laughed, after the manner of Till Eulenspiegel, who was doleful when things went downhill, but full of merry pranks on the weary way up, always on the lookout for what lay ahead. When her father was at home, she was dejected and ill; when he was away, she always felt much better, like the innumerable husbands and wives who hide from each other the sweet secret that neither is altogether indispensable to the other.

48 That the [illegible] nature were justified [illegible] for laughing is shown by the subsequent period of good health. She succeeded in letting her whole past sink into oblivion. Only the episode with the Italian remained as a reminder of the underworld. But with a quick gesture she flung the door to and remained healthy. [illegible] the unconscious came creeping back, just when she seemed [illegible] safely over the mountain in the perfect state, so to speak, of wife and mother.

[illegible] the cause of the neurosis lies in the [illegible] that she [illegible] discovered [illegible] something [illegible] had previously [illegible] connection [illegible] were [illegible] revealed by the [illegible] experience [illegible] the immediate cause of the neurosis. We [illegible] say that the content of and reason for the neurosis was the conflict between the [illegible] [illegible] love for her husband.

[illegible] we look at the same clinical picture from the [illegible] the will to power, it [illegible] power. The [illegible] The [illegible] of the [illegible] an [illegible] attempt of the [illegible] over the [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] Already [illegible] [illegible] out of [illegible] gaining [illegible] of her father's [illegible] We are inclined to regard such an [illegible] a moment and ask [illegible] whose purpose is [illegible] And [illegible] about the [illegible]

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we [illegible] overlook things which would show [illegible] in a less favourable light.

51 The patient then had a [illegible] fit at the [illegible] of her father, where she had finally arrived on foot. It was an hyste[illegible] [illegible] a psychogenic symptom [illegible] its own [illegible] and [illegible] those of the conscious [illegible]. It [illegible] a difference not to be [illegible] of and [illegible] when [illegible] and now certain [illegible] arise. The [illegible] went [illegible] in modern parlance [illegible] where the counterparts of our conscious [illegible] have long been [illegible]. Hence for [illegible] we wish to know nothing of our unconscious [illegible] is the [illegible] of [illegible] is the [illegible]. But alas, it fares with us as with Brother Medardus in Hoffmann's tale *The Devil's Elixir*: somewhere we have a sinister and frightful brother, our own flesh-and-blood counterpart, who holds and maliciously hoards everything that we would so willingly hide under the table.

52 The first outbreak of neurosis in our patient occurred at the moment she realized that there was something in her father which she could not dominate. And then a great light dawned: she now knew what was the purpose of her mother's nervousness, namely, that when you encounter an obstacle which cannot be overcome by rational methods and charm, there is still another method, hitherto unknown to her, which her mother had [illegible]. So from now on she imitates her mother's neurosis. But what, we may ask, is the use of a neurosis? What does it do? Anyone who has in his neighbourhood had a decent case of neurosis knows enough what it can "do." There is no better method of tyrannizing over the entire household. Heart attacks, [illegible] fits, spasms of all kinds produce an enormous effect that can hardly be surpassed. Oceans of sympathy are let loose, there is the anguish of worried parents, the running to and fro of servants, [illegible] doctors, [illegible] diagnoses, elaborate examinations, lengthy treatments, heavy expenses, and there in the midst of all the hubbub lies the innocent sufferer, who [illegible] everything with gratitude when at last he recovers from his spasms.

53 This [illegible] arrangement—to use Adler's expres-

[illegible] and [illegible] wherever [illegible] was [illegible] father [illegible] was [illegible] on her [illegible] But when a [illegible] loved and [illegible] of wife and [illegible] So long as her reserved [illegible] was [illegible] exercising went [illegible] her husband had a [illegible] of interests [illegible] she [illegible] to that [illegible] exercise of her power because [illegible] had escaped her mastery.

[illegible] It is [illegible] the point of view of power [illegible] counsel for the one party [illegible] when I perceive [illegible] party [illegible] and said, "You have [illegible] I perceive [illegible] in excess [illegible]

[illegible] While [illegible] point of view is [illegible] as [illegible] and [illegible] reconciled to the second.

IV

THE PROBLEM OF THE ATTITUDE-TYPE

I

56 The incompatibility of the two theories discussed in the preceding chapters requires a standpoint superordinate to both, in which they could come together in unison. We are certainly not entitled to decide in favour of the one or the other, however convenient this expedient might be. For if we examine the two theories without prejudice, we cannot deny that both contain significant truths, and, contradictory as these are, they should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. The Freudian theory is attractively simple, so much so that it almost pains one if anybody drives in the wedge of a contrary assertion. But the same is true of Adler's theory. It too is of illuminating simplicity and explains as much as the Freudian theory. No wonder, then, that the adherents of both schools obstinately cling to their one-sided truths. For humanly understandable reasons they are unwilling to give up a beautiful, rounded theory in exchange for a paradox, or, worse still, lose themselves in the confusion of contradictory points of view.

57 Now, since both theories are in a large measure correct—that is to say, since they both appear to explain their material—it follows that a neurosis must have two opposite aspects, one of which is grasped by the Freudian, the other by the Adlerian theory. But how comes it that each investigator sees only one side, and why does each maintain that he has the only valid view? It must come from the fact that, owing to his psychological peculiarity, each investigator most readily sees that factor in the neurosis which corresponds to his peculiarity. It cannot be assumed that the cases of neurosis seen by Adler are totally different from those seen by Freud. Both are obviously working with the same material; but because of personal peculiarities

[illegible]

58 [illegible]

59 [illegible] desire for pleasure.

60 This difference can hardly be anything else but a difference of temperament, a contrast between two types of human mentality, one of which finds the determining agency pre-eminently in the subject, the other in the object. A middle view, it may be that of common sense, would suppose that human behaviour is conditioned as much by the subject as by the object. The two investigators would probably assert that their theory does not envisage a psychological explanation of the normal man, but is a theory of neurosis. But in that case Freud would have to explain and treat some of his patients along Adlerian lines, and Adler condescend to give earnest consideration in certain instances to his former teacher's point of view—which has occurred neither on the one side nor on the other.

61 The spectacle of this dilemma made me ponder the question: are there at least two different human types, one of them more interested in the object, the other more interested in himself? And does that explain why the one sees only the one and the other only the other, and thus each arrives at quite different conclusions? As we have said, it was hardly to be supposed that fate selected the patients so methodically that a definite group invariably reached a definite doctor. For some time it had struck me, in connection with myself and with my colleagues, that there are some cases which make a distinct appeal to one, while others somehow refuse to click. It is of crucial importance for the treatment whether a good relationship between doctor and patient is possible or not. If some measure of natural confidence does not develop within a short period, then the patient will do better to choose another doctor. I myself have never shrunk from recommending to a colleague a patient whose peculiarities were not in my line or were unsympathetic to me, and indeed this is in the patient's own interests. I am positive that in such a case I would not do good work. Everyone has his personal limitations, and the psychotherapist especially is well advised never to disregard them. Excessive personal differences and incompatibilities cause resistances that are disproportionate and not altogether unjustified. The Freud-Adler controversy is simply a paradigm and one single instance among many possible attitude-types.

62 I have long busied myself with this question and have finally, on the basis of numerous observations and experiences, come to postulate two fundamental attitudes, namely introversion and extraversion. The first attitude is normally characterized by a hesitant, reflective, retiring nature that keeps itself to itself, shrinks from objects, is always slightly on the defensive and prefers to hide behind mistrustful scrutiny. The second is normally characterized by an outgoing, candid, and accommodating nature that adapts easily to a given situation, quickly forms attachments, and, setting aside any possible misgivings, will often venture forth with careless confidence into unknown situations. In the first case obviously the subject, and in the second the object, is all-important.

63 Naturally these remarks sketch the two types only in the roughest outlines.[1] As a matter of empirical fact, the two attitudes, to which I shall come back shortly, can seldom be observed in their pure state. They are infinitely varied and compensated, so that often the types are not at all easy to establish. The reason for the variation—apart from individual fluctuations—is the predominance of one of the conscious functions, such as thinking or feeling, which then gives the basic attitude a special character. There are, besides, compensations of the basic type, which generally come from experiences which have taught a man perhaps in a very painful way that he cannot give free rein to his nature. In other cases, for instance in neurotics, one does not know whether one is dealing with a conscious or an unconscious attitude, because, owing to the dissociation of the personality, sometimes one half of it and sometimes the other is uppermost, and this confuses one's judgment. That is what makes it so excessively trying to live with neurotic persons.

64 The actually existent and far-reaching type differences, of which I have described eight groups[2] in the above-mentioned

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[1] A comprehensive study of the type problem is to be found in my *Psychological Types*, Coll. Works, Vol. 6.

[2] Namely, [illegible] the existing types. Further points of difference are age, sex, environment, and level of development. My typology is based on the four orienting functions of consciousness: thinking, feeling, sensation, intuition. [illegible] See bibliography [illegible] here cited by date of [illegible] —EDITORS.]

think associated [illegible] with [illegible] [illegible] type [illegible].

59 It is also very [illegible] the [illegible] above the opposites and [illegible] create a theory [illegible] not [illegible] of the [illegible] side but [illegible] this [illegible] the [illegible] reason [illegible] that [illegible] founded [illegible] heroic [illegible] of feeling [illegible] deep [illegible] some [illegible] reality [illegible] appeared to [illegible] as these [illegible] should they be so [illegible] which [illegible] [illegible] knife [illegible] what [illegible] and [illegible] This was what Nietzsche wanted [illegible] which he [illegible] the soul of humanity [illegible] times [illegible] had of a great [illegible] the human soul. [illegible] Nietzsche's phrase has [illegible] been [illegible] part of a [illegible] are [illegible] of great [illegible] measured to the [illegible] case [illegible] and [illegible] in the world that [illegible] the power [illegible] when there [illegible] that [illegible] destroyed [illegible] been [illegible] that [illegible]

60 Both [illegible] to [illegible] with no all consequences [illegible] like [illegible] they are [illegible] to the [illegible] requires an [illegible] appear these [illegible] advantage [illegible] of [illegible] the [illegible] power [illegible] things. Anyone who wishes to get a vivid impression of how irresponsibly a psychologizing [illegible] his subject from narrow [illegible] should turn to the writings of Möbius on Nietzsche, [illegible] the various "psychiatric" writings [illegible] case of [illegible] He [illegible] for patients who [illegible] "understanding."

61 It [illegible] not conscious [illegible] they are [illegible] as it were [illegible]

are lesti[illegible] relative [illegible] You are [illegible] that [illegible] I [illegible] exp[illegible] [illegible] here and [illegible] there [illegible] or that. I [illegible] be [illegible] to assert that this reduction is w[illegible] in a given case, but exalted to the status of a general explanation of the [illegible] psyche [illegible] a reductive theory by itself is impossible. [illegible] of beauty [illegible] certainly always [illegible] psyche is [illegible] together. It is [illegible] A man seems only half understood when [illegible] everything in him came into being. [illegible] as we[illegible] been dead years. As a living being [illegible] is not understood, for life does not have only a yesterday, nor is it explained by reducing today to yesterday. Life has also a tomorrow, and today is understood only when we can add to our knowledge of what was yesterday the beginnings of tomorrow. This is true of all life's psychological expressions, even of pathological symptoms. The symptoms of a neurosis are not simply the effects of long-past causes, whether [illegible] sexuality [illegible] power; they are also attempts at a new synthesis of life [illegible] successful attempts [illegible] nevertheless, with a core of value and meaning. They are seeds that fail to sprout owing to the inclement conditions of inner and outer nature.

68 The reader will [illegible] ask: What in the world is the value and meaning of a neurosis [illegible] curse of humanity? [illegible] As much good, possibly, as flies and [illegible] pests [illegible] the good [illegible] natural science, it may yet be wise enough from the point of view of psychology, if we here substitute [illegible] for [illegible] pests. Even Nietzsche [illegible] more than [illegible] I myself have known more than one person who owed his whole usefulness and reason for existence to a neurosis which prevented all the worst follies in his life and

[illegible] ideas [illegible] something that [illegible] developed [illegible] valuable potentialities. These [illegible] have been stifled and that the neurosis will [illegible] bring up [illegible] than [illegible] the place where he belonged [illegible] are [illegible] the meaning of them [illegible] their true significance in [illegible] in the conscious mind is nothing but [illegible] and error. With [illegible] the case is reversed [illegible] neurosis has a different meaning. In these cases, but not in the former, a thoroughgoing reduction is indicated.

69 At this point the reader may be inclined to grant the possibility that the neurosis has such a meaning in certain cases, while denying it so far-reaching a purposiveness in ordinary everyday cases. What, for instance, could be the value of a neurosis in the above-mentioned case of asthma, with its hysterical anxiety states? I admit that the value is not so obvious here, especially when the case is considered from the theoretical reductive standpoint, that is, from the shadow-side of individual development.

70 The two theories we have been discussing evidently have this much in common: they pitilessly unveil everything that belongs to man's shadow-side. They are theories or, more correctly, hypotheses which explain in what the pathogenic factor consists. They are accordingly concerned not with a man's positive values, but with his negative values, which make themselves so disturbingly conspicuous.

71 A "value" is a possibility for the display of energy. But in so far as a negative value is likewise a possibility for the display of energy, which can be seen most clearly in the notable display of neurotic energy—it too is properly a "value." But [illegible] possible useless and harmful manifestations of energy. Energy in itself is neither good nor bad, neither useful nor harmful, but neutral, since everything depends on the form into which energy passes. Form gives energy its quality. On the other hand, mere form without energy is equally neutral. For the creation of a real value, therefore, both energy and valuable form are needed. In neurosis psychic energy[1] is present, but undoubtedly in an inferior and unserviceable form. Both the reductive theories act as solvents of this inferior form. They are approved caustic remedies by means of which we

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[1] [I refer the reader to my essay "On Psychic Energy," Coll. Works, Vol. 8.]

energy

drawn into the neurotic energy. Now it has hitherto been supposed that this newly disengaged energy would become at the disposal of the patient so that he can apply it at his pleasure. Since it was thought that the energy is nothing but the instinctual power of sex, people talked of a sublimation of this energy, on the assumption that the patient could, with the help of analysis, canalize the sexual energy into a "sublimation"—in other words, could apply it non-sexually, in the practice of an art, perhaps, or in some other good or useful activity. According to this view, it is possible for the patient, from free choice or inclination, to achieve the sublimation of his instinctual forces.

70 We may allow that this view has a certain justification in so far as man is at all capable of marking out a definite line along which his life shall run. But we know that there is no human foresight or wisdom that can prescribe direction to our life, except for small stretches of the way. This is, of course, true only of the "ordinary" type of life, not of the "heroic" type. The latter kind also exists, though it is much rarer. Here we certainly may not say that no marked direction can be given to life, or only for short distances. The heroic conduct of life is absolute—that is, it is determined by fateful decisions, and the decision to go in a certain direction holds sometimes right to the bitter end. Admittedly the doctor has to do in the main only with human beings, and seldom with heroes; and then they are mostly of a type whose heroism is an infantile defiance of a fate greater than they, or a pompously inflated pose to cover up some hurtful insufficiency. In this overpoweringly banal existence of ours there is little that is extraordinary that is healthy, and there is not much room for conspicuous heroism. Not that heroic demands are never put to us: on the contrary—and this is just what is so irritating and irksome—the banal everyday makes banal demands upon our patience, our devotion, perseverance, self-sacrifice; and for us to fulfil these demands, as we must, humbly and without making any grandiose gestures, a heroism is needed that cannot be seen from the outside. It does not glitter, is not praised, and always seeks concealment in everyday dress. These are the demands which, if not fulfilled, are the cause of neuroses. In order to evade them, many a man has made a bold decision about his life and carried it through, even if in the common human estimation

it was a great error. Before a face such as this one can only bow one's head. But as I say, such cases are rare; the others are in the vast majority. For them the direction of their life is not a simple straight line; [illegible] confronts them like an intricate [illegible] all [illegible] possibilities, and yet of these many possibilities only one is their own real way. Who would presume, even though armed with the completest knowledge of his own character, to designate in advance that single possibility? Much indeed can be attained by the will, but in view of the fate of certain markedly strong-willed personalities, it is a fundamental error to try to [illegible] at all costs to our will. Our will is a function regulated by reflection; hence it is dependent on the quality of that reflection. [illegible] supposes [illegible] the rational [illegible] reason. But [illegible] ever been shown or will ever be [illegible] reason that they too are at all rational? We have on the contrary good grounds for supposing that they are irrational, or rather that in the last resort they are grounded beyond human reason. The irrationality of events is shown in what we call chance, which we are obviously compelled to deny, because we cannot in principle think of a process that is not causal and necessary, whence it follows that it cannot happen by chance. In practice, however, chance reigns everywhere, and so obtrusively that we might just as well put our causal philosophy in our pocket. The plenitude of life is governed by law and yet not governed by law, rational and yet irrational. Hence [illegible] the will that is grounded in reason are valid only up to a point. The further we go in the direction selected by reason, the surer we may be that we are excluding the irrational possibilities of life which have just as much right to be lived. It was indeed highly expedient for man to become somewhat capable of directing his life. It may justly be maintained that the acquisition of reason is the greatest achievement of humanity; but that is not to say that things must or will always continue in that direction. The terrible catastrophe of the World War [illegible]

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* M[illegible] had [illegible] that [illegible] I had [illegible] of the [illegible] New York [illegible]

a very thick line through the calculations of even the most optimistic rationalizers of culture. In 1913 Ostwald wrote:

> The whole world is agreed that the present state of armed peace is untenable and is gradually becoming impossible. It demands immense sacrifices from each single nation, far exceeding the expenditure for cultural purposes, yet without securing any positive values. If mankind could discover ways and means of doing away with these preparations for wars which never take place, together with the conscription of a large part of the nations that are at the age of maximum strength and efficiency for the purposes of war, and the arms, and all the other countless evils which the present state of affairs creates, such an immense economy of energy would be effected that from this moment we could look forward to a blossoming of culture never yet dreamed of. For war, like private combat, is the most primitive means of settling conflicts of will, [illegible], and entails the most grievous waste of energy. Hence the complete abolition of warfare potential no less than of actual warfare is the categorical imperative of efficiency and one of the supremely important cultural tasks of our day.[6]

73 The irrationality of fate, however, did not concur with the rationality of well-meaning thinkers. It ordained not only the destruction of the accumulated arms and armies but, far beyond that, a mad and monstrous devastation, a mass murder without parallel—from which humanity may possibly draw the conclusion that only one side of fate can be mastered with rational intentions.

74 What is true of humanity in general is also true of each individual, for humanity consists only of individuals. And as is the psychology of humanity, so also is the psychology of the individual. The World War brought a terrible reckoning with the rational intentions of civilization. What is called "will" in the individual is called imperialism in nations. For all will is a demonstration of power over fate, i.e., the exclusion of chance. Civilization is the rational, "purposeful" sublimation of free energies, brought about by will and intention. It is the same with the individual; and just as the idea of a world civilization received a fearful correction at the hands of war, so the individual must often learn in his life that so-called "disposable" energies are not his to dispose.

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[6] Wilhelm Ostwald, *Die Philosophie der Werte* (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 312f.

70 Once an American—I was consulted by a business man of about forty-five, whose case is a good illustration of what has been said. He was a typical American self-made man who had worked his way up from the bottom. He had been very successful, and had founded an enormous business. He had also succeeded in organizing it in such a way that he was able to think of retiring. Two years before I saw him he had actually retired. Till then he had lived entirely for his business and concentrated all his energies upon it with the incredible intensity and one-sidedness peculiar to successful American business men. He had acquired a splendid estate where he thought of "living," by which he meant horses, automobiles, golf, tennis, parties, and what not. But he had reckoned without his host. The energies which should have been at his disposal would not enter into these alluring prospects, but went capering off in quite another direction. A few weeks after the inauguration of the longed-for life of bliss, he began brooding over peculiar, vague sensations in his body, and a few weeks more sufficed to plunge him into a state of extreme hypochondria. He had a complete nervous collapse. From a healthy man of uncommon physical strength and abounding energy he became a peevish child. That was the end of all his glories. He fell from one state of anxiety into another and worried himself almost to death with hypochondriacal fancies. He then consulted a famous specialist, who recognized at once that there was nothing wrong with the man but lack of work. The patient saw the sense of this, and returned to his former position. But to his immense disappointment no interest in the business could be aroused. Neither patience nor resolution was of any use. His energy could not by any means be forced back into the business. His condition naturally became worse than before. All that had formerly been living, creative energy in him now turned against him with terrible destructiveness. His creative genius rose up, as it were, in revolt against him; and just as he had formerly built up great organizations in the world, so now his demon spun equally subtle systems of hypochondriacal delusion that completely annihilated him. When I saw him he was already a hopeless moral ruin. Nevertheless I tried to make clear to him that, though such a gigantic energy could be withdrawn from the business, the question remained: where should it go? The finest horses, the

fastest cars and the most amusing places may very likely serve to allure the energy. [illegible] it would be legitimate enough to think that a man who had devoted his whole life to serious work had a sort of natural right to enjoy himself. Yes, if fate had behaved in a human, rational way, it would certainly be so: first work, then well-earned rest. But fate behaves irrationally, and the energy of life inconveniently demands a gradient acceptable to itself; otherwise it simply gets dammed up and turns destructive. It regresses to former situations—in the case of this man, to the memory of a syphilitic infection contracted twenty-five years before. Yet even this was only a stage on the way to the resuscitation of infantile reminiscences which had almost vanished in the meantime. It was the original relation to his mother that mapped the course of his symptoms: they were an arrangement whose purpose it was to compel the attention and interest of his long-dead mother. Nor was this stage the last, for the ultimate goal was to drive him back, as it were, into his own body, after he had lived since his youth only in his head. He had differentiated one side of his being; the other side remained in an inert physical state. He would have needed this "descent" in order to "live." The hypochondriacal depression pushed him down into the body he had always overlooked. Had he been able to follow the direction indicated by his depression and hypochondriacal illusion, and make himself conscious of the fantasies which proceed from such a condition, that would have been the road to salvation. My arguments naturally met with no response, as was to be expected. A case so far advanced can only be cared for until death; it can hardly be cured.

70 This example clearly shows that it does not lie in our power to transfer "disposable" energy at will to a rationally chosen object. The same is true in general of the apparently disposable energy which is set free when we have destroyed its unserviceable forms through the corrosive of the reductive analysis. This energy, as we have said, can at best be applied voluntarily for only a short time. But in most cases it refuses to seize hold, for any length of time, of the possibilities rationally presented to it. Psychic energy is a very fastidious thing which insists on fulfilment of its own conditions. However much energy may be present, we cannot make it serviceable until we have succeeded in finding the right gradient.

77 This possession of the gradient is an enormous practical problem which crops up in most analyses. For instance, when in a favourable case the disposable energy, the so-called libido,* does seize on a rational object, we think we have brought about the transformation through conscious exertion of the will. But in that we are deluded, because even the most strenuous exertions would not have sufficed had there not been present at the same time a gradient in that direction. How important the gradient is can be seen in cases when, despite the most desperate exertions and despite the fact that the object chosen or the form desired impresses everyone with its reasonableness, the transformation still refuses to take place, and all that happens is a new repression.

78 It has become abundantly clear to me that life can flow forward only along the path of the gradient. But there is no energy unless there is a tension of opposites; hence it is necessary to discover the opposite to the attitude of the conscious mind. It is interesting to see how this compensation by opposites also plays its part in the historical theories of neurosis: Freud's theory espoused Eros, Adler's the will to power. Logically, the opposite of love is hate, and of Eros, Phobos (fear); but psychologically it is the will to power. Where love reigns, there is no will to power; and where the will to power is paramount, love is lacking. The one is but the shadow of the other: the man who adopts the standpoint of Eros finds his compensatory opposite

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* From the foregoing it will have become clear to the reader that the term "libido," [illegible] and used by him for practical usage, is used by me in a much wider sense. I use it to mean psychic energy, which is equivalent to the intensity with which psychic contents are charged. Freud, in accordance with his theoretical assumptions, identifies libido with Eros and tries to distinguish it from psychic energy in general, for he says: [illegible] [illegible] p. [illegible]: "We have defined the concept of libido as a quantitatively variable force which could serve as a measure of processes and transformations occurring in the field of sexual excitation. We distinguish this libido in respect of its special origin from the energy which must be supposed to underlie mental processes in general." Elsewhere Freud remarks that in respect of the destructive instinct he lacks "a term analogous to libido." Since the so-called destructive instinct is also a phenomenon of energy, [illegible] as sheer psychic energy. [illegible] "On Psychic Energy," [illegible] pars. 4ff. [illegible] pp. [illegible]

in the will to power, and that of the man who puts the accent on power is Eros. Seen from the one-sided point of view of the conscious attitude, the shadow is an inferior component of the personality and is consequently repressed through intensive resistance. But the repressed content must be made conscious so as to produce a tension of opposites, without which no forward movement is possible. The conscious mind is on top, the shadow underneath, and just as high always longs for low and hot for cold, so all consciousness, perhaps without being aware of it, seeks its unconscious opposite, lacking which it is doomed to stagnation, congestion, and ossification. Life is born only of the spark of opposites.

79 It was a concession to intellectual logic on the one hand and to psychological prejudice on the other that impelled Freud to name the opposite of Eros the destructive or death instinct. For in the first place, Eros is not equivalent to life; but for anyone who thinks it is, the opposite of Eros will naturally appear to be death. And in the second place, we all feel that the opposite of our own highest principle must be purely destructive, deadly, and evil. We refuse to endow it with any positive life-force, hence we avoid and fear it.

80 As I have already indicated, there are many highest principles both of life and of philosophy, and accordingly there are just as many different forms of compensation by opposites. Earlier on I singled out the two—as it seems to me—main opposite types, which I have called introverted and extraverted. William James[1] had already been struck by the existence of these types among thinkers. He distinguished them as "tender-minded" and "tough-minded." Similarly Ostwald[2] found an analogous distinction between classical and romantic types among men of learning. So I am not alone in my idea of types, to mention only these two well-known names among many others. Historical researches have shown me that not a few of the great spiritual controversies rest upon the opposition of the two types. The most significant case of this kind is the opposition between nominalism and realism, which beginning with the difference between the Platonic and Megaric schools became the heritage of scholastic philosophy, where it is Abelard's great merit to

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[1] *Pragmatism* (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1907).

[2] *Grosse Männer* (Leipzig, 1910).

[illegible] ed at least one attempt to unite the two opposed standpoints, it has [illegible].* This controversy has continued right into our own day, as is shown in the opposition between idealism and materialism. And again, not only the human mind in general, but each individual has a share in this opposition of types. It has come to light on closer investigation that either type has a predilection to marry its opposite, each being unconsciously complementary to the other. The reflective nature of the introvert causes him always to think and consider before acting. This naturally makes him slow to act. His shyness and distrust of things induces hesitation, and so he always has difficulty in adapting to the external world. Conversely the extravert has a positive relation to things. He is, so to speak, attracted by them. New, unknown situations fascinate him. In order to make closer acquaintance with the unknown he will jump into it with both feet. As a rule he acts first and thinks afterwards. Thus his action is swift, subject to no misgivings and hesitations. The two types therefore seem created for a symbiosis. The one takes care of reflection and the other sees to the initiative and practical action. When the two types marry they may effect an ideal union. So long as they are fully occupied with their adaptation to the manifold external needs of life they fit together admirably. But when the man has made enough money, or if a fine legacy should drop from the skies and external necessities no longer press, then they have time to occupy themselves with one another. Hitherto they stood back to back and defended themselves against necessity. But now they turn face to face and look for understanding—only to discover that they have never understood one another. Each speaks a different language. Then the conflict between the two types begins. This struggle is envenomed, brutal, full of mutual depreciation, even when conducted quietly and in the greatest intimacy. For the value of the one is the negation of value for the other. It might reasonably be supposed that each, conscious of his own value, would peaceably recognize the other's value, and that in this way any conflict would be superfluous. I have seen a good number of cases where this line of argument was adopted, without, however, arriving at a satisfactory goal. Where it is a question of normal people, such critical periods of transition will be overcome fairly smoothly. By "normal" I mean a person who can somehow exist under all circumstances which afford him the minimum needs of life. But many people cannot do this; hence not so very many people are normal. What we commonly mean by a "normal" person is actually an ideal person whose happy blend of character is a rare occurrence. By far the greater number of more or less differentiated persons demand conditions of life which afford considerably more than the certainty of food and sleep. For these the ending of a symbiotic relationship comes as a severe shock.

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* [illegible] Vol. 6, Part I, par. [illegible] 1923, pp. [illegible]

81 It is not easy to understand why this should be so. Yet if we consider that no man is simply introverted or simply extraverted, but has both attitudes potentially in him—although he has developed only one of them as a function of adaptation—we shall immediately conjecture that with the introvert extraversion lies dormant and undeveloped somewhere in the background, and that introversion leads a similar shadowy existence in the extravert. And this is indeed the case. The introvert does possess an extraverted attitude, but it is unconscious, because his conscious gaze is always turned to the subject. He sees the object, of course, but has false or inhibiting ideas about it, so that he keeps his distance as much as possible, as though the object were something formidable and dangerous. I will make my meaning clear by a simple illustration:

Let us suppose two youths rambling in the country. They come to a fine castle; both want to see inside it. The introvert says, "I'd like to know what it's like inside." The extravert answers, "Right, let's go in," and makes for the gateway. The introvert draws back—"Perhaps we aren't allowed in," says he, with visions of policemen, fines, and fierce dogs in the background. Whereupon the extravert answers, "Well, we can ask. They'll let us in all right"—with visions of kindly old watchmen, hospitable seigneurs, and the possibility of romantic adventures. On the strength of extraverted optimism they at length find themselves in the castle. But now comes the dénouement. The castle has been rebuilt inside, and contains nothing but a couple of rooms with a collection of old manuscripts. As it happens, old manuscripts are the chief joy of the introverted youth. Hardly has he caught sight of them when he becomes as one transformed. He loses himself in contemplation of the treasures, [illegible] manuscripts. He engages the keeper in conversation so as to extract from him as much information as possible about [illegible] the [illegible] asks to see the [illegible] [illegible], reputed [illegible]. His shyness has vanished, [illegible] objects have taken on a seductive glamour, and the world wears a new face. But meanwhile the spirits of the extraverted [illegible] are sinking lower and lower. His face grows longer and he begins to yawn. No kindly [illegible] are forthcoming here, no knightly hospitality, not a trace of romantic adventure—only a castle made over into a museum. There are manuscripts enough to be seen at home. Whereas the enthusiasm of the one rises, the spirits of the other fall, the castle [illegible] the museum reminds him of a library, library is associated with university, university with studies and menacing examinations. Gradually a veil of gloom descends over the once so interesting and enticing castle. The object becomes negative. "Isn't it marvellous," cries the introvert, "to have stumbled on this wonderful collection?" "The place bores me to extinction," replies the other with undisguised ill humour. This annoys the introvert, who secretly vows never again to go walking with an extravert. The latter is annoyed with the other's annoyance, and he thinks to himself that he always knew the fellow was an inconsiderate egotist who would, in his own selfish interest, waste all the lovely spring day that could be enjoyed so much better out of doors.

82 What has happened? Both were wandering along together in happy symbiosis until they discovered the fatal castle. Then the fore-thinking or Promethean introvert said it might be seen from the inside, and the after-thinking or Epimethean extravert opened the door.[1] At this point the types invert themselves: the introvert, who at first resisted the idea of going in, cannot now be dragged out again, and the extravert curses the moment when he set foot inside the castle. The former is now fascinated by the object, the latter by his negative thoughts. When the introvert spotted the manuscripts, it was all up with him. His shyness vanished, the object took possession of him, and he surrendered himself willingly. The extravert, however, felt a growing resistance to the object and was eventually made the prisoner of his own ill-humoured subject. The introvert became

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[1] [illegible] Spitteler's *Prometheus und Epimetheus* in *Psychological Types* [illegible] pp. [illegible]

extraverted, the extravert introverted. But the extraversion of the introvert is different from the extraversion of the extravert, and vice versa. So long as both were wandering along in joyous harmony, neither fearful of the other, because each was in his natural character. Each was positive to the other, because their attitudes were complementary. They were complementary, however, only because the attitude of the one included the other. We can see this from the short conversation at the gateway. Both wanted to enter the castle. The doubt of the introvert as to whether an entry were possible also held good for the other. The initiative of the extravert likewise held good for the other. Thus the attitude of the one included the other, and this is always in some degree true if a person happens to be in the attitude natural to him, for this attitude has some degree of collective adaptation. The same is true of the introvert's attitude, although this always comes from the subject. It simply goes from subject to object, while the extravert's attitude goes from object to subject.

83 But the moment when, in the case of the introvert, the object overpowers and attracts the subject, his attitude loses its social character. He forgets the presence of his friend, he no longer includes him; he becomes absorbed in the object and does not see how very bored his friend is. In the same way the extravert loses all consideration for the other as soon as his expectations are disappointed and he withdraws into subjectivity and moodiness.

84 We can therefore formulate the occurrence as follows: in the introvert the influence of the object produces an inferior extraversion, while in the extravert an inferior introversion takes the place of his social attitude. And so we come back to the proposition from which we started: "The value of the one is the negation of value for the other."

85 Positive as well as negative occurrences can constellate the inferior counter-function. When this happens, sensitiveness appears. Sensitiveness is a sure sign of the presence of inferiority.[1] This provides the psychological basis for discord and misunderstanding, not only between two people but also in ourselves. The essence of the inferior function is autonomy: it is independent, it attacks, fascinates, and so spins us about that we

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[1] See *Psychological Types*, Def. 30.

are no longer masters of ourselves and can no longer rightly distinguish between ourselves and others.

86 Accordingly it is essential for the development of character that we should allow the other side, the inferior function, to find expression. We cannot in the long run allow one part of our personality to be cared for symbiotically by another; for the moment when we might have need of the other function may come at any time and find us unprepared, as the above example shows. And bad consequences may be had: the extravert loses his indispensable relation to the object, and the introvert loses his to the subject. Conversely, it is equally indispensable for the introvert to arrive at some form of action not constantly beleaguered by doubts and hesitations, and for the extravert to reflect upon himself, yet without endangering his relationships.

87 In extraversion and introversion it is clearly a matter of two antithetical natural attitudes or trends, which Goethe once referred to as diastole and systole. They ought, in their harmonious alternation, to give life a rhythm, but it seems to require a high degree of art to achieve such a rhythm. Either one must do it quite unconsciously, so that the natural law is not disturbed by any conscious act, or one must be conscious in a much higher sense, to be capable of willing and carrying out the antithetical movements. Since we cannot develop backwards into animal unconsciousness, there remains only the more strenuous way forwards into higher consciousness. Certainly that consciousness, which would enable us to live the great Yea and Nay of our own free will and purpose, is an altogether superhuman ideal. Still, it is a goal. Perhaps our present mentality only allows us consciously to will the Yea and to bear with the Nay. When that is the case, much is already achieved.

88 The problem of opposites, as an inherent principle of human nature, forms a further stage in our process of realization. As a rule it is one of the problems of maturity. The practical treatment of a patient will hardly ever begin with this problem, especially not in the case of young people. The neuroses of the young generally come from a collision between the forces of reality and an inadequate, infantile attitude, which from the causal point of view is characterized by an abnormal dependence on the real or imaginary parents, and from the teleological point

of view by unrealizable illusions, plans, and aspirations. Here the reductive methods of Freud and Adler are entirely in place. But there are many neuroses which either appear only at maturity or else deteriorate to such a degree that the patients become incapable of work. Naturally, one can point out in these cases that an unusual dependence on the parents existed even in youth, and that all kinds of infantile illusions were present; but all that did not prevent them from taking up a profession, from practising it successfully, from keeping up a marriage of sorts until that moment in later years when the previous attitude suddenly failed. In such cases it is of little help to make them conscious of their childhood fantasies, dependence on the parents, etc., although this is a necessary part of the procedure and often has a not unfavourable result. But the real therapy only begins when the patient sees that it is no longer father and mother who are standing in his way, but himself, i.e., an unconscious part of his personality which carries on the role of father and mother. Even this realization, helpful as it is, is still negative; it simply says, "I realize that it is not father and mother who are against me, but I myself." But who is it in him that is against him? What is this mysterious part of his personality that hides under the father- and mother-imagos, making him believe for years that the cause of his trouble must somehow have got into him from outside? This part is the counterpart to his conscious attitude, and it will leave him no peace and will plague him until it has been accepted. For young people a liberation from the past may be enough: a beckoning future lies before them, rich in possibilities. It is sufficient to break a few bonds; the life-urge will do the rest. But we are faced with another task in the case of people who have left a large part of their life behind them, for whom the future no longer beckons with marvellous possibilities and nothing is to be expected but the endless round of familiar duties and the doubtful pleasures of old age.

89 If ever we succeed in liberating young people from the past, we see that they always transfer the imagos of their parents to more suitable substitute figures. For instance, the feeling that clung to the mother now passes to the wife, and the father's authority passes to respected teachers and superiors or to institu-

[illegible] Although this is not a fundamental solution, it is [illegible] a [illegible] than [illegible] and there [illegible] and resistances.

89 [illegible] is very different. He has put [illegible] He has [illegible] perhaps, and has [illegible] the [illegible] in the [illegible] of a [illegible] He has [illegible] real his [illegible] and [illegible] that what [illegible] has become a [illegible] Here there are [illegible] projected [illegible] The energy streaming back from these [illegible] and activates [illegible] development.

90 In a young man [illegible] fixed up on the neuro[illegible] when [illegible] and hope and the chance [illegible] on the second half of [illegible] of the function of opposites being dominant [illegible] development no [illegible] and the transference of the [illegible] to new figures: it proceeds via the problem of opposites.

91 [illegible] even in [illegible] a [illegible] psychological theory of the [illegible] Hence the Freudian and Adlerian [illegible] when they claim [illegible] But [illegible] technical, auxiliary [illegible] other. A [illegible] self-regulating system.

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93 If at this point we take up the thread we let fall earlier, we shall now see clearly where we are to look for the values which the individual has lost [illegible] are to be found in the unconscious. At this point too we can return to the case of the young woman and apply the insight we have gained. Let us suppose that this patient is analysed, that she has through the treatment come to understand the nature of the unconscious thoughts lurking behind her symptoms, and has thus regained possession of the [illegible] unconscious energy which [illegible] the strength of those symptoms. The question then arises: what to do with the so-called available energy? In accordance with the psychological type of the patient it would be rational to transfer this energy to an object—to philanthropic work, for example, or some useful activity. With exceptionally energetic natures that are not afraid of wearing themselves out [illegible] people [illegible] this [illegible] possible [illegible] most people it is impossible. For—do not forget—the libido, as this psychic energy is technically called, already possesses its unconscious object, in the form of the young Italian or some equally real human substitute. In these circumstances a sublimation is as impossible as it is desirable, because the real object generally offers the energy a much better gradient than the most admirable ethical activities. [illegible] of us talk about a person only as [illegible] would like [illegible] the real [illegible] ways [illegible] the real [illegible] Thus [illegible]

94 [illegible] the [illegible] disposable energy at [illegible] its own gradient [illegible] in dreams [illegible] free [illegible] the [illegible] we discover that the patient [illegible] the young Italian [illegible] ion.[4] The latter has now become the [illegible]

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[4] Freud [illegible] the name of transference [illegible] tion of unconscious contents.

serious libido. If the patient altogether refuses to recognize the fact of the transference,[18] or if the doctor fails to understand it or interprets it falsely, vigorous resistances supervene, directed towards making the relation with the doctor completely impossible. Then the patient goes away and looks for another doctor or for some one who understands; or if he gives up the search, he gets stuck in his problem.

95 If, however, the transference to the doctor takes place and is accepted, a natural form is found which supplants the earlier one and at the same time provides the energy with an outlet relatively free from conflict. Hence if the libido is allowed to run its natural course it will find its own way to the destined object. Where this does not happen, it is always a question of wilful defiance of the laws of nature, or of some disturbing influence.

96 In the transference all kinds of infantile fantasies are projected. They must be cauterized, i.e., resolved by reductive analysis, and this used to be called severing the transference. Thereby the energy is again released from an unserviceable form and again we are faced by the problem of its disposability. Once more we shall put our trust in nature, hoping that even before it is sought an object will have been chosen which will provide a favourable gradient.

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[18] Contrary to certain views, I am not of the opinion that the "transference to the doctor" is a regular phenomenon indispensable to the success of the treatment. Transference is projection, and projection is either there or not there. But it is not necessary. In no sense can it be "made," for by definition it springs from unconscious motivations. The doctor may be a suitable object for the projection, or he may not. There is absolutely no saying that he will in all circumstances correspond to the natural gradient of the patient's libido, for it is quite on the cards that the libido has in view a much more important object for its projections. The absence of projections to the doctor may in fact considerably facilitate the treatment, because the real personal values can then come more clearly to the fore.

V

THE PERSONAL AND THE COLLECTIVE (OR TRANSPERSONAL) UNCONSCIOUS

97 At this point a new stage in the process of realization begins. We can continue the analysis of the infantile transference fantasies to the point where it becomes abundantly clear even to the patient that he was making the doctor his father, mother, uncle, guardian, and teacher, and all the rest of the parental authorities. But, as experience has repeatedly shown, still other fantasies appear which represent the doctor as a saviour or godlike being, naturally in complete contradiction to healthy conscious reasoning. Moreover it transpires that these godlike attributes go far beyond the framework of the Christian standpoint in which we have grown up; they take on a pagan glamour and, indeed, very often appear in animal form.

98 The transference in itself is no more than a projection of unconscious contents. At first it is the so-called superficial contents of the unconscious that are projected, as can be seen from symptoms, dreams, and fantasies. In this stage the doctor is interesting as a possible lover (rather like the young Italian in the case we were discussing). Then he appears more as the father: either the good kind father or the "thunderer," according to the qualities with which the real father was endowed for the patient. Sometimes the doctor takes on a maternal significance, which seems somewhat peculiar, but is still within the bounds of possibility. All these fantasy projections are founded on personal memories.

99 Finally there appear forms of fantasy that possess an extravagant character. The doctor is then endowed with uncanny powers: he is a magician or a wicked demon, or else the corresponding personification of goodness, a saviour. Again he may appear as a mixture of both. It must be understood, of course, that he need not necessarily appear thus to the patient's conscious mind, it is only the fantasies coming to the surface that

[illegible] in disguise. Some patients [illegible] get [illegible] that [illegible] fantasies [illegible] from their [illegible] have little or nothing to do with the character [illegible]. [illegible] ideas consistently [illegible] there are no personal grounds in the memory for this projection. It can sometimes be shown that some [illegible] fantasies [illegible] at a certain period in [illegible] and attached themselves to one person or another, although [illegible] any real reason for them.

101 [illegible] has shown in a brilliant essay[1] how Leonardo da Vinci was influenced in his later life by the fact that he had two mothers. The fact of the two mothers, or of a double descent, was real enough in Leonardo's case, but it has played a part in the lives of other artists as well. Benvenuto Cellini had this fantasy of a double descent. Generally speaking it is a mythological motif. Many heroes in legend have two mothers. The fantasy does not arise from the actual fact that the heroes have two mothers; it is a widespread, "primordial" image belonging not to the secrets of personal history but to the mental history of mankind.

There are present in every individual, besides his personal memories, the great "primordial" images, as Jacob Burckhardt once aptly called them, the inherited powers of human imagination as it was from time immemorial. The fact of this inheritance explains the truly amazing phenomenon that certain motifs from myths and legends repeat themselves the world over in identical forms. It also explains why it is that our mental patients can reproduce exactly the same images and associations that are known to us from the old texts. I give some examples of this in my book *Symbols of Transformation*.[2] In so doing I do not by any means assert the inheritance of ideas, but only of the possibility of such ideas, which is something very different.

102 In this further stage of treatment, then, when fantasies are produced which no longer rest on personal memories, we have to do with the manifestations of a deeper layer of the unconscious where [illegible] [illegible] images [illegible] dominants of

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[1] *Leonardo da Vinci* (London, 1922).

[2] [illegible] "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious," [illegible] *Works*, Vol. 9

speaking, I have called these images or motifs "archetypes," also "dominants" of the unconscious. For a further elucidation of the idea, I must refer the reader to the relevant literature.[3]

103 This discovery means another step forward in our understanding: the recognition, that is, of two layers in the unconscious. We have to distinguish between a personal unconscious and an impersonal or transpersonal unconscious. We speak of the latter also as the collective unconscious,[4] because it is detached from anything personal and is common to all men, since its contents can be found everywhere, which is naturally not the case with the personal contents. The personal unconscious contains lost memories, painful ideas that are repressed (i.e., forgotten on purpose), subliminal perceptions, by which are meant sense-perceptions that were not strong enough to reach consciousness, and finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness. It corresponds to the figure of the shadow[5] so frequently met with in dreams.[6]

104 The primordial images are the most ancient and the most universal "thought-forms" of humanity. They are as much feelings as thoughts; indeed, they lead their own independent life rather in the manner of part-souls, as can easily be seen in those philosophical or Gnostic systems which rely on awareness of the unconscious as the source of knowledge. The idea of angels, archangels, "principalities and powers" in St. Paul, the arch-

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[3] *Symbols of Transformation* (Coll. Works, Vol. 5); *Psychological Types* (Coll. Works, Vol. 6), ch. XI, Def. 26. *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (Coll. Works, Vol. 9, i): "Concerning the Archetypes, with Special Reference to the Anima Concept"; (Coll. Works, Vol. 9, i), "Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype" (Coll. Works, Vol. 9, i); "The Psychology of the Child Archetype" and "The Psychological Aspects of the Kore" (Coll. Works, Vol. 9, i); Commentary on *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (Coll. Works, Vol. 13); [illegible] see bibliographical note at end of this volume. [illegible]

[4] The collective unconscious stands for the objective psyche, the personal unconscious for the subjective psyche.

[5] By shadow I mean the "negative" side of the personality, the sum of all those unpleasant qualities we like to hide, together with the insufficiently developed functions and the contents of the personal unconscious. A comprehensive account of the shadow is to be found in [illegible] Wolff, "Einführung in die Grundlagen der Komplexen Psychologie," in *Die kulturelle Bedeutung der Komplexen Psychologie* (Berlin, 1935), pp. 1-168.

[6] "A Review of the Complex Theory" (Coll. Works, Vol. 8).

ers of the demons, the heavenly hierarchy of Dionysius the Areopagite, etc., come from the perception of the relative autonomy of the archetypes.

We have now found the object which the libido chooses when it is freed from the personal, infantile form of transference. It follows its own gradient down into the depths of the unconscious, and there activates what has lain slumbering from the beginning. It has discovered the hidden treasure upon which mankind ever and anon has drawn, and from which it has raised up its gods and demons, and all those potent and mighty thoughts without which man ceases to be man.

106 Let us take as an example one of the greatest thoughts which the nineteenth century brought to birth: the idea of the conservation of energy. Robert Mayer, the real creator of this idea, was a physician and not a physicist or natural philosopher, for whom the making of such an idea would have been more appropriate. But it is very important to realize that the idea was not, strictly speaking, "made" by Mayer. Nor did it come into being through the fusion of ideas or scientific hypotheses then existent, but grew in its creator like a plant. Mayer wrote about it in the following way to Griesinger in 1844:

> I am far from having hatched out the theory at my writing desk. [He then reports certain physiological observations he had made in 1840 and 1841 as ship's doctor in Java.] Now if one wants to be clear on matters of physiology, some knowledge of physical processes is essential, unless one prefers to work at things from the metaphysical side, which I find infinitely disgusting. I therefore held fast to physics and stuck to the subject with such fondness that I paid but little attention to the remote quarter of the globe in which we were, preferring to remain on board, where I could work without interruption, and where I passed many an hour as though inspired, the like of which I cannot remember either before or since. Some flashes of thought that passed through me while in the harbour of Surabaya were at once assiduously followed up, and in their turn led to fresh subjects. Those times have passed, but the quiet examination of that which then came to the surface has taught me that it is a truth which can not only be subjectively felt, but also objectively proven. It remains to be seen whether this can be done by a man so little versed in physics as I am.

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[1] Robert Mayer, *Kleinere Schriften und Briefe*, ed. by Weyrauch, p. 213. Letter to Wilhelm Griesinger, June 16, 1844.

107 In his book on energetics,[5] Helm expresses the view that Robert Mayer's new idea did not detach itself gradually from the traditional concepts of energy by deeper reflection on them, but belongs to those intuitively grasped ideas which, arising in other realms of a spiritual nature, as it were take possession of the mind and compel it to reshape the traditional conceptions in their own likeness."

108 The question now arises: Whence came this new idea that thrusts itself upon consciousness with such elemental force? And whence did it derive the power that could so seize upon consciousness as to divert it from the multitudinous impressions of a first voyage to the tropics? These questions are not so easy to answer. But if we apply our theory here, the explanation can only be this: the idea of energy and its conservation must be a primordial image that was dormant in the collective unconscious. Such a conclusion naturally obliges us to prove that a primordial image of this kind really did exist in the mental history of mankind and was operative through the ages. As a matter of fact, this proof can be produced without much difficulty: the most primitive religions in the most widely separated parts of the earth are founded upon this image. These are the so-called dynamistic religions whose sole and determining thought is that there exists a universal magical power[6] about which everything revolves. Tylor, the well-known English investigator, and Frazer likewise, misunderstood this idea as animism. In reality primitives do not mean, by their concept of power, souls or spirits at all, but something which the American investigator Lovejoy has appropriately termed "primitive energetics." This concept is equivalent to the idea of soul, spirit, God, health, bodily strength, fertility, magic, influence, power, prestige, medicine, as well as certain states of feeling which are characterized by the release of affects. Among certain Polynesians mulungu—this same primitive power-concept—is spirit, soul, daemonism, magic, prestige; and when anything astonish-

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[5] Cf. F. Helm, *Die Energetik nach ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1898), p. 20.

[6] Generally called mana. Cf. Nathan Söderblom, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens* [illegible] Leipzig, 1916 [illegible] A. O. Lovejoy, "The Fundamental Concept of the Primitive Philosophy," *The Monist*, XVI (1906), 361.

-ing happens the people cry out "Mulungu!" This power-concept is also the earliest form of a concept of God among primitives and is an image which has undergone countless variations in the course of history. In the Old Testament the magic power glows in the burning bush and in the countenance of Moses; in the Gospels it descends with the Holy Ghost in the form of fiery tongues from heaven. In Heraclitus it appears as world energy, as "ever-living fire"; among the Persians it is the fire-glow of haoma, divine grace; among the Stoics it is the primal warmth, the power of fate. In medieval legend it appears as the aura or halo, and it flames up like a flame from the roof of the hut in which the saint lies in ecstasy. In their visions the saints behold the sun of this power, the plenitude of light. According to the old view the soul itself is this power; in the idea of the soul's immortality there is an allusion to its conservation, and in the Buddhist and primitive notion of metempsychosis—transmigration of souls—is an unlimited mutability together with its constant preservation.

109 So this idea has been stamped on the human brain for aeons. That is why it lies ready to hand in the unconscious of every man. Only, certain conditions are needed to cause it to appear. These conditions were evidently fulfilled in the case of Robert Mayer. The greatest and best thoughts of man shape themselves upon these primordial images as upon a blueprint. I have often been asked where the archetypes or primordial images come from. It seems to me that their origin can only be explained by assuming them to be deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity. One of the commonest and at the same time most impressive experiences is the apparent movement of the sun every day. We certainly cannot discover anything of the kind in the unconscious, so far as the known physical process is concerned. What we do find, on the other hand, is the myth of the sun-hero in all its countless modifications. It is this myth, and not the physical process, that forms the sun archetype. The same can be said of the phases of the moon. The archetype is a kind of readiness to produce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas. Hence it seems as though what is impressed upon the unconscious were exclusively the subjective fantasy-ideas aroused by the physical process. Therefore we may take it that archetypes are recurrent

impressions made by subjective reactions. Naturally this assumption only pushes the problem further back without solving it. There is nothing to prevent us from assuming that certain archetypes exist even in animals, that they are grounded in the peculiarities of the living organism itself and are therefore direct expressions of life whose nature cannot be further explained. Not only are the archetypes, apparently, impressions of ever-repeated typical experiences, but, at the same time, they behave empirically like agents that tend towards the repetition of these same experiences. For when an archetype appears in a dream, in a fantasy, or in life, it always brings with it a certain influence or power by virtue of which it either exercises a numinous or a fascinating effect, or impels to action.[1]

110 Having shown in this example how new ideas develop out of the treasure-house of primordial images, we will now proceed to the further description of the transference process. We saw that the libido had seized upon these new and seemingly absurd associations—the contents of the collective unconscious. As I have already said, the projection of primordial images upon the doctor is a danger not to be underestimated in the further course of treatment. For these images contain not only all the fine and good things that humanity has ever thought and felt, but the worst infamies and devilries of which men have ever been capable. Owing to their specific energy—for they behave like highly charged autonomous centres of power—they exert a fascinating and possessive influence upon the conscious mind and can thus produce extensive alterations in the subject. This can be seen in religious conversions and other cases of suggestion, and especially in the development of certain forms of schizophrenia.[2] Now, if the patient is unable to distinguish the personality of the doctor from these projections, all hope of an understanding is finally lost and a human relationship becomes impossible. But if the patient avoids this Charybdis, he is wrecked on the Scylla of introjecting these images—in other words, he ascribes their peculiarities not to the doctor but to himself. This is just as

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[1] "The Structure of the Psyche," Coll. Works, Vol. 8.

[2] Cf. Symbols of Transformation, index, s.v. "Schreber"; and Jan Nelken, "Analytische Beobachtungen über Phantasien eines Schizophrenen," in Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, IV (1912), 504.

[illegible] he vacillates between an extravagant [illegible] and a contempt [illegible] In alternation [illegible] contents of the co[illegible] In this way he makes [illegible] that have always [illegible] or the day before. [illegible] themselves have be[illegible] God is all [illegible] psycho[illegible] God's existence. The [illegible] God. Moreover [illegible] Paul's words [illegible] the idea of God [illegible] if we [illegible] God [illegible] known that we can [illegible] God [illegible]ure to ourselves in [illegible] The existence of God is [illegible] and perfect man [illegible] can be certain that it is [illegible] But [illegible] whereas the rational is essentially tied to the conscious mind. The conscious mind must have reason, firstly to discover some order in the chaos of disorderly individual events occurring in the world, and secondly to create order, at least in human affairs. We are moved by the laudable and useful ambition to extirpate the chaos of the irrational both within and without to the best of our ability. Apparently the process has gone pretty far. As a mental patient once told me: "Doctor, last night I disinfected the whole heavens with bichloride of mercury, but I found no God." Something of the sort has happened to us as well.

111 Old Heraclitus, who was indeed a very great sage, discovered the most marvellous of all psychological laws: the regulative function of opposites. He called it *enantiodromia*, a running contrariwise, by which he meant that sooner or later everything runs into its opposite. (Here I would remind you of the case above of the American business man, a beautiful example of enantiodromia.) Thus the rational attitude of culture necessarily runs into its opposite, namely the irrational devastation of culture.[1] We should never identify ourselves with reason, for man is not and never will be a creature of reason alone, a fact to be noted by all pedantic culture-mongers. The irrational cannot and must not be extirpated. The gods cannot and must not die. I said just now that there seems to be something, a kind of superior power, in the human psyche, and that if this is not the idea of God, then it is the "belly." I wanted to express the fact that one or other basic instinct, or complex of ideas, will invariably concentrate upon itself the greatest sum of psychic energy and thus force the ego into its service. As a rule the ego is drawn into this focus of energy so powerfully that it identifies with it and thinks it desires and needs nothing further. In this way a craze develops, a monomania or possession, an acute one-sidedness which most seriously imperils the psychic equilibrium. Without doubt the capacity for such one-sidedness is the secret of success of a sort, for which reason our

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[1] [This sentence was written during the first World War. I have let it stand in its original form because it contains a truth which has been confirmed more than once in the course of history. (Written in 1925.) As present events show, the confirmation did not have to wait very long. Who wants this blind destruction? But we all help the daemon to our last gasp. O sancta simplicitas! (Written in 1942.)]

civilization assiduously strives to foster it. The passion, the piling up of energy in these monomanias, is what the ancients called a "god," and in common speech we still do the same. Do we not say, "He makes a god of this or that"? A man thinks that he wills and chooses, and does not notice that he is already possessed, that his interest has become the master, arrogating all power to itself. Such interests are indeed gods of a kind, which, once recognized by the many, gradually form a "church" and gather a herd of believers about them. This we then call an "organization." It is followed by a disorganizing reaction which aims to drive out the devil with Beelzebub. The enantiodromia that always threatens when a movement attains to undisputed power offers no solution of the problem, for it is just as blind in its disorganization as it was in its organization.

The only person who escapes the grim law of enantiodromia is the man who knows how to separate himself from the unconscious, not by repressing it—for then it simply attacks him from the rear—but by putting it clearly before him as *that which he is not*.

This prepares the way for the solution of the Scylla and Charybdis problem described above. The patient must learn to differentiate what is ego and what is non-ego, i.e., collective psyche. In this way he finds the material to which he will henceforth have to accommodate himself. His energy, until now laid up in unserviceable, pathological forms, has come into its proper sphere. It is essential, in differentiating the ego from the non-ego, that a man should be firmly rooted in his ego-function; that is, he must fulfil his duty to life, so as to be in every respect a viable member of the community. All that he neglects in this respect falls into the unconscious and reinforces its position, so that he is in danger of being swallowed up by it. But the penalties for this are heavy. As Synesius has expressed it of old, it is just the spirit-inspired soul (πνευματικὴ ψυχή) that becomes god and demon, and as such suffers the divine punishment of being torn asunder like Zagreus. This was what Nietzsche experienced at the onset of his malady. Enantiodromia means being torn asunder into pairs of opposites, which are the attributes of the god, and hence also of the godlike man who owes his godlikeness to his victory over the gods. As soon as we speak of the collective unconscious we find ourselves in a sphere, and concerned with a problem which is altogether prevalent in the practical analysis of young people, or of those who have remained infantile too long. Wherever the path is hard and other obstacles have still to be overcome, wherever there is a whole heap of life still to be conquered, which is the natural possession of the average man, then we would better make no mention of the collective unconscious and the problem of opposites. But once the parental transferences and the youthful illusions have been mastered, or are at least ripe for mastery, then we must speak of these things. We are here outside the range of Freudian and Adlerian reductions; we are no longer concerned with how to remove the obstacles to a man's profession, or to his marriage, or to anything that means a widening of his life, but are confronted with the task of finding a meaning that will enable him to continue living at all—a meaning that is more than blank resignation and mournful retrospect.

114 Our life is like the course of the sun. In the morning it gains continually in strength until it reaches the zenith heat of high noon. Then comes the enantiodromia: the steady forward movement no longer denotes an increase, but a decrease, in strength. Thus our task in handling a young person is different from the task of handling an older person. In the former case it is enough to clear away all the obstacles that hinder expansion and ascent; in the latter, we must nurture everything that assists the descent. An inexperienced youth thinks one can let the old people go, because not much more can happen to them anyway: they have their lives behind them and are no better than petrified pillars of the past. But it is a great mistake to suppose that the meaning of life is exhausted with the period of youth and expansion; that, for example, a woman who has passed the menopause is "finished." The afternoon of life is just as full of meaning as the morning; only, its meaning and purpose are different.[14] Man has two aims: the first is the natural aim, the begetting of children and the business of protecting the brood; to this belongs the acquisition of money and social position. When this aim has been reached a new phase begins: the cultural aim. For the attainment of the former we have the help of nature and, on top of that, education; for the attainment of the latter, little or nothing helps us. Often, indeed, a false ambition

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[14] "The Stages of Life," *Coll. Works*, Vol. 8.

[illegible] that [illegible] seems to be a [illegible] or at least feels [illegible] though [illegible] what [illegible] the cultural phase [illegible] for many people they come too [illegible] of youth or to the [illegible] hoping to salvage [illegible] this was a last [illegible] One sees [illegible] find them [illegible] in the [illegible] end and [illegible] will sink into a [illegible] less [illegible] when they have [illegible] Now [illegible] many [illegible] afternoon. It is a sort of second puberty, another storm and stress period, not infrequently accompanied by tempestuous passion [illegible] years ago. But the problems that crop up at this age are no longer to be solved by the old recipes; the hand of this clock cannot be put back. What youth found and must find outside, the man of life's afternoon must find within himself. Here we face new problems which often cause the doctor no little headache.

The transition from morning to afternoon means a revaluation of the earlier values. There comes the urgent need to appreciate the value of the opposite of our former ideals, to perceive the error in our former convictions, to recognize the untruth in our former truth, and to feel how much antagonism and even hatred lay in what until now had passed for love. Not a few of those who are drawn into the conflict of opposites jettison everything that had previously seemed to them good and worth striving for; they try to live in complete opposition to their former ego. Changes of profession, divorces, religious convulsions, apostasies of every description are the symptoms of this swinging over to the opposite. The snag about a radical conversion into one's opposite is that one's former life suffers repression and thus produces just as unbalanced a state as existed before, when the counterparts of the conscious virtues and values were still repressed and unconscious. Just as before perhaps neurotic disturbances arose because the opposing fantasies were unconscious, so now other disturbances arise through the repression of former idols. It is of course a fundamental mistake to imagine that when we see the non-value in a value or the untruth in a truth, the value or the truth ceases to exist. It has only become relative. Everything human is relative, because everything rests on an inner polarity; for everything is a phenomenon of energy. Energy necessarily depends on a pre-existing polarity, without which there could be no energy. There must always be high and low, hot and cold, etc., so that the equilibrating process—which is energy—can take place. Therefore the tendency to deny all previous values in favour of their opposites is just as much of an exaggeration as the earlier one-sidedness. And in so far as it is a question of rejecting universally accepted and indisputable values, the result is a fatal loss. One who acts in this way empties himself out with his values, as Nietzsche has already said.

6 The point is not conversion into the opposite but conservation of previous values together with recognition of their opposites. Naturally this means conflict and self-division. It is understandable enough that one should shrink from it, philosophically as well as morally; hence the alternative sought, more often than conversion into the opposite, is a convulsive stiffening of the previous attitude. It must be admitted that, in the case of elderly men, this is a phenomenon of no little merit. However disagreeable it may be, at least they do not become renegades, they remain upright, they do not fall into muddleheadedness nor yet into the mire; they are no defaulters, but are merely dead wood, or, to put it more politely, pillars of the past. But the accompanying symptoms, the rigidity, the narrow-mindedness, the staidness, these *laudatores temporis acti*, are unpleasant, not to say harmful; for the method of upholding a truth or any other value is so rigid and violent that their unmannerliness repels more than the truth attracts, so that the result is the opposite of the intended good. The fundamental cause of their rigidity is their fear of the problem of opposites; they have a foreboding and secret dread of the sinister brother of Medardus. Therefore there must be only one truth and one guiding principle of action, and that must be absolute; otherwise it affords no protection against the impending disaster which is sensed everywhere save in themselves. But actually the most dangerous revolutionary is within ourselves, and all must realize this who would pass over safely into the second half of life. Certainly this means exchanging the apparent security we have so far enjoyed for a condition of insecurity, of internal

division of uncomfortable sensations. The worst feature of all is that there appears to be no way out of such a situation. *Tertium non datur*, says logic: there is no middle way.

117 The practical necessities of treatment have therefore forced us to look for ways and means that might lead out of this intolerable situation. Whenever a man is confronted by an apparently insurmountable obstacle, he draws back; he makes what is technically called a regression. He goes back to the times when he found himself in similar situations, and he tries to apply again the means that helped him then. But what helped in youth is of no use in age. What good did it do that American business man to return to his former position? It simply would not work. So the regression continues right back into childhood (hence the childishness of many neurotics), and finally to the time before childhood. That may sound strange, but, in point of fact, it is not only logical but altogether possible.

118 We mentioned earlier that the unconscious contains, as it were, two layers: the personal and the collective. The personal layer ends at the earliest memories of infancy, but the collective layer comprises the pre-infantile period, that is, the residues of ancestral life. Whereas the memory-images of the personal unconscious are, as it were, filled out, because they are images personally experienced by the individual, the archetypes of the collective unconscious are not filled out because they are forms not personally experienced. On the other hand, when psychic energy regresses, going even beyond the period of early infancy, and breaks into the legacy of ancestral life, the mythological images are awakened: these are the archetypes.[15] An interior spiritual world whose existence we never suspected opens out and displays contents which seem to stand in the sharpest contrast to

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[15] The reader will note the admixture here of a new element in the idea of the archetypes, not previously mentioned. This admixture is not a piece of unintentional obscurity, but a deliberate extension of the archetype by means of the karmic factor, which is very important in Indian philosophy. The karma aspect is essential to a deeper understanding of the nature of an archetype. Without entering here into a closer description of this factor, I would like at least to mention its existence. I have been severely attacked by critics for my idea of archetypes. I admit at once that it is a controversial idea and more than a little perplexing. But I have always wondered what sort of idea my critics would have used to characterize the empirical material in question.

at the other. These images are so intense that it is quite understandable why they [illegible] should be taken literally [illegible]. This appears simply because [illegible] meet the need for expressing and formulating the wordless [illegible] experiences going on within ourselves. [illegible] of Christianity [illegible] Catholicism. The latter [illegible] are to express far more completely than Protestantism the facts in question through its dogma and ritual symbolism. But neither in the past nor in the present has ever Catholicism attained anything like the richness of the old pagan symbolism, which is why the pagan symbolism persisted far into Christian times and then gradually went underground, remaining a current that from the early Middle Ages to modern times has never quite lost its vitality. To a large extent it vanished from the surface, but, changing its form, it came back again to compensate the one-sidedness of our conscious mind with its modern orientation.[8] Our consciousness is so saturated with Christianity, so utterly moulded by it, that the unconscious counter-position can find no foothold there, for the simple reason that it seems too much in contradiction with our ruling ideas. The more one-sidedly, rigidly, and absolutely the one position is held, the more aggressive, hostile, and incompatible will the other become, so that at first sight there would seem to be little prospect of reconciling the two. But once the conscious mind admits at least the relative validity of all human opinion, then the opposition loses something of its irreconcilable character. In the meantime the conflict casts about for appropriate expression in, for instance, the oriental religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism. The syncretism of theosophy goes a long way towards meeting this need, and that explains its numerous successes.

119 The work involved in analytical treatment gives rise to experiences of an archetypal nature which require to be expressed and shaped. Obviously this is not the only occasion for experiences of such a kind; they often occur quite spontaneously, and by no means only in the case of "psychological"-minded people. I have heard the most astonishing dreams and visions from the lips of people whose mental sanity not even

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[8] Cf. my "Paracelsus as a Spiritual Phenomenon," Coll. Works, Vol. 13, and *Psychology and Alchemy*, Coll. Works, Vol. 12.

the professional psychologist could doubt. The experience of the archetype is frequently guarded as the closest personal secret, because it is felt to strike into the very core of one's being. It is like a primordial experience of the non-ego, of an interior opponent who throws down a challenge to the understanding. Naturally enough we then look round for helpful parallels, and it happens all too easily that the original occurrence is interpreted in terms of derivative ideas. A typical instance of this kind is the Trinity vision of Brother Nicholas of Flüe,[17] or again St. Ignatius' vision of the snake with multiple eyes, which he first interpreted as a divine apparition and then as a visitation from the devil. Through these periphrastic interpretations the authentic experience is replaced by images and words borrowed from a foreign source and by views, ideas, and forms that have not grown on our soil and have no ties with our hearts but only with our heads. Indeed not even our thought can clearly grasp them, because it never invented them. It is a case of stolen goods that bring no prosperity. Such substitutes make men shadowy and unreal; they put empty words in the place of living realities and slip out of the painful tension of opposites into a wan, two-dimensional, phantasmal world where everything vital and creative withers and dies.

120 The wordless occurrences which are called forth by regression to the pre-infantile period need no substitutes; they demand to be individually shaped in and by each man's life and work. They are images sprung from the life, the joys and sorrows, of our ancestors, and to life they seek to return, not in experience only but in deed. Because of their opposition to the conscious mind they cannot be translated straight into our world; hence a way must be found that can mediate between conscious and unconscious reality.

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[17] Cf. "Bruder Klaus," *Coll. Works*, Vol. 11.

VI

THE SYNTHETIC OR CONSTRUCTIVE METHOD

121 The process of coming to terms with the unconscious is a true labour, a work which involves both action and suffering. It has been named the "transcendent function"[1] because it represents a function based on real and "imaginary," or rational and irrational, data, thus bridging the yawning gulf between conscious and unconscious. It is a natural process, a manifestation of the energy that springs from the tension of opposites, and it consists in a series of fantasy-occurrences which appear spontaneously in dreams and visions. The same process can also be observed in the initial stages of certain forms of schizophrenia. A classic account of such a process is to be found, for example, in Gérard de Nerval's autobiographical fragment *Aurélia*. But the most important literary example is Part II of *Faust*.[2] The natural process by which the opposites are united came to serve me as the model and basis for a method which consists essentially in this: everything that happens in the course of nature, unconsciously and automatically, is [illegible] and integrated into the conscious mind and its outlook. Failure in many cases is due precisely to the fact that they lack the mental and spiritual equipment to master the events taking place within them. Here medical help has to intervene in the form of a special method of treatment.

122 As we have seen, the theories discussed at the beginning of this book rest on an exclusively causal-reductive procedure which resolves the dream (or fantasy) into its memory-components and the underlying instinctual processes. I have indicated

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[1] I discovered only subsequently that the idea of the transcendent function also occurs in the higher mathematics, and is actually the name of the function of real and imaginary numbers.

[2] For an analysis of one dream series see *Psychology and Alchemy*, Coll. Works, Vol. 12.

achieve the synthesis as well as the aim to construct this procedure. It breaks down at the point where the dream symbols can no longer be reduced to personal reminiscences or aspirations, that is, when the images of the collective unconscious begin to appear. It would be quite senseless to try to reduce these collective ideas to anything personal; and not only senseless but positively harmful, as painful experience has taught me. Only with much difficulty and after long hesitation and disabused by many failures was I able to decide to abandon the purely personalistic attitude of medical psychology, in the sense indicated. I had first to come to the fundamental realization that analysis, in so far as it is reduction and nothing more, must necessarily be followed by synthesis, and that certain kinds of psychic material mean next to nothing if simply broken down, but display a wealth of meaning if, instead of being broken down, that meaning is reinforced and extended by all the conscious means at our disposal—by the so-called method of amplification.[1] The images or symbols of the collective unconscious yield their distinctive values only when subjected to a synthetic mode of treatment. Just as analysis breaks down the symbolical fantasy material into its components, so the synthetic procedure integrates it into a universal and intelligible statement. The procedure is not exactly simple, so I will give an example which will help to explain the whole process.

123 A woman patient, who had just reached the critical borderline between the analysis of the personal unconscious and the emergence of contents from the collective unconscious, had the following dream: *She is about to cross a wide river. There is no bridge, but she finds a ford where she can cross. She is on the point of doing so, when a large crab that lay hidden in the water seizes her by the foot and will not let her go.* She wakes up in terror.

Associations:

124 *River:* "It forms a boundary that is difficult to get over. I have to overcome an obstacle. It probably has to do with the fact that I am progressing so slowly. I ought to reach the other side."

125 *Ford:* "An opportunity to cross in safety, a possible way; otherwise the river would be too broad. In the treatment lies the possibility of surmounting the obstacle."

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[1] For definition see *Psychology and Alchemy* (Coll. Works, Vol. 12), pp. 277f.—EDITORS.

126 *Crab:* The crab was quite hidden in the water. I did not see it before. Cancer (German *Krebs* = crab), is a terrible disease, incurable (reference to Mrs. X, who died of carcinoma). I am afraid of this disease. The crab is an animal that walks backwards, and obviously wants to drag me into the river. It caught hold of me in a horrible way and I was terribly frightened. What keeps stopping me from getting across? Oh yes, I had another row with my friend (a woman).

127 There is something peculiar about her relations with this friend. It is a sentimental attachment bordering on the homosexual, that has lasted for years. The friend is like the patient in many ways, and equally nervous. They have marked artistic interests in common. The patient is the stronger personality of the two. Because their mutual relationship is too intimate and excludes too many of the other possibilities of life, both are nervous and, despite their ideal friendship, have violent scenes due to mutual irritability. The unconscious is trying in this way to put a distance between them, but they refuse to listen. The quarrel usually begins because one of them finds that she is still not sufficiently understood, and urges that they should speak more plainly to one another, whereupon both make enthusiastic efforts to unbosom themselves. Naturally a misunderstanding comes about in next to no time, and a worse scene than ever ensues. *Faute de mieux* this quarrelling had long been for both of them a pleasure, and one which they were unwilling to renounce. My patient in particular could not do without the sweet pain of being misunderstood by her best friend, although every scene "tired her out terribly." She had long since realized that this friendship had outlived itself, and only her false ambition made her believe that something ideal could still be made of it. She had formerly had an exaggerated, fantastic relationship to her mother, and after her mother's death had transferred her feelings to her friend.

Analytical interpretation on the subjective level[4]

128 [illegible] sentence: I see well enough that I ought to cross the river, that is, give up relations with my friend. [illegible]

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[4] A parallel view of the two kinds of interpretation is to be found in Herbert Silberer's illuminating book *Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism* (New York, 1917).

[illegible] could not get out of her clutches, i.e., [illegible] the wish that I want another to draw me to her [illegible] exuberant [illegible] I know so well. [illegible] strong [illegible] homosexual [illegible] projected on the latter. The crab seizes her by the foot. The patient has large "masculine" feet; she plays the masculine role towards her friend, and has corresponding sexual fantasies. The foot has a well-known phallic significance.[8] The complete interpretation therefore runs as follows: The reason why she does not want to leave her friend is because she has repressed sexual desires for her. As these desires are morally and aesthetically incompatible with the tendency of the conscious personality, they are repressed and therefore more or less unconscious. Her anxiety corresponds to her repressed desire.

129 This interpretation is a severe depreciation of the patient's exalted idea of friendship. To be sure, at this point in the analysis she would no longer have taken exception to such an interpretation. Some time ago the facts had already convinced her of her homosexual tendencies, so that she could freely admit this inclination, though it was by no means agreeable to her. If, then, I had given her this interpretation at the present stage of treatment, I would not have encountered any resistance. She had already overcome the painfulness of this unwelcome tendency by understanding it. But she would have said to me: "Why are we still analysing this dream? It only reiterates what I have known for a long time." The interpretation, in fact, tells the patient nothing new; she therefore finds it uninteresting and ineffectual. Such an interpretation would have been impossible at the beginning of the treatment, because the unusual prudery of the patient would not under any circumstances have admitted anything of the kind. The "poison" of understanding had to be instilled with extreme caution and in very small doses, until she gradually became more reasonable. Now when the analytical or causal-reductive interpretation ceases to bring to light anything new, but only the same thing in different variations, the moment has come to look for possible archetypal motifs. If such a motif comes clearly to the fore, it is high time to change the interpretative procedure. The causal-reductive pro-

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[8] This argument is pursued by Sigmar Baron von Schultze-Galléra, *Fuss- und Schuhsymbolik und Erotik* (Leipzig, 1909).

regime has in this particular case certain disadvantages. Firstly, it does not take accurately into account the patient's associations, e.g., the association of crab with cancer. Secondly, the peculiar choice of the symbol remains unexplained. Why should the mother-complex appear as a crab? A prettier and more plastic representation would have been a water nymph. ("Half drew she him, half sank he down," etc.) An octopus, a dragon, a snake, or a fish would have served as well. Thirdly, the causal-reductive procedure forgets that the dream is a subjective phenomenon, and that, consequently, an exhaustive interpretation can never refer the crab only to the mother, but must refer it also to the subject, the dreamer herself. The dreamer is the whole dream; she is the river, the ford, and the crab, or rather these details express conditions and tendencies in the unconscious of the subject.

130 I have therefore introduced the following terminology: I call every interpretation which equates the dream images with real objects an interpretation on the objective level. In contrast to this is the interpretation which refers every part of the dream and all the actors in it back to the dreamer himself. This I call interpretation on the subjective level. Interpretation on the objective level is analytic, because it breaks down the dream content into complexes of memory that refer to external situations. Interpretation on the subjective level is synthetic, because it detaches the underlying complexes of memory from their external causes, regards them as tendencies or components of the subject, and reunites them with that subject. (In any experience I experience not merely the object but first and foremost myself, provided, of course, that I render myself an account of the experience.) In this case, therefore, all the contents of the dream are treated as symbols for subjective contents.

131 Thus the synthetic or constructive process of interpretation[6] is interpretation on the subjective level.

The synthetic or constructive interpretation

132 The patient is unconscious of the fact that the obstacle to be overcome lies in herself, namely, a boundary-line that is difficult to cross and hinders further progress. Nevertheless it is possible to pass the barrier, but a special and unexpected danger

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[6] Cf. "The Content of the Psychoses," Part II (Coll. Works, Vol. 3). Elsewhere I have called this procedure the "hermeneutic" method. Cf. below, par. 493f.

to relate this situation at the moment something analogous to a human or animal [illegible] which moves backwards and downwards, threatening with it the whole personality of the former. It is rather like a cancerous disease that begins in some secret place and is incurable, overpowering. The patient imagines that her friend is a [illegible] and is dragging her down. So long as she believes that she must go on trying to "uplift" her friend, educate and improve her, she is bound to make futile and senseless [illegible] efforts to stop herself from being dragged down. Naturally her friend makes similar efforts, for she is in the same pass as the patient. So the two keep springing at each other like fighting cocks, each trying to get the upper hand. And the higher the one climbs, the [illegible] the other [illegible] torments the other. Who, then, is right? Each seeks the fault in the other on the objective level. Interpretation on the subjective level brings release from this bind, for the dream shows the patient that she has something in herself which prevents her from crossing the boundary, i.e., from getting out of one situation or attitude into another. The interpretation of a change of place as a change of attitude is corroborated by the forms of speech in certain primitive languages, where, for example, "I am thinking of going" is expressed as "I am at the place of going." To make the dream language clear we need numerous parallels from the psychology of primitives and historical symbolism, because dreams spring essentially from the unconscious, which contains remnants of all the functional possibilities of all preceding periods of evolution. A classical example is the "Crossing of the Great Water" in the Chinese oracle book, the *I Ching*.[1]

123 Of course everything now depends on what is meant by the crab. We know in the first place that it is something connected with the friend (since the patient associates it with her friend), and also something connected with her mother. Whether mother and friend really have this quality is irrelevant so far as the patient is concerned. The situation can be changed only by the patient changing herself. Nothing can be changed in the mother, for she is dead. And the friend cannot be [illegible] into changing. If she wants to change, that is her own affair. The fact

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[1] Translated by Cary F. Baynes from the Richard Wilhelm translation (Bollingen Series XIX, New York, 1950; London, 1951).

that the quality of this longing, which is connected with the mother, points to something infinite. What then is there in common in the patient's relation to her mother and to her friend? The common factor is a violent sentimental demand for love, so impassioned that she feels herself overwhelmed by it. This demand has the character of an overpowering animal longing, which, as we know, is blind. So we are dealing with an unbridled, undifferentiated, and not yet humanized part of the libido which still possesses the compulsive character of an instinct, a part still untamed by domestication. For such a part of the libido the animal is an entirely appropriate symbol. But why should the animal be a crab? The patient associates the crab with cancer, of which disease Mrs. X died at about the same age as that now reached by the patient herself. So there may be a hint of an identification with Mrs. X. We must therefore follow this up. The patient relates the following about her: Mrs. X was widowed early; she was very gay and full of life. She had a series of adventures with men, one in particular with an extremely gifted artist whom the patient knew personally, and who always impressed her as remarkably fascinating and strange.

134 An identification can only occur on the basis of some unrecognized, unconscious similarity. Now in what way is our patient similar to Mrs. X? Here I was able to recall to the patient's mind a series of earlier fantasies and dreams which had plainly shown that she too had a frivolous streak in her, which she always anxiously repressed because she feared that this tendency, dimly apprehended in herself, might lead her to an immoral life. With this we have gained a further important contribution to our understanding of the animal element, for once more we come upon the same untamed instinctive craving, but this time directed towards men. And we have also discovered another reason why she cannot let go of her friend: she must cling to her so as not to fall a victim to this other tendency, which seems to her much more dangerous. Accordingly she remains at the infantile, homosexual level, which serves her as a defence. (Experience shows that this is one of the most potent motives for clinging to unsuitable infantile relationships.) In this animal element, however, also lies her health, the germ of a [illegible] personality which will not shrink from the hazards of life.

155 But the patient had drawn quite a different conclusion from the fate of Mrs. X. She had taken the latter's sudden grave illness and early death as the punishment of fate for the gay life which, without admitting it, the patient had always envied. When Mrs. X died, the patient made a very long moral face which concealed an all-too-human malicious satisfaction. To punish herself for this she unconsciously used the example of Mrs. X to scare herself away from life and all further development, and burdened herself with the miseries of an unsatisfying friendship. Naturally this whole sequence of events had never been clear to her, otherwise it would never have happened. The rightness of this surmise was easily verified from the material.

156 The story of this identification by no means ends here. The patient subsequently emphasized that Mrs. X possessed a not inconsiderable artistic capacity, which developed only after her husband's death and then led to her friendship with the artist. This fact seems to be one of the essential reasons for the identification, if we remember that the patient had remarked what a strong and peculiarly fascinating impression the artist had made upon her. A fascination of this kind is never exercised exclusively by one person upon another; it is always a phenomenon of relationship, which requires two persons, inasmuch as the person fascinated necessarily has a corresponding disposition. But the disposition must be unconscious, or no fascination will take place. The fascination is a compulsive phenomenon, in the sense that it lacks a conscious motive; it is not a process of the will, but something that rises up from the unconscious and forcibly imposes itself upon the conscious mind.

157 It must therefore be assumed that the patient has an unconscious disposition similar to that of the artist. Accordingly she is also identified with a man.* We recall the analysis of the dream, where we met an allusion to the masculine side. And in fact the patient does play a masculine role with her friend. She is the active one, the one who always sets the tone, who bosses her friend and sometimes even forces her to do something she alone wants. Her friend is distinctly feminine, even in external appearance, while the patient is clearly of a somewhat masculine type. Her voice too is stronger and deeper than her friend's.

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* I am not mentioning the fact that the deeper reason for the sudden fixation w[illegible] be a [illegible] on the part of the patient.

Mrs. X is described as a very feminine woman, comparable to her friend so the pa[illegible]ks in gentleness and almost naïveness. This gives us another clue: the relation to her friend: the patient obviously plays the same role that the artist played with Mrs. X. This is how she unconsciously completes her identification with Mrs. X and her lover, and thus, in spite of all, she gives expression to the frivolous streak in her which she has so anxiously repressed. But she is not acting it consciously; she is rather the plaything of this unconscious tendency; in other words, she is possessed by it and has become the unconscious exponent of her complex.

138 We now know very much more about the crab. It contains the inner psychology of this unpaired bit of libido. The unconscious identifications keep drawing her down further and further. They have this power because, being unconscious, they are not open to insight or correction. The crab is therefore the symbol for the unconscious contents. These contents are always trying to draw the patient back into her relations with her friend. The crab walks backwards; but the connection with her friend is synonymous with disease, for through it she became neurotic.

139 Strictly speaking, all this analysis belongs to the analysis on the objective level. But we must not forget that we came into possession of this knowledge only by making use of the subjective level, which thus proves to be an important heuristic principle. For practical purposes we might rest content with the results so far reached, but we have to satisfy the demands of theory: not all the associations have yet been evaluated, nor has the significance of the choice of symbol yet been sufficiently explained.

140 We shall now take up the patient's remark that the crab lay hidden under the water and that she did not see it at first. Nor did she see at first the unconscious relations we have just discussed; they too lay hidden in the water. The river is the obstacle that prevents her from crossing to the other side. It was precisely these unconscious relations, binding her to her friend, that presented her. The unconscious was the obstacle. Thus the water signifies the unconscious, or rather the state of being unconscious, of concealment; for the crab too is something unconscious, in fact it is the dynamic content that lies concealed in the unconscious.

VII

THE ARCHETYPES OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

141 We are now faced with the task of grasping [illegible] ever the patient [illegible] has so far been [illegible] level [illegible] for this purpose we must detach the [illegible] from the objects and [illegible] them as symbolical exponents of the patient's subjective complexes. If we try to interpret the figure of Mrs. X on the subjective level, we must regard it as the personification of a part or rather of a certain aspect of the dreamer. Mrs. X then becomes an image of what the patient would like to be and yet fears to be. She represents, as it were, a partial picture of the patient's future character. The fascinating artist cannot so easily be raised to the subjective level, because the artistic ability lying dormant in the patient is already taken up by Mrs. X. It would however be correct to say that the artist is the image of the patient's masculinity, which is not consciously realized and therefore lies in the unconscious.[1] This is true in the sense that the patient does in fact deceive herself in this matter. In her own eyes she is quite remarkably fragile, sensitive, and feminine, and not in the least masculine. She was therefore indignant when I pointed out her masculine traits. But the strange feeling is quite out of keeping with these traits. It seems to be entirely lacking in them. Yet it must be [illegible] somewhere, since she produced this feeling out of herself.

142 Whenever such an element is not to be found in the dreamer herself, experience teaches us that it is always projected. But upon whom? Is it still [illegible] to the artist? He has long

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[1] I have called this masculine element in woman the animus and the corresponding feminine element in man the anima. See [illegible] pars. [illegible], and Emma Jung, "Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Animus," in Wirklichkeit der Seele (Zurich, 1934), pp. 296ff.

[illegible] from [illegible] patient's [illegible] very well have taken [illegible] as a [illegible] patient, and [illegible] yet she had no personal [illegible] But her he was [illegible] a figure of [illegible] as a [illegible] there must be [illegible] upon whom [illegible] she was [illegible] palpably aware of it in herself.

143 At this point we [illegible] level [illegible] out if we can [illegible] The patient does not know any [illegible] apart from [illegible] there [illegible] is projected on [illegible] and certainly [illegible] never appe[illegible] the [illegible] asked [illegible] did I see [illegible] when you are not with me [illegible] same [illegible] When I am with you you are quite pleasant [illegible] the picture I have of you changes [illegible] she haunted [illegible] [illegible] like an evil [illegible] such [illegible]

144 So the [illegible] was [illegible] on me as [illegible] the transference and that is [illegible] There were [illegible] really [illegible] Mrs. X [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] we were [illegible] [illegible] progress.

147 It is at this point that many a treatment [illegible] to a standstill. There is no way of getting out of the [illegible] of the unconscious except for the doctor to [illegible] himself to the subjective eye and to acknowledge himself as an image. But an image of what? Here lies the greatest difficulty of all. "Well now," the doctor will say, [illegible] in the unconscious of the patient." Whereupon she will say, "What! I am a man and a stranger like any other man at [illegible] or demon? Not on your life! I cannot [illegible] nonsense. I'd sooner believe [illegible] It is preposterous to transfer such things to her [illegible] any more than the doctor [illegible] an evil expression on her face [illegible] never seen before. I am suddenly faced by the possession of a painful misunderstanding. What is it? Disappointed love? Does she feel offended, depreciated? In her glance there lurks something of the beast of prey, something really demonic. Is she a demon after all? Or am I the beast of prey [illegible] and is it [illegible] sitting before me a terrified victim trying to defend herself [illegible] All this must surely be nonsense, fantasy [illegible] What new chord have I struck? It is only a passing moment. The expression on the patient's face clears, and she says as though relieved: "It is queer, but just now I had a feeling [illegible] point I can never get over in relation to my friend. It is a horrible feeling, something inhuman, evil, cruel. I simply cannot describe how queer this feeling is. It makes me hate and despise my friend when it comes, although I [illegible] it with all my might."

148 [illegible] throws a [illegible] light on what has happened. I have taken the place of the friend. The friend has been overcome. The ice of the repression is broken [illegible] the patient [illegible] Now I know [illegible] and all the good in her [illegible] patient has [illegible] A new phase of the transference has [illegible] the nature of the X that has been projected onto me.

[illegible] One [illegible] of [illegible] And [illegible] a statesman.

[illegible] the [illegible] the necessary [illegible]

[illegible] We [illegible] such an [illegible]

[illegible] These attributes always [illegible] collective unconscious are [illegible] Personal [illegible] and display the correspon[illegible] been startled by the rust[illegible]

[illegible] collective psyche. In so far as through our unconscious we [illegible] the historical [illegible] which [illegible] ages have [illegible] Equally we have a share in gods and devils [illegible] unconscious [illegible] persons [illegible] the sharpest [illegible] personal and [illegible] very [illegible] existence of the contents [illegible] they are [illegible]

Simply [illegible] consciousness [illegible] the gods and demons were not regarded as psychic projections and hence as contents of the unconscious but as self-evident realities. Only in the [illegible] did people discover that the gods did not really exist, but were simply projections. Thus the gods were disposed of. But the corresponding psychological function was by no means disposed of [illegible] and men were [illegible] the [illegible] of so powerful a function as the religious function naturally have serious consequences for the psychology [illegible] Rousseau [illegible] experience [illegible] has been [illegible] the [illegible] the function of the [illegible] we cannot [illegible]

[illegible] and natural [illegible] the then [illegible] in their own ways, even devoting their loftiest ideas and their best wits to expressing its madness in the most perfect form. We see the same thing in miniature in our patient, who fled from a sense of life that seemed to her irrational. Mrs. X [illegible] to live it out in pathological form and with the greatest sacrifices in her relations with her friend.

151 There is nothing for it but to recognize the irrational as a necessary, because ever-present, psychological function, and to take its contents not as concrete realities—that would be a regression!—but as psychic realities, real because they work. The collective unconscious, being the repository of man's experience and at the same time the prior condition of this experience, is an image of the world which has taken aeons to form. In this image certain features, the archetypes or dominants, have crystallized out in the course of time. They are the ruling powers, the gods, images of the dominant laws and principles, and of typical, regularly occurring events in the soul's cycle of experience.[3] In so far as these images are more or less faithful replicas of psychic events, their archetypes, that is, their general characteristics which have been emphasized through the accumulation of similar experiences, also correspond to certain general characteristics of the physical world. Archetypal images can therefore be taken metaphorically, as intuitive concepts for physical phenomena. For instance, aether, the primordial breath or soul-substance, is a concept found all over the world, and energy, or magical power, is an intuitive idea that is equally widespread.

152 On account of their affinity with physical phenomena, the archetypes usually appear in projection; and, because projections are unconscious, they appear on persons in the immediate environment, mostly in the form of abnormal over- or under-valuations which provoke misunderstandings, quarrels,

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[3] As will be clear from the above, the archetypes may be regarded as the effects and deposits of experiences that have already taken place, but equally they appear as the factors which cause such experiences.

[4] [illegible] the Structure of the Psyche [illegible], Vol. 8, paras. [illegible]ff. [illegible] pp. [illegible]ff.)

[illegible] as we say. He [illegible] Mr. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] formations [illegible] [illegible] types are [illegible] powerful effect [illegible] suppressed [illegible] conscious [illegible] with [illegible] as processes and since these [illegible] their evaluation [illegible] Thus when some [illegible] because [illegible] what makes the [illegible] possible. But [illegible] say that the [illegible] may be a [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] effect arises between [illegible] a devil [illegible] as devilish [illegible] by projecting it. But [illegible] as decent as [illegible] The [illegible] in such a case [illegible] present in [illegible] apart and keeps them [illegible] from [illegible] The devil is a variant of the shadow [illegible] the dangerous aspect of the unrecognized dark half of the personality.

[illegible] types that is almost invariably met with in [illegible] as the [illegible] of this [illegible] same [illegible] [illegible] in words and [illegible] the [illegible] while in *Faust* he is the actual hero.

[illegible]

[illegible] This figure often appears as [illegible] type, and [illegible] represents a [illegible] aspect [illegible] from [illegible] same [illegible] so far as [illegible] a very [illegible] is the wise old man.[4]

[illegible] step [illegible] words [illegible] disappears [illegible] For [illegible] we [illegible] real existence of the [illegible] take [illegible]

[illegible] state of dissociation [illegible] collective psyche. On the one [illegible] and on the [illegible] state of [illegible] namely a [illegible] and the [illegible] eyes. [illegible] present [illegible] of [illegible] after [illegible] lapse [illegible] as well as its [illegible]

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[4] [illegible] man who [illegible] and [illegible] speak of ordinary coyotes and of "doctor" coyotes.

[5] [illegible]

157 Before we go into this new question—and a passionate one—let us return to the dream from which we started. This whole discussion has given us a wider understanding of the dream and particularly of one essential part of it: the feeling of fear. This fear is a primitive dread of the contents of the collective unconscious. As we have seen, the patient identifies herself with Mrs. X, thereby showing that she too has some relation to the mysterious artist. It proved that the doctor was identified with the artist, and further we saw that on the subjective level I became an image for the figure of the magician in the collective unconscious.

158 All this is covered in the dream by the symbol of the crab, that which walks backwards. The crab is the living content of the unconscious, and it cannot be exhausted or made ineffective by analysis on the objective level. We can, however, separate the mythological or collective psychic contents from the objects of consciousness and consolidate them as psychological realities outside the individual psyche. Through the act of cognition we "posit" the reality of the archetypes, or, more precisely, we postulate the psychic existence of such contents on a cognitive basis. It must be expressly stated that it is not just a question of cognitive contents, but of transsubjective, largely autonomous psychic systems which on that account are only very conditionally under the control of the conscious mind and for the most part escape it altogether.

159 So long as the collective unconscious and the individual psyche are coupled together without being differentiated, no progress can be made, or, to speak in terms of the dream, the boundary cannot be crossed. If, despite that, the dreamer makes ready to cross the border-line, the unconscious becomes activated, seizes her, and holds her fast. The dream and its material characterize the collective unconscious partly as a lower animal that lives hidden in the depths of the water, and partly as a dangerous disease that can be cured only by a timely operation. To what extent this characterization is apt has already been seen. As we have said, the animal symbol points specifically to the extra-human, the transpersonal; for the contents of the collective unconscious are not only the residues of archaic specifically human modes of functioning, but also the residues of functions from man's animal ancestry, whose duration in [illegible]

was [illegible] that epoch of specific [illegible] These residues, or engrams, as Semon calls them, [illegible] adult, which [illegible] not only to retard the pace of development, but actually to force it into regression [illegible] the state [illegible] the energy [illegible] becomes serviceable again by being [illegible] unconscious and turned towards [illegible] The [illegible] have established this [illegible] energy [illegible] way by means of [illegible] however, is too much at variance with our [illegible] has moreover been too radically supplanted by [illegible] for us to accept it as [illegible] possible, [illegible] the problem [illegible] take [illegible] the unconscious as collective [illegible] of [illegible] hypotheses in no way [illegible] consciousness itself is a [illegible] also [illegible] and at the same time a possible [illegible] of effect [illegible] residues of our racial history. [illegible] the crossing of previous boundaries [illegible] and is therefore appropriately called the [illegible] It is synonymous with progressive development [illegible] that

160 The parallel with the [illegible] is very striking. More often [illegible] not the [illegible] with the monster [illegible] the water, perhaps at a ford. This is the case particularly in the Redskin myths with which Longfellow's *Hiawatha* [illegible] In the decisive [illegible] is like Jonah [illegible] swallowed by the monster, as Frobenius has shown,[4] with a wealth of detail. But once inside the monster, the hero begins to settle accounts with the creature in his own way, while it swims eastwards with him towards the rising sun. He cuts off a portion of the viscera, the heart for instance, or some essential organ by virtue of which

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[3] In his [illegible] observations on [illegible] theory of the unconscious, *Das Unbewusste* [illegible] *in Beziehung* [illegible] The term [illegible] Semon to explain the [illegible] unconscious. The concept of [illegible] only in certain [illegible] with Semon's concept of [illegible] Cf. Semon, *Die Mneme als erhaltendes Prinzip im Wechsel des organischen Geschehens* [illegible] as *The Mneme* (London, 1921).

[4] Leo Frobenius, *Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes* (Berlin, 1904).

the monster lives on the valuable energy that animates the unconscious. Thus he kills the monster, [illegible] where the hero is new born through the transcendent function (the "night sea journey," as Frobenius calls it), steps forth sometimes in the company of all those whom the monster has previously devoured. In this manner the normal state of things is restored, since the unconscious, robbed of its energy, no longer occupies the dominant position. Thus the myth graphically describes the problem which also engages our patient.*

161 I must now emphasize the not unimportant fact which must also have struck the reader, that in the dream the collective unconscious appears under a very negative aspect, as something dangerous and harmful. This is because the patient has a richly developed, indeed positively luxuriant fantasy-life, possibly due to her literary gift. Her powers of fantasy are a symptom of illness in that she revels in them far too much and allows real life to slip by. Any more mythology would be exceedingly dangerous for her, [illegible] a great [illegible] of external life [illegible] before her still unlived. She has too little hold upon life to risk at once a complete reversal of standpoint. The collective unconscious has caught up with her and threatens to bear her away from a reality whose demands have not been adequately met. Accordingly, as the dream indicates, the collective unconscious had to be presented to her as something dangerous, otherwise she would have been only too ready to make it a refuge from the demands of life.

162 In judging a dream we must observe very carefully how the figures are introduced. For example, the crab that personifies the unconscious is negative, since it "walks backwards," and in addition it holds back the dreamer at [illegible] moment. Misled by the so-called dream-mechanisms of Freud's dream-manufacture, such as displacement, inversion, etc., people have imagined they could make themselves independent of the "facade" of the dream by supposing that the true dream-thoughts lay hidden behind it. As against this I have long maintained that

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* Those of my readers who have a deeper interest in the problem of opposites and its solution, as well as in the mythological aspect of the unconscious, are referred to [illegible] *Psychological Types* [illegible] and The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, Coll. Works, Vol. 9.

we have no right to accuse the dream of, so to speak, a deliberate manoeuvre calculated to deceive. Nature is often obscure or impenetrable, but she is not, like man, deceitful. We must therefore take it that the dream is just what it pretends to be, neither more nor less.[9] If it shows something in a negative light, there is no reason for assuming that it is meant positively. The archetypal danger at the ford is so apparent that one is almost tempted to take the dream as a warning. But I must discountenance all such anthropomorphic interpretations. The dream itself wants nothing; it is a self-evident content, a plain natural fact like the sugar in the blood of a diabetic or the fever in a patient with typhus. It is only we who, if we are clever and can unriddle the signs of nature, turn it into a warning.

163 But a warning of what? Of the obvious danger that the unconscious may overpower the dreamer at the moment of crossing. And what would being overpowered mean? An invasion by the unconscious may very easily occur at moments of critical change and decision. The bank from which she approaches the river is her situation as known to her so far. This situation has precipitated her into a neurotic deadlock, as though she had come up against an impassable obstacle. The obstacle is represented in the dream as a perfectly passable river. So things do not seem to be very serious. But in the river, most unexpectedly, the crab lies hidden, and this represents the real danger on account of which the river is or appears to be impassable. For had she previously known that the dangerous crab was lurking at this particular spot, she might perhaps have ventured to cross somewhere else, or have taken other precautions. In the dreamer's present situation it is eminently desirable that a crossing should be made. The crossing means in the first place a carrying over, a transference, of her earlier situation to the doctor. That is the new feature. Were it not for the unpredictable unconscious this would not mean such a great risk. But we saw that through the transference the activity of archetypal figures is liable to be let loose, a fact we had not bargained for. We have reckoned without our host, for we "forgot the gods."

164 Our dreamer is not a religious person, she is "modern." She has forgotten the religion she was once taught; she knows

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[9] "General Aspects of Dream Psychology," Coll. Works, Vol. 8.

nothing of those moments when the gods intervene, or rather she does not know that there are age-old situations whose nature it is to stir up the depths. One should not underestimate its passion and its danger. Love may summon forth unsuspected powers in the soul for which we had better be prepared. Religio in the sense of a careful consideration of unknown dangers and agencies: that is what is in question here. From a simple projection love may come upon her with all its fatal power, some dazzling illusion that might throw her life out of its natural course. Is it a good thing or a bad, God or devil, that will befall the dreamer? Without knowing what it is, she feels that she is already in its clutches. And who can say whether she will be able to cope with this complication? Until now she has managed to circumvent such an eventuality, but now it threatens to seize hold of her. That is a risk we should avoid, or if we must take the plunge, we need a good deal of "trust in God" or faith in a successful issue. Thus, unsought and unexpected, the question creeps in of one's religious attitude to fate.

165 The dream as it stands leaves the dreamer no alternative at present but to withdraw her foot carefully; for to go on would be fatal. She cannot yet leave the neurotic situation, because the dream gives her no positive indication of any help from the unconscious. The unconscious powers are still unpropitious and obviously expect more work and a deeper insight from the dreamer before she can really venture across.

166 I certainly do not wish by this negative example to convey the impression that the unconscious plays a negative role in all cases. I will therefore add two further dreams, this time of a young man, which illuminate another and more favourable side of the unconscious. I do this the more readily since the solution of the problem of opposites can be reached only irrationally, by way of contributions from the unconscious, i.e., from dreams.

167 First I must [illegible] personally [illegible] the dreamer, for without [illegible] he will hardly be able to transport himself into the peculiar atmosphere of the dreams. There are dreams that are pure poems and can therefore only be understood through the mood they convey as a whole. The dreamer is a youth of a little over twenty, still entirely boyish in appearance. There is even a touch of girlishness in his looks and manner of expression. The latter betrays

a very good education and upbringing. He is intelligent, with pronounced intellectual and aesthetic interests. His aestheticism is very much in evidence: we are instantly aware of his good taste and his fine appreciation of all forms of art. His feelings are tender and soft, given to the enthusiasms typical of puberty, but somewhat effeminate. There is no trace of adolescent callowness. Undoubtedly he is too young for his age, a clear case of retarded development. It is quite in keeping with this that he should have come to me on account of his homosexuality. The night preceding his first visit he had the following dream: "*I am in a lofty cathedral filled with mysterious twilight. They tell me that it is the cathedral at Lourdes. In the centre there is a deep dark well, into which I have to descend.*"

168 The dream is clearly a coherent expression of mood. The dreamer's comments are as follows: "Lourdes is the mystic fount of healing. Naturally, I remembered yesterday that I was going to you for treatment and was in search of a cure. There is said to be a well like this at Lourdes. It would be rather unpleasant to go down into this water. The well in the church was ever so deep."

169 Now what does this dream tell us? On the surface it seems clear enough, and we might be content to take it as a kind of poetic formulation of the mood of the day before. But we should never stop there, for experience shows that dreams are much deeper and more significant. One might almost suppose that the dreamer came to the doctor in a highly poetic mood and was entering upon the treatment as though it were a sacred religious act to be performed in the mystical half-light of some awe-inspiring sanctuary. But this does not fit the facts at all. The patient merely came to the doctor to be treated for that unpleasant matter, his homosexuality, which is anything but poetic. At any rate we cannot see from the mood of the preceding day why he should dream so poetically, if we were to accept so direct a causation for the origin of the dream. But we might conjecture, perhaps, that the dream was stimulated precisely by the dreamer's impressions of that highly unpoetical affair which impelled him to come to me for treatment. We might even suppose that he dreamed in such an intensely poetical manner just because of the unpoeticalness of his mood on the day before, much as a man who has fasted by day dreams of

at [illegible] at night. It cannot be denied that the thought of treatment [illegible] and its unconscious [illegible] results in the dream [illegible] more effectively the [illegible] of the dreamer. He will be drawn on [illegible] in spite of the fact that he [illegible] Something of the dream mood will persist [illegible] even [illegible] he has to submit [illegible] Perhaps the disillusionment [illegible] with after-glow of the dream feeling.

170 It [illegible] perhaps [illegible] dream. This would not be [illegible] dreams are compensatory.[1] [illegible] of the dream picture. The dream [illegible] of course [illegible] ment to what he was about [illegible] that the dream gives him a [illegible] the nature of the treatment [illegible] the image of the cathedral [illegible] think of Cologne Cathedral. Even as a [illegible] I [illegible] and I saw a [illegible] I used to ask if that were Cologne Cathedral. I wanted to be a priest in a cathedral like that."

171 In these associations the patient is describing a very important experience of his childhood. As in nearly all cases of this kind he had a particularly close tie with his mother. By this we are not to understand a particularly good or intense conscious relationship, but something in the nature of a secret, subterranean tie which expresses itself consciously perhaps only in the retarded development of character, i.e., in a relative infantilism. The developing personality naturally veers away from such an unconscious infantile bond; for nothing is more obstructive to development than persistence in an unconscious—we could also say a psychically embryonic—state. For this rea

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[1] The idea of compensation has already been extensively used by Alfred Adler.

which the first feelers [illegible] the last support [illegible] a kind of object. That is [illegible] this object must be, in some sense, an analogue of her. This was precisely the case with my patient. The intensity with which his childish fantasy seized upon the symbol of the Mother Church proves the strength of his unconscious need for a substitute for the mother. The unconscious needs [illegible] further in a case where the infantile [illegible] injury. Hence the enthusiasm with which [illegible] took hold of the idea of the Church [illegible] another mother. We speak not only of Mother Church, but even of the Church's womb. In the ceremony known as the *benedictio fontis*, the baptismal font is apostrophized as "immaculatus divini fontis uterus." We naturally think that a man must have known this consciously before it could get to work in his fantasy, and that an unknowing child could not possibly be affected by such significations. Such analogies certainly do not work by way of the conscious mind, but in quite another manner.

172 The Church, however, has a higher meaning for the grown-up individual than a purely natural, or "carnal," tie to the parents. Consequently it frees the individual from an unconscious natural relationship which, strictly speaking, is not a relationship at all but simply a condition of inchoate, unconscious identity. It is just because it is unconscious that it possesses a tremendous inertia and offers the utmost resistance to any kind of spiritual development. It would be hard to say what the essential difference is between this state and the soul of an animal. Now, it is by no means the special prerogative of the Christian Church to try to make it possible for the individual to detach himself from his original, animal-like condition; the Church is simply the latest, and specifically Western, form of an instinctive striving that is probably as old as mankind itself. It is a striving that can be found in the most varied forms among all primitive peoples who are in any way developed and have not yet become degenerate: I mean the institution or rite of initiation into manhood. When he has reached puberty the young man is conducted to the "men's house," or some other place of consecration, where he is systematically alienated from his family. At the same time he is initiated into the religious mysteries, and in this way is ushered

information, but as an extraordinarily effective instrument of education.)

175 We come now to the second dream. I must explain in advance that in the first consultation I did not refer in any way to the dream we have just been discussing. It was not even mentioned. Nor was there a word said that was even remotely connected with the foregoing. This is the second dream: *"I am in a great Gothic cathedral. At the altar stands a priest. I stand before him with my friend, holding in my hand a little Japanese ivory figure, with the feeling that it is going to be baptized. Suddenly an elderly woman appears, takes the fraternity ring from my friend's finger, and puts it on her own. My friend is afraid that this may bind him in some way. But at the same moment there is a sound of wonderful organ music."*

176 Here I will only bring out briefly those points which continue and supplement the dream of the preceding day. The second dream is unmistakably connected with the first: once more the dreamer is in church, that is, in the state of initiation into manhood. But a new figure has been added: the priest, whose absence in the previous situation we have already noted. The dream therefore confirms that the unconscious meaning of his homosexuality has been fulfilled and that a further development can be started. The actual initiation ceremony, namely the baptism, may now begin. The dream symbolism corroborates what I said before, namely that it is not the prerogative of the Christian Church to bring about such transformations and psychic transmutations, but that behind the Church there is a living primordial image which in certain conditions is capable of enforcing them.

177 What, according to the dream, is to be baptized is a little Japanese ivory figure. The patient says about this: "It was a tiny, grotesque little manikin that reminded me of the male organ. It was certainly odd that this member was to be baptized. But after all, with the Jews circumcision is a sort of baptism. That must be a reference to my homosexuality, because the friend standing with me before the altar is the one with whom I have sexual relations. We belong to the same fraternity. The fraternity ring obviously stands for our relationship."

178 We know that in common usage the ring is the token of a bond or relationship, as for example the wedding ring. We can

[illegible] new [illegible] as a renewed and changed personality, into a new world, like one reborn (palingenesis). The initiation is often attended by all kinds of tortures, sometimes including such things as circumcision and the like. These practices are undoubtedly very old. They have almost become instinctive mechanisms, with the result that they continue to repeat themselves without external compulsion, as in the "baptisms" of German students or the even more wildly extravagant initiations in American students' fraternities. They are engraved in the unconscious as a primordial image.

173 When his mother told him as a little boy about Cologne Cathedral, this primordial image was stirred and awakened to life, but there was no priestly instructor to develop it further, so the child remained in his mother's hands. Yet the longing for a man's leadership continued to grow in the boy, taking the form of homosexual leanings—a faulty development that might never have come about had a man been there to educate his childish fantasies. The deviation towards homosexuality has, to be sure, numerous historical precedents. In ancient Greece, as also in certain primitive communities, homosexuality and education were practically synonymous. Viewed in this light, the homosexuality of adolescence is only a misunderstanding of the otherwise very appropriate need for masculine guidance. One might also say that the fear of incest which is based on the mother-complex extends to women in general; but in my opinion an immature man is quite right to be afraid of women, because his relations with women are generally disastrous.

174 According to the dream, then, what the initiation of the treatment signifies for the patient is the fulfilment of the true meaning of his homosexuality, i.e., his entry into the world of the adult man. All that we have been forced to discuss here in such tedious and long-winded detail, in order to understand it properly, the dream has condensed into a few vivid metaphors, thus creating a picture which works far more effectively on the imagination, feeling, and understanding of the dreamer than any learned discourse. Consequently the patient was better and more intelligently prepared for the treatment than if he had been overwhelmed with medical and pedagogical maxims. For this reason I regard dreams not only as a valuable source of

hence we safely take the fraternity ring in this case as symbolizing the homosexual relationship, and the fact that the dreamer appears together with his friend points in the same direction.

179 The complaint to be remedied is homosexuality. The dreamer is to be led from this relatively childish condition and initiated into the adult state by means of a kind of circumcision ceremony under the supervision of a priest. These ideas correspond exactly to my analysis of the previous dream. Thus far the development has proceeded logically and consistently with the aid of archetypal images. But now a disturbing factor appears to enter. An elderly woman suddenly takes possession of the fraternity ring; in other words, she draws to herself what has hitherto been a homosexual relationship, thus causing the dreamer to fear that he is getting involved in a new relationship with obligations of its own. Since the ring is now on the hand of a woman, a marriage of sorts has been contracted, i.e., the homosexual relationship seems to have passed over into a heterosexual one, but a heterosexual relationship of a peculiar kind since it concerns an elderly woman. "She is a friend of my mother's," says the patient. "I am very fond of her, in fact she is like a mother to me."

180 From this remark we can see what has happened in the dream: as a result of the initiation the homosexual tie has been cut and a heterosexual relationship substituted for it, a platonic friendship with a motherly type of woman. In spite of her resemblance to his mother, this woman is not his mother any longer, so the relationship with her signifies a step beyond the mother towards masculinity, and hence a partial conquest of his adolescent homosexuality.

181 The fear of the new tie can easily be understood, firstly as fear which the woman's resemblance to his mother might naturally arouse—it might be that the dissolution of the homosexual tie has led to a complete regression to the mother—and secondly as fear of the new and unknown factors in the adult heterosexual state with its possible obligations, such as marriage, etc. That we are in fact concerned here not with a regression but with a progression seems to be confirmed by the music which now peals forth. The patient is musical and especially susceptible to solemn organ music. Therefore music signifies for him a very positive feeling, so in this case it forms a harmonious conclusion

so the dream came with [illegible] is well equipped to leave behind a beautiful [illegible] to the [illegible].

82 If you consider the fact that up to now the patient had seen me only for one consultation, in which little more was discussed than a general anamnesis, you will doubtless agree with me when I say that such dreams make astonishing anticipations. They show the patient's situation in a light that is very remarkable, and one that is very strange to the medical consciousness, while at the same time lending to the banal medical situation an aspect that is uniquely attuned to the mental peculiarities of the dreamer and thus capable of stirring his aesthetic, intellectual and religious interests to a serious pitch. No better conditions for treatment could possibly be imagined. One is almost persuaded, from the meaning of these dreams, that the patient entered upon the treatment with the utmost readiness and hopefulness, quite prepared to cast aside his boyishness and become a man. In reality, however, this was not the case at all. Consciously he was full of hesitation and resistance; moreover, as the treatment progressed, he constantly showed himself antagonistic and difficult, ever ready to slip back into his previous infantilism. Consequently the dreams stand in strict contrast to his conscious behaviour. They move along progressive lines and take the part of the educator. They clearly reveal their special function. This function I have called compensation. The unconscious progressiveness and the conscious regressiveness together form a pair of opposites which, as it were, keeps the scales balanced. The influence of the educator tilts the balance in favour of progression.

83 In the case of this young man the images of the collective unconscious play an entirely positive role, which comes from the fact that he has no really dangerous tendency to fall back on a fantasy-substitute for reality and to entrench himself behind it against life. The effect of these unconscious images has something fateful about it. Perhaps—who knows?—these eternal images are what men mean by fate.

84 The archetypes are of course always at work everywhere. But practical treatment, especially in the case of young people, does not always require the patient to come to close quarters with them. At the climacteric, on the other hand, it is necessary to give special attention to the images of the collective unconscious, because they are the source from which hints may be

[illegible] the solution of the problem of opposites. From the [illegible] reveals itself as a mode of apprehension dominated by the archetypes and capable of uniting the opposites. By apprehension I do not mean simply intellectual understanding, but understanding through experience. An archetype, as we have said, is a dynamic image, a fragment of the objective psyche, which can be truly understood only if experienced as a living opposite.

185 A general account of this process, which may extend over a long period of time, would be pointless, even if such a description were possible, because it takes the greatest imaginable variety of forms in different individuals. The only common factor is the emergence of certain definite archetypes. I would mention in particular the shadow, the animal, the wise old man, the anima, the animus, the mother, the child, besides an indefinite number of archetypes representative of situations. A special position must be accorded to those archetypes which stand for the goal of the developmental process. The reader will find the necessary information on this point in my *Psychology and Alchemy*, as well as in *Psychology and Religion*, and in the volume produced in collaboration with Richard Wilhelm, *The Secret of the Golden Flower*.[11]

186 The transcendent function does not proceed without aim and purpose, but leads to the revelation of the essential man. It is in the first place a purely natural process, which may in some cases pursue its course without the knowledge or assistance of the individual, and can sometimes forcibly accomplish itself in the face of opposition. The meaning and purpose of the process is the realization, in all its aspects, of the personality originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm; the production and unfolding of the original, potential wholeness. The symbols used by the unconscious to this end are the same as those which mankind has always used to express wholeness, completeness, and perfection: symbols, as a rule, of the quaternity and the circle. For these reasons I have termed this the *individuation process*.

187 This natural process of individuation served me both as a model and guiding principle for my method of treatment. The

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[11] Respectively, in Vols. 12, 11, and [illegible] my commentary [illegible] 13 of the *Collected Works*.

unconscious as compensation of a neurotic conscious attitude contains all the elements that could effectively and healthily correct the one-sidedness of the conscious mind, provided these elements were made conscious, that is, understood and integrated into it as realities. It is only very seldom that a dream achieves such intensity that the shock is enough to throw the conscious mind out of the saddle. As a rule dreams are too feeble and too unintelligible to exercise a radical influence on consciousness. In consequence, the compensation runs underground in the unconscious and has no immediate effect. But it has some effect all the same; it is indirect in so far as the unconscious opposition will, if consistently ignored, arrange symptoms and situations which irresistibly thwart our conscious intentions. The aim of the treatment is therefore to understand and to appreciate, so far as practicable, dreams and all other manifestations of the unconscious, firstly in order to prevent the formation of an unconscious opposition which becomes more dangerous as time goes on, and secondly in order to make the fullest possible use of the healing factor of compensation.

188 These proceedings naturally rest on the assumption that a man is capable of attaining wholeness, in other words, that he has it in him to be healthy. I mention this assumption because there are without doubt individuals who are not at bottom altogether viable and who rapidly perish if, for any reason, they come face to face with their wholeness. Even if this does not happen, they merely lead a miserable existence for the rest of their days as fragments or partial personalities, shored up by social or psychic parasitism. Such people are, very much to their own misfortune, more often than not inveterate humbugs who cover up their deadly emptiness under a fine outward show. It would be a hopeless undertaking to try to treat them with the method here discussed. The only thing that helps here is to keep up the show, for the truth would be unendurable or useless.

189 When a case is treated in the manner indicated the initiative lies with the unconscious, but all criticism, choice, and decision lie with the conscious mind. If the decision is right, it will be confirmed by dreams indicative of progress; in the other event correction will follow from the side of the unconscious. The course of treatment is thus rather like a running conversation with the unconscious. That the correct interpreta-

[illegible] be sufficiently clear from what has been said. But [illegible] ask [illegible] of the interpretation. Is there anything approaching a reliable criterion for the correctness of an interpretation? This question, happily, can be answered in the affirmative. If we have made a wrong interpretation, or if it is somehow incomplete, we may be able to see it from the next dream. Thus, for example, the earlier motif will be repeated in clearer form, or our interpretation may be debunked by some ironic paraphrase, or it may meet with straightforward violent opposition. Now supposing that these interpretations also go astray, the general inconclusiveness and futility of our procedure will make itself felt soon enough in the bleakness, sterility, and pointlessness of the undertaking, so that doctor and patient alike will be suffocated either by boredom or by doubt. Just as the reward of a correct interpretation is an uprush of life, so an incorrect one dooms itself to deadlock, resistance, doubt, and mutual desiccation. Stoppages can of course also arise from the resistance of the patient, as for instance from an obstinate clinging to outworn illusions or infantile demands. Sometimes, too, the doctor lacks the necessary understanding, as once happened to me in the case of a very intelligent patient, a woman who for various reasons looked to me rather a dubious customer. After a satisfactory beginning I had the feeling, growing more and more, that somehow my interpretation of her dreams was not quite hitting the mark. As I was unable to put my finger on the source of error, I tried to talk myself out of this feeling. But during the consulting hours I became aware of the growing dullness of our conversation, with a steadily increasing sense of [illegible]. Finally I resolved to speak about it at the next opportunity to my patient, who it seemed to me had not failed to notice this fact. The next night I had the following dream: *I was walking along a country road through a valley lit by the evening sun. On my right, standing on a steep hill, was a castle, and on the topmost tower, on a kind of balustrade, sat a woman. In order to see her properly I had to bend my head back so far that I got a crick in the neck. Even in my dream I recognized the woman as my patient.*

190 My conclusion was that if I had to look up so much in the dream, I must obviously have looked down on my patient

in reality. When I told her the dream together with the interpretation, a complete change came over the situation at once, and the treatment shot ahead beyond all expectation. Experiences of this kind, although paid for very dearly, lead to an unshakable confidence in the reliability of dream compensations.

97 To the manifold problems involved in this method of treatment all my labours and researches have been devoted for the last ten years. But since, in this present account of analytical psychology, I am concerned only to provide a general survey, a more detailed exposition of the widely ramified scientific, philosophical, and religious implications must remain in abeyance. For this I shall have to refer my reader to the literature mentioned above.

VIII

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE THERAPEUTIC APPROACH TO THE UNCONSCIOUS

192 We are greatly mistaken if we think that the unconscious is something harmless that could be made into an object of entertainment, a parlour game. Certainly the unconscious is not always and in all circumstances dangerous, but as soon as a neurosis is present it is a sign of a special heaping up of energy in the unconscious, like a charge that may explode. Here caution is indicated. One never knows what one may be releasing when one begins to analyse dreams. Something deeply buried and invisible may thereby be set in motion, very probably something that would have come to light sooner or later anyway—but again, it might not. It is as if one were digging an artesian well and ran the risk of stumbling on a volcano. When neurotic symptoms are present one must proceed very carefully. But the neurotic cases are not by a long way the most dangerous. There are cases of people, apparently quite normal, showing no especial neurotic symptoms—they may themselves be doctors and educators—priding themselves on their normality, models of good upbringing, with exceptionally normal views and habits of life, yet whose normality is an artificial compensation for a latent psychosis. Those concerned suspect nothing of their condition. Their vague suspicions may perhaps find only an indirect expression in the fact that they are particularly interested in psychology and psychiatry, and are attracted to these things as a moth to the light. But since the technique of analysis activates the unconscious and brings it to the fore, in these cases the healthy compensation is destroyed. The unconscious breaks forth in the form of uncontrollable fantasies and overwrought states which may, in certain circumstances, lead to mental disorder and possibly even to suicide. Unfortunately these latent psychoses are not so very uncommon.

193 The danger of [illegible] in cases like these threatens everybody who concerns himself with the analysis of the unconscious, even if he be equipped with a large measure of experience and skill. Through clumsiness, mistaken ideas, arbitrary interpretations, and so forth, he may even wreck cases that need not necessarily have turned out badly. This is by no means peculiar to the analysis of the unconscious but is the penalty of any medical intervention that miscarries. The assertion that analysis drives people mad is obviously just as stupid as the vulgar notion that the psychiatrist is [illegible] mad because he deals with lunatics.

194 Apart from the risks of treatment, the unconscious may also turn dangerous on its own account. One of the commonest forms of danger is the instigating of accidents. A very large number of accidents of every description, more than people would ever guess, are of psychic causation, ranging from trivial mishaps like stumbling, banging oneself, burning one's fingers, etc., to car smashes and catastrophes in the mountains; all these may be psychically caused and may sometimes have been preparing for weeks or even months. I have examined many cases of this kind, and often I could point to dreams which showed signs of a tendency to self-injury weeks beforehand. All those accidents that happen through so-called carelessness should be examined for such determinants. We know of course that when for one reason or another we feel out of sorts, we are liable to commit not only the minor stupidities but something really dangerous which, given the right psychological moment, may well put an end to our lives. The popular saying "Old So-and-so chose the right time to die" comes from a sure sense of the secret psychological causation in question. In the same way, bodily ills can be caused or indefinitely protracted. A wrong functioning of the psyche can do much to injure the body, just as conversely a bodily illness can affect the psyche; for psyche and body are not separate entities, but one and the same life. Thus there is seldom a bodily ailment that does not show psychic complications, even if it is not psychically caused.

195 It would be wrong, however, to dwell only on the unfavourable side of the unconscious. In all ordinary cases the unconscious is unfavourable or dangerous only because we are not at one with it and therefore in opposition to it. A negative [illegible]

order to undergo a far-reaching psychological development neither outstanding intelligence nor any other talent is necessary, since in this development moral qualities can make up for intellectual shortcomings. It must not on any account be imagined that the treatment consists in grafting upon people's minds general formulae and complicated doctrines. There is no question of that. Each can take what he needs in his own way and in his own language. What I have presented here is an intellectual formulation; it is not the sort of thing discussed in the general run of practical work. The little snippets of case history I have woven into my theme give a rough idea of what happens in practice.

200 If after all that has been related in the foregoing chapters, the reader should still not feel capable of forming a clear picture of the theory and practice of modern medical psychology, that would not surprise me so very much. I would on the contrary be the first to blame my faulty gift of exposition, since it can hardly be possible to give a concrete picture of that wide field of thought and experience which is the domain of medical psychology. On paper the interpretation of a dream may look arbitrary, muddled, and spurious; but the same thing in reality can be a little drama of unsurpassed realism. To *experience* a dream and its interpretation is very different from having a tepid rehash set before you on paper. Everything about this psychology is, in the deepest sense, experience; the entire theory, even where it puts on the most abstract airs, is the direct outcome of something experienced. If I accuse the Freudian sexual theory of one-sidedness, that does not mean that it rests on groundless speculation; it too is a faithful picture of real facts which force themselves upon our practical observation. And if the inferences made from them develop into a one-sided theory, that only goes to show with what powers of persuasion both objective and subjective the facts impose themselves. One can hardly ask the individual investigator to rise superior to his own deepest impressions and the abstract formulation of them. For the acquisition of impressions as well as their conceptual mastery is in itself a lifetime's work. For my part, I had the great advantage over both Freud and Adler of not having grown up within the narrow confines of a psychology of the neuroses; rather, I approached it from the side of psychiatry

to lose the unconscious or its splitting off is detrimental in so far as the dynamics of the unconscious are identical with instinctual energy.[1] Disalliance with the unconscious is synonymous with loss of instinct and rootlessness.

196 If we can successfully develop that function which I have called the transcendent, the disharmony ceases and we can then enjoy the favourable side of the unconscious. The unconscious then gives us all the encouragement and help that a bountiful nature can shower upon man. It holds possibilities which are locked away from the conscious mind, for it has at its disposal all subliminal psychic contents, all those things which have been forgotten or overlooked, as well as the wisdom and experience of uncounted centuries, which are laid down in its archetypal organs.

197 The unconscious is continually active, combining its material in ways which serve the future. It produces, no less than the conscious mind, subliminal combinations that are prospective; only, they are markedly superior to the conscious combinations both in refinement and in scope. For these reasons the unconscious could serve man as a unique guide, provided that he can resist the lure of being misguided.

198 In practice the treatment is adjusted according to the therapeutic results obtained. Results may appear at almost any stage of the treatment, quite irrespective of the severity or duration of the illness. And conversely, the treatment of a severe case may last a very long time without reaching, or needing to reach, the higher stages of development. There are a fair number of people who, even after therapeutic results have been obtained, go through further stages of transformation for the sake of their own development. So it is not true that one must be a severe case in order to go through the whole process. At all events only those individuals can attain to a higher degree of consciousness who are destined to it and called to it from the beginning, i.e., who have a capacity and an urge for higher differentiation. In this matter men differ extremely, as also do the animal species, among whom there are conservatives and progressives. Nature is aristocratic, but not in the sense of having reserved the possibility of differentiation exclusively for species high in the scale. So too with the possibility of psychic development: it is not reserved for specially gifted individuals. In other words, in

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[1] "Instinct and Unconscious," Coll. Works, Vol. 8.

was prepared for modern psychology by Nietzsche, and apart from Freud's views I also had before my eyes the growth of the views of Adler. In this way I found myself in the thick of the conflict from the very beginning, and was forced to regard not only the existing opinions but my own as well as relative, or rather as expressions of a certain psychological type. Just as the Breuer case we have discussed was decisive for Freud, so a decisive experience underlies my own views. Towards the end of my medical training I observed for a long period a case of somnambulism in a young girl. It became the theme of my doctor's dissertation.[5] For one acquainted with my scientific writings it may not be without interest to compare this forty-year-old study with my later ideas.

200 Work in this field is pioneer work. I have often made mistakes and had many times to forget what I had learned. But I know and am content to know that as surely as light comes out of darkness so truth is born of error. I have let Guglielmo Ferrero's mot about the "misérable vanité du savant"[6] serve me for a warning, and have therefore never feared my mistakes nor seriously regretted them. For me scientific research work was never a milch cow or a means of prestige but a struggle, often a bitter one, forced upon me by daily psychological experience of the sick. Hence not everything I bring forth is written out of my head but much of it comes from the heart also, a fact I would beg the gracious reader not to overlook if, following up the intellectual line of thought, he comes upon certain lacunae that have not been properly filled in. A harmonious flow of exposition can only be expected when one is writing about things which one already knows. But when, urged on by the need to help and to heal, one acts as a pathfinder, one must speak also of realities as yet unknown.

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[5] "On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena," *Coll. Works*, Vol. 1.

[6] "C'est donc un devoir moral de l'homme de science de s'exposer à commettre des erreurs et à subir des critiques, pour que la science avance toujours. Ceux qui sont doués d'un esprit assez sérieux et froid pour ne pas croire que tout ce qu'ils écrivent est l'expression de la vérité absolue et éternelle, approuveront cette théorie qui place les raisons de la science au dessus de la misérable vanité et du mesquin amour propre du savant." *Les Lois psychologiques du symbolisme* (Paris, 1895), p. viii; trans. of *I simboli in rapporto alla storia e filosofia del diritto alla psicologia e alla sociologia* (Turin, 1893).

CONCLUSION

201 In conclusion, I must ask the reader to forgive me for having tried to say in these few pages so much that is new and perhaps hard to understand. I expose myself to his critical judgment because I feel it is the duty of one who goes his own way to inform society of what he finds on his voyage of discovery, be it cooling water for the thirsty or the sandy wastes of unfruitful error. The one helps, the other warns. Not the criticism of individual contemporaries will decide the truth or falsity of his discoveries, but future generations. There are things that are not yet true today, perhaps we dare not find them true, but tomorrow they may be. So every man whose fate it is to go his individual way must proceed with hopefulness and watchfulness, ever conscious of his loneliness and its dangers. The peculiarity of the way here described is largely due to the fact that in psychology, which springs from and acts upon real life, we can no longer approach it from the narrowly intellectual scientific standpoint, but are driven to take account of the standpoint of feeling and consequently of everything that the psyche actually contains. In practical psychology we are dealing not with any generalized human psyche, but with individual human beings and the multitude of problems that oppress them. A psychology that satisfies the intellect alone can never be practical, for the totality of the psyche can never be grasped by intellect alone. Whether we will or no, philosophy keeps breaking through, because the psyche seeks an expression that will embrace its total nature.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This little book is the outcome of a lecture which was originally published in 1916 under the title "La Structure de l'inconscient."[1] It subsequently appeared in English under the title "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" in my *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*.[2] I mention these facts because I wish to place it on record that the present essay is not making its first appearance but is rather the expression of a long-standing endeavour to grasp and—at least in its essential features—to depict the strange character and course of that *drame intérieur*, the transformation process of the unconscious psyche. This idea of the independence of the unconscious, which distinguishes my views so radically from those of Freud, came to me as far back as 1902, when I was engaged in studying the psychic history of a young girl somnambulist.[3] In a lecture on [illegible] the content of the psychoses,[4] I approached this idea from another side. In 1912 I illustrated some of the main points of the process in an individual case and at the same time I indicated the historical and ethnological parallels to these seemingly universal psychic events.[5] In the above-mentioned essay [illegible] I made my first attempt at a comprehensive account of the whole process. It was a mere attempt, of whose inadequacy I was painfully aware. The difficulties presented by the material were so great that I could not hope to do them justice in a single essay. I therefore let it rest at the stage of "work in progress," with the intention of returning to it at some later opportunity.

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[1] Cf. below, pars. 437ff., "The Structure of the Unconscious."

[2] 2nd ed., London, 1917; New York, 1920.

[3] "On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena," Coll. Works, Vol. 1.

[4] *Der Inhalt der Psychose* [illegible]

[5] *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* [illegible] New York [illegible] [illegible] Works, Vol. 5, *Symbols of Transformation* [illegible]

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL
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twelve years of further experience enabled me, in 1928, to undertake a thorough revision of my formulations of 1916, and the result of these labours was the little book *Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten*.* This time I tried to describe chiefly the relation of the ego-consciousness to the unconscious process. Following this intention I concerned myself more particularly with those phenomena which are to be regarded as the reactive symptoms of the conscious personality to the influences of the unconscious. In this way I tried to effect an indirect approach to the unconscious process itself. These investigations have not yet come to a satisfactory conclusion, for the answer to the crucial problem of the nature and essence of the unconscious process has still to be found. I would not have ventured on this exceedingly difficult task without the greatest possible experience. Its solution is reserved for the future.

I trust the reader of this book will bear with me if I beg him to regard it [illegible] as an earnest attempt on my part to form an intellectual conception of a new and hitherto unexplored field of experience. It is not a question of a clever system of thought, but with the formulation of complex psychic experiences which have never yet been the subject of scientific study. Since the psyche is an irrational datum and cannot, in accordance with the old picture, be equated with a more or less divine Reason, it should not surprise us if, in the course of psychological experience, we come across, with extreme frequency, processes and happenings which run counter to our rational expectations and are therefore rejected by the rationalistic attitude of our conscious mind. Such an attitude is naturally not very suitable for psychological observation, because it is in the highest degree unscientific. We must not attempt to tell nature what to do if we want to observe her operations undisturbed.

It is twenty-eight years of psychological and psychiatric experience that I am trying to sum up here, so perhaps my little book may lay some claim to serious consideration. Naturally I could not say everything in this single exposition. The reader will find a continuation of the last chapter in *The Secret of the*

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* Trans. by H. G. and C. F. Baynes as "The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious" in *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, London and New York, 1928.

Golden Flower,[1] the book I brought out in collaboration with my friend Richard Wilhelm. I do not wish to omit reference to this publication, because Oriental philosophy has been concerned with these interior psychic processes for many hundreds of years and is therefore, in view of the great need for comparative material, of inestimable value in psychological research.

October, 1934 C. G. JUNG

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[1] Trans. by Cary F. Baynes (London and New York, 1931). [The commentary by Jung is in *Coll. Works*, Vol. 13.—EDITORS.]

PART ONE

THE EFFECTS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS UPON CONSCIOUSNESS

I

THE PERSONAL AND THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

202 In Freud's view, as most people know, the contents of the unconscious are limited to infantile tendencies which are repressed because of their incompatible character. Repression is a process that begins in early childhood under the moral influence of the environment and lasts throughout life. Through analysis the repressions are removed and the repressed wishes made conscious.

203 According to this theory, the unconscious contains only those parts of the personality which could just as well be conscious, and are in fact suppressed only through upbringing. Although from one point of view the infantile tendencies of the unconscious are the most conspicuous, it would nonetheless be incorrect to define or evaluate the unconscious entirely in these terms. The unconscious has still another side to it: it includes not only repressed contents, but also all psychic material that lies below the threshold of consciousness. It is impossible to explain the subliminal nature of all this material on the principle of repression; otherwise, through the removal of repressions, a man would acquire a phenomenal memory which would thenceforth forget nothing.

204 We therefore emphatically say that in addition to the repressed material the unconscious contains all those psychic components that have fallen below the threshold, including sublim-

and sexual problems. Moreover, we know that our experience as well as theoretical reasons confirm that the unconscious also contains all the material that has not yet reached the threshold of consciousness. These are the seeds of future conscious contents. Equally we have reason to suppose that the unconscious is never at rest in the sense of being inactive, but is continually engaged in grouping and regrouping its contents. Only in pathological cases can this activity be regarded as completely autonomous; normally it is co-ordinated with the conscious mind in a compensatory relationship.

203 It is to be assumed that all these contents are personal in so far as they are acquired during the individual's life. Since this life is limited, the number of acquired contents in the unconscious must also be limited. This being so, it might be thought possible to empty the unconscious either by analysis or by making a complete inventory of unconscious contents, on the ground that the unconscious cannot produce anything more than is already known and accepted in the conscious mind. We should also have to infer, as already indicated, that if one could stop the descent of conscious contents into the unconscious by doing away with repression, unconscious productivity would be paralysed. This is possible only to a very limited extent, as we know from experience. We urge our patients to hold fast to repressed contents that have been re-associated with consciousness, and to assimilate them into their plan of life. But this procedure, as we may daily convince ourselves, makes no impression on the unconscious, since it calmly goes on producing dreams and fantasies which, according to Freud's original theory, must arise from personal repressions. If in such cases we pursue our observations systematically and without prejudice, we shall find material which, although similar in form to the previous personal contents, yet seems to contain allusions that go far beyond the personal sphere.

204 Casting about in my mind for an example to illustrate what I have just said, I have a particularly vivid memory of a woman patient with a mild hysterical neurosis which, as we expressed it in those days, had its principal cause in a "father-complex." By this we wanted to denote the fact that the patient's peculiar relationship to her father stood in her way.

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¹ Professor Jung refers here to his [illegible]

She had been on very good terms with her father, who had since died. It was a relationship chiefly of feeling. In such cases it is usually the intellectual function that is developed, and this later becomes the bridge to the world. Accordingly our patient became a student of philosophy. Her energetic pursuit of knowledge was motivated by her need to extricate herself from the emotional entanglement with her father. This operation may succeed if her feelings can find an outlet on the new intellectual level, perhaps in the formation of an emotional tie with a suitable man, equivalent to the former tie. In this particular case, however, the transition refused to take place, because the patient's feelings remained suspended, oscillating between her father and a man who was not altogether suitable. The progress of her life was thus held up, and that inner disunity so characteristic of a neurosis promptly made its appearance. The so-called normal person would probably be able to break the emotional bond in one or the other direction by a powerful act of will, or else—and this is perhaps the more usual thing—he would come through the difficulty unconsciously, on the smooth path of instinct, without ever being aware of the sort of conflict that lay behind his headaches or other physical discomforts. But any weakness of instinct, which may have many causes, is enough to hinder a smooth unconscious transition. Then all progress is delayed by conflict, and the resulting stasis of life is equivalent to a neurosis. In consequence of the standstill, psychic energy flows off in every conceivable direction, apparently quite uselessly. For instance, there are excessive innervations of the sympathetic system, which lead to nervous disorders of the stomach and intestines; or the vagus (and consequently the heart) is stimulated; or fantasies and memories, uninteresting enough in themselves, become overvalued and prey on the conscious mind (mountains out of molehills). In this state a new motive is needed to put an end to the morbid suspension. Nature herself paves the way for this, unconsciously and indirectly, through the phenomenon of the transference (Freud). In the course of treatment the patient transfers the father-imago to the doctor, thus making him, in a sense, the father, and in the sense that he is not the father, also making him a substitute for the man she cannot reach. The doctor therefore becomes both a father and a kind of lover—in other words, he [illegible] in whom the opposites are united, and for this reason he stands in a quasi-divine position [illegible] of the conflict. [illegible] the case, [illegible] he draws upon himself an overvaluation that is almost incredible to the outsider, for to the patient he seems like a saviour or a god. This way of speaking is not altogether so laughable as it sounds. It is indeed a bit much to be a father and mother at once. Nobody could possibly stand up to it in the long run, precisely because it is too much of a good thing. One would have to be a demigod at least to sustain such a role without a break, for all the time one would have to be the giver. To the patient in the state of transference, this provisional solution naturally seems ideal, but only at first; in the end she comes to a standstill, which is just as bad as the neurotic conflict was. Fundamentally, nothing has yet happened that might lead to a real solution. The conflict has merely been transferred. Nevertheless a successful transference can—at least temporarily—cause the whole neurosis to disappear, and for this reason it has been very rightly recognized by Freud as a healing factor of first-rate importance, but at the same time as a provisional state only, for although it holds out the possibility of a cure, it is far from being the cure itself.

207 This somewhat lengthy discussion seemed to me essential if my example was to be understood, for my patient had arrived at the state of transference and had already reached the upper limit where the standstill begins to make itself disagreeable. The question now arose: what next? I had of course become the complete saviour, and the thought of having to give me up was not only exceedingly distasteful to the patient, but positively terrifying. In such a situation "sound common sense" generally comes out with a whole repertory of admonitions: "you simply must," "you really ought," "you just cannot," etc. So far as sound common sense is, happily, not too rare and not entirely without effect (pessimists, I know, exist), a rational motive can, in the exuberant feeling of health you get from transference, release so much enthusiasm that a painful sacrifice can be risked with a mighty effort of will. If successful—and these things sometimes are—the sacrifice bears blessed fruit, and the erstwhile patient leaps at one bound into the state of being practically cured. The doctor is generally so delighted that he fails to tackle the theoretical difficulties connected with this little miracle.

208 If the leap does not succeed—and it did not succeed with my patient—one is then faced with the problem of severing the transference. Here psychoanalytic theory shrouds itself in a thick darkness. Apparently we are to fall back on some nebulous trust in fate: somehow or other the matter will settle itself. "The transference stops automatically when the patient runs out of money," as a slightly cynical colleague once remarked to me. Or the ineluctable demands of life make it impossible for the patient to linger on in the transference—demands which compel the involuntary sacrifice, sometimes with a more or less complete relapse as a result. (One may look in vain for accounts of such cases in the books that sing the praises of psychoanalysis!)

209 To be sure, there are hopeless cases where nothing helps; but there are also cases that do not get stuck and do not inevitably leave the transference situation with bitter hearts and sore heads. I told myself, at this juncture, with my patient, that there must be a clear and respectable way out of the impasse. My patient had long since run out of money—if indeed she ever possessed any—but I was curious to know what means nature would devise for a satisfactory way out of the transference deadlock. Since I never imagined that I was blessed with that "sound common sense" which always knows exactly what to do in every tangled situation, and since my patient knew as little as I, I suggested to her that we could at least keep an eye open for any movements coming from a sphere of the psyche uncontaminated by our superior wisdom and our conscious plannings. That meant first and foremost her dreams.

210 Dreams contain images and thought-associations which we do not create with conscious intent. They arise spontaneously without our assistance and are representatives of a psychic activity withdrawn from our arbitrary will. Therefore the dream is, properly speaking, a highly objective, natural product of the psyche, from which we might expect indications, or at least hints, about certain basic trends in the psychic process. Now, since the psychic process, like any other life-process, is not just a causal sequence, but is also a process with a teleological orientation, we might expect dreams to give us certain indicia about the objective causality as well as about the objective tendencies,

because they are nothing less than self-portraits of the psychic life-process.

211 On the basis of these reflections, then, we subjected the dreams to a careful examination. It would lead too far to quote word for word all the dreams that now followed. Let it suffice to sketch their principal character: the majority referred to the person of the doctor, that is to say, the actors were unmistakably the dreamer herself and her doctor. The latter, however, seldom appeared in his natural shape, but was generally distorted in a remarkable way. Sometimes his figure was of supernatural size, sometimes he seemed to be extremely aged, then again he resembled her father, but was at the same time curiously woven into nature, as in the following dream: *Her father (who in reality was of small stature) was standing with her on a hill that was covered with wheat-fields. She was quite tiny beside him, and he seemed to her like a giant. He lifted her up from the ground and held her in his arms like a little child. The wind swept over the wheat-fields, and as the wheat swayed in the wind, he rocked her in his arms.*

212 From this dream and from others like it I could discern various things. Above all I got the impression that her unconscious was unshakably holding to the idea of my being the father-lover, so that the fatal tie we were trying to undo appeared to be doubly strengthened. Moreover one could hardly avoid seeing that the unconscious placed a special emphasis on the supernatural, almost "divine" nature of the father-lover, thus accentuating still further the overvaluation occasioned by the transference. I therefore asked myself whether the patient had still not understood the wholly fantastic character of her transference, or whether perhaps the unconscious could never be reached by understanding at all, but must blindly and idiotically pursue some nonsensical chimera. Freud's idea that the unconscious can "do nothing but wish," Schopenhauer's blind and aimless Will, the gnostic demiurge who in his vanity deems himself perfect and then in the blindness of his limitation creates something lamentably imperfect—all these pessimistic suspicions of an essentially negative background to the world and the soul came threateningly near. And indeed there would be nothing to set against this except a well-meaning "you

enough, reinforced by a stroke of the axe that would cut down the whole phantasmagoria [illegible].

209 But as I said, the case was over and over in my mind, [illegible] I said to myself: it cannot be denied that the dreams continue to speak in the same old metaphors with which our conversations have made both doctor and patient sick [illegible]. But the patient has an undoubted understanding of her transference fantasy. She knows that I appear to her as a semi-divine father-lover, and she can, at least intellectually, distinguish this from my factual reality. Therefore the dreams are obviously reiterating the conscious standpoint minus the conscious criticism, which they completely ignore. They reiterate the conscious contents, not in toto, but insist on the fantastic standpoint as opposed to "sound common sense."

210 I naturally asked myself what was the source of this obstinacy and what was its purpose. That it must have some purposive meaning I was convinced, for there is no truly living thing that does not have a final meaning, that can in other words be explained as a mere left-over from antecedent facts. But the energy of the transference is so strong that it gives one the impression of a vital instinct. That being so, what is the purpose of such fantasies? A careful examination and analysis of the dreams, especially of the one just quoted, revealed a very marked tendency—in contrast to conscious criticism, which always seeks to reduce things to human proportions—to endow the person of the doctor with superhuman attributes. He had to be gigantic, primordial, huger than the father, like the wind that sweeps over the earth—was he then to be made into a god? Or, I said to myself, was it rather the case that the unconscious was trying to create a god out of the person of the doctor, as it were to free a vision of God from the veils of the personal, so that the transference to the person of the doctor was no more than a misunderstanding on the part of the conscious mind, a stupid trick played by "sound common sense"? Was the urge of the unconscious perhaps only apparently reaching out towards the person, but in a deeper sense towards a god? Could the longing for a god be a passion welling up from our darkest, instinctual nature, a passion unswayed by any outside influences, deeper and stronger perhaps than the love for a human person? Or was it perhaps

the highest and truest meaning of that inappropriate love we call transference, a little bit of real Gottesminne, that has been lost to consciousness ever since the fifteenth century?

215 No one will doubt the reality of a passionate longing for a human person; but that a fragment of religious psychology, an historical anachronism, indeed something of a medieval curiosity—we are reminded of Mechtild of Magdeburg—should come to light as an immediate living reality in the middle of the consulting-room, and be expressed in the prosaic figure of the doctor, seems almost too fantastic to be taken seriously.

216 A genuinely scientific attitude must be unprejudiced. The sole criterion for the validity of an hypothesis is whether or not it possesses an heuristic—i.e., explanatory—value. The question now is, can we regard the possibilities set forth above as a valid hypothesis? There is no a priori reason why it should not be just as possible that the unconscious tendencies have a goal beyond the human person, as that the unconscious can "do nothing but wish." Experience alone can decide which is the more suitable hypothesis.

217 This new hypothesis was not entirely plausible to my very critical patient. The earlier view that I was the father-lover, and as such presented an ideal solution of the conflict, was incomparably more attractive to her way of feeling. Nevertheless her intellect was sufficiently clear to appreciate the theoretical possibility of the new hypothesis. Meanwhile the dreams continued to disintegrate the person of the doctor and swell it to ever vaster proportions. Concurrently with this there now occurred something which at first I alone perceived, and with the utmost astonishment, namely a kind of subterranean undermining of the transference. Her relations with a certain friend deepened perceptibly, notwithstanding the fact that consciously she still clung to the transference. So that when the time came for leaving me, it was no catastrophe, but a perfectly reasonable parting. I had the privilege of being the only witness during the process of severance. I saw how the transpersonal control-point developed—I cannot call it anything else—a guiding function and step by step gathered to itself all the former personal overvaluations; how, with this afflux of energy, it gained influence over the resisting conscious mind without the patient's consciously noticing what was happening. From this I realized that

the dreams were not just fantasies, but self-representations of unconscious developments which allowed the psyche of the patient gradually to outgrow the pointless personal tie.[8]

218 This change took place, as I showed, through the unconscious development of a transpersonal control-point; a virtual goal, as it were, that expressed itself symbolically in a form which can only be described as a vision of God. The dreams swelled the human person of the doctor to superhuman proportions, making him a gigantic primordial father who is at the same time the wind, and in whose protecting arms the dreamer rests like an infant. If we try to make the patient's conscious, and traditionally Christian, idea of God responsible for the divine image in the dreams, we would still have to lay stress on the distortion. In religious matters the patient had a critical and agnostic attitude, and her idea of a possible deity had long since passed into the realm of the inconceivable, i.e., had dwindled into a complete abstraction. In contrast to this, the god-image of the dreams corresponded to the archaic conception of a nature-daemon, something like Wotan. Θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα, "God is spirit," is here translated back into its original form where πνεῦμα means "wind": God is the wind, stronger and mightier than man, an invisible breath-spirit. As in the Hebrew *ruach*, so in Arabic *ruh* means breath and spirit.[9] Out of the purely personal form the dreams develop an archaic god-image that is infinitely far from the conscious idea of God. It might be objected that this is simply an infantile image, a childhood memory. I would have no quarrel with this assumption if we were dealing with an old man sitting on a golden throne in heaven. But there is no trace of any sentimentality of that kind; instead, we have a primitive conception that can correspond only to an archaic mentality. These primitive conceptions, of which I have given a large number of examples in my *Symbols of Transformation*, tempt one to make, in regard to unconscious material, a distinction very different from that between "preconscious" and "unconscious" or "subconscious" and "unconscious." The justification for these distinctions need not be discussed here. They have a definite value and are worth refining further as points of view.

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[8] See [illegible]

[9] For a fuller explanation of this theme see [illegible] *Symbols of Transformation, Coll. Works*, Vol. 5, Index, under "wind."

The fundamental distinction on which [illegible] is based upon [illegible] of a [illegible] point of view. From what has been said it is clear that we have to distinguish in the unconscious a layer which we may call the personal unconscious. The materials contained in this layer are of a personal nature in so far as they have the character partly of acquisitions derived from the individual's life and partly of psychological factors which could just as well be conscious. It is readily understandable that incompatible psychological elements are liable to repression and therefore become unconscious. But on the other hand we also have the possibility of making and keeping the repressed contents conscious once they have been recognized. We recognize them as personal contents because we can discover their effects, or their partial manifestation, or their specific origin in our personal past. They are integral components of the personality, they belong to its inventory, and their loss to consciousness produces an inferiority in one or the other respect—an inferiority, moreover, that has the psychological character not so much of an organic mutilation or an inborn defect as of a want which gives rise to a feeling of moral resentment. The sense of moral inferiority always indicates that the missing element is something which one feels one should not be missing, or which could be made conscious if only one took enough trouble. The feeling of moral inferiority does not come from a collision with the generally accepted and in a sense arbitrary moral law, but from the conflict with one's own self which, for reasons of psychic equilibrium, demands that the deficit be redressed. Whenever a sense of moral inferiority appears, it shows that there is not only a demand to assimilate an unconscious component, but also the possibility of assimilating it. In the last resort it is a man's moral qualities which force him, either through direct recognition of the necessity to do so, or indirectly through a painful neurosis, to assimilate his unconscious self and to keep himself fully conscious. Whoever progresses along this road of realizing the unconscious self must inevitably bring into consciousness the contents of the personal unconscious, thus widening the scope of his personality. I should add at once that this "widening" primarily concerns the moral consciousness, one's self-knowledge, for the unconscious contents that are released and brought into consciousness by analysis are usually unpleas-

and which has presumably shown that these wishes, memories, tendencies, plans, etc., were repressed. These are the elements that are brought to the surface in the same way by a far-reaching confession, though to a much more limited extent. The rest comes out as a rule in dream-analysis. It is often very interesting to watch how the dreams fetch up the essential points, bit by bit and with the nicest choice. The total material that is added to consciousness causes a considerable widening of the horizon, a deepened self-knowledge which, more than anything else, is calculated to humanize a man and make him modest. But even self-knowledge, assumed by all wise men to be the best and most efficacious, has different effects on different characters. We make very remarkable discoveries in this respect in practical analysis, but I shall deal with this question in the next chapter.

219 As my example of the archaic idea of God shows, the unconscious seems to contain other things besides personal acquisitions and belongings. My patient was quite unconscious of the derivation of "spirit" from "wind," or of the parallelism between the two. This content was not the product of her thinking, nor had she ever been taught it. The critical passage in the New Testament was inaccessible to her—τὸ πνεῦμα πνεῖ ὅπου θέλει—since she knew no Greek. If we must take it as a wholly personal acquisition, it might be a case of so-called cryptomnesia,[4] the unconscious recollection of a thought which the dreamer had once read somewhere. I have nothing against such a possibility in this particular case; but I have seen a sufficient number of other cases—many of them are to be found in the book mentioned above—where cryptomnesia can be excluded with certainty. Even if it were a case of cryptomnesia, which seems to me very improbable, we should still have to explain what the predisposition was that caused just this image to be retained and later, as Semon puts it, "ecphorated" (ἐκφορεῖν, Latin *efferre*, 'to produce'). In any case, cryptomnesia or no cryptomnesia, we are dealing with a genuine and thoroughly primitive god-image that grew up in the unconscious of a civilized person

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[4] Cf. Théodore Flournoy, *Des Indes à la Planète Mars: Étude sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie* (Paris and Geneva, 1900; trans. by D. B. Vermilye as *From India to the Planet Mars*, New York, 1900), and Jung, "Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena" (Coll. Works, Vol. 1, [illegible] and 1920, p. 86).

and produced a living effect—an effect which might well give the psychologist of religion food for reflection. There is nothing about this image that could be called personal; it is a wholly collective image, the ethnic origin of which has long been known to us. Here is an historical image of world-wide distribution that has come into existence again through a natural psychic function. This is not so very surprising, since my patient was born into the world with a human brain which presumably still functions today much as it did of old. We are dealing with a reactivated archetype, as I have elsewhere called these primordial images.[5] These ancient images are restored to life by the primitive, analogical mode of thinking peculiar to dreams. It is not a question of inherited ideas, but of inherited thought-patterns.[6]

220 In view of these facts we must assume that the unconscious contains not only personal, but also impersonal collective components in the form of inherited categories[7] or archetypes. I have therefore advanced the hypothesis that at its deeper levels the unconscious possesses collective contents in a relatively active state. That is why I speak of the collective unconscious.

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[5] Cf. *Psychological Types*, Coll. Works, Vol. 6, Def. 26.

[6] Consequently the accusation of "fantastic mysticism" levelled at my ideas is lacking in foundation.

[7] Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, *Mélanges d'histoire des religions* (Paris, 1909), p. xxix.

II

PHENOMENA RESULTING FROM THE ASSIMILATION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

221 The process of assimilating the unconscious yields some very remarkable phenomena. In some patients it leads to an unmistakable and often unpleasant [illegible] ness; [illegible] they know everything, they are completely au fait with their unconscious, and they believe themselves to be perfectly acquainted with everything that comes out of it. At any rate with every interview the doctor sees them getting more and more above themselves. Others on the contrary are depressed, even crushed by the contents of the unconscious. They lose their self-confidence and look on with dull resignation at all the extraordinary things the unconscious produces. Patients of the first type, in the exuberance of their self-confidence, assume a responsibility for the unconscious that goes much too far, beyond all reasonable bounds; whereas the other sort finally give up all sense of responsibility [illegible] realization of the powerlessness of the ego against the fate that rules it from the unconscious.

222 If we examine these two extreme reactions [illegible] more closely, we find that behind the optimistic self-confidence of the first there lurks a [illegible] powerlessness, for which the conscious optimism acts as an unsuccessful compensation. And behind the pessimistic resignation of the second there is a defiant will to power, far surpassing in cocksureness the conscious optimism of the first.

223 With these two types of reaction I have sketched only the two rough extremes. A finer shading would have been truer to reality. As I have said elsewhere, every analysand starts by unconsciously misusing his newly won knowledge in the interests of his abnormal, neurotic attitude, unless he is sufficiently freed from his symptoms in the early stages to be able to dispense w

further treatment altogether. A very important contributory factor is that in the early stages everything is still understood on the objective level, i.e., without distinction between imago and object, so that everything is directly related to the object. Hence the man for whom "other people" are the objects of prime importance will conclude from any self-knowledge he may have imbibed at this stage of the analysis: "Aha! so that is what other people are like!" He will therefore feel it his duty, according to his nature, tolerant or otherwise, to enlighten the world. But the other man, who feels himself to be more the object of his fellows than their subject, will be weighed down by this self-knowledge and become correspondingly depressed. (I am naturally leaving out of account those numerous and more superficial natures who experience these problems only by the way.) In both cases the relation to the object is strengthened—in the first case in an active, in the second case in a reactive sense. The collective element is markedly accentuated. The one extends the sphere of his action, the other the sphere of his suffering.

224 Adler has employed the term "godlikeness" or "godalmightiness" to characterize certain basic features of neurotic power psychology. If I likewise borrow the same term from *Faust*, I use it here more in the sense of that well-known passage where Mephisto writes in the student's album and makes the following aside:

Just follow the old advice
And my cousin the snake,
And one day your likeness to God
Will make you quiver and quake.[1]

Godlikeness evidently refers to knowledge, the knowledge of good and evil.[2] The analysis and conscious realization of unconscious contents engender a certain superior tolerance, thanks to which even relatively indigestible portions of one's unconscious characterology can be accepted. This tolerance may look very wise and superior, but often it is no more than a grand gesture that brings all sorts of consequences in its train. Two spheres have been brought together which before were kept anxiously apart. After considerable resistances have been overcome, the union of opposites is successfully achieved, at least in all appearances. The deeper understanding thus gained, the juxtaposition of what was before separated and hence the apparent overcoming of the moral conflict, give rise to a feeling of superiority that may well express itself in the form of "godlikeness." But this same juxtaposition of good and evil can have a very different effect on a different kind of temperament. Not everyone will feel himself a superman, holding in his hands the scales of good and evil. It may also seem as though he were a helpless object caught between hammer and anvil; not in the least a Hercules at the parting of the ways, but rather a rudderless ship buffeted between Scylla and Charybdis. For without knowing it, he is caught up in perhaps the greatest and most ancient of human conflicts, experiencing the throes of eternal principles in collision. Well might he feel himself like a Prometheus chained to the Caucasus, or as one crucified. This would be a "godlikeness" in suffering. Godlikeness is certainly not a scientific concept, although the term expresses the psychological facts very graphically. Nor do I imagine that every reader will immediately grasp the peculiar state of mind implied by "godlikeness." The term belongs too exclusively to the sphere of *belles-lettres*. So I should probably be better advised to give a more careful description of this state. The insight and understanding, then, gained by the analysand usually reveal much to him that was hitherto unconscious. He naturally applies this knowledge to his environment; in consequence he sees, or thinks he sees, many things that were before invisible. Since his knowledge was helpful to him, he readily assumes that it would be useful also to others. In this way he is liable to become arrogant; it may be well meant, but it is nonetheless annoying to other people. He feels as though he possesses a key that opens many, perhaps even all, doors. Psychoanalysis itself has this same bland unconsciousness of its limitations, as can clearly be seen from the way it meddles with works of art.

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[1] *Faust*, Part I, 3rd scene in Faust's study.

[2] [Mephistopheles writes in the student's album: "Eritis sicut Deus, scientes bonum et malum."—EDITORS.]

225 Since human nature is not compounded wholly of light, but also abounds in shadows, the insight gained in practical analysis is often somewhat painful, the more so if, as is generally the case, one has previously neglected the other side. Hence there are people who take their newly won insight very much to heart, far too much in fact, quite forgetting that they are not

unique in having [illegible]. Others allow themselves to get unduly depressed and are then [illegible] and doubt everything, finding [illegible] answer. That is why many excellent analysts with very good ideas can never bring themselves to publish them, because the psychic problem, as they see it, is so overwhelmingly vast that it seems to them almost impossible to tackle it scientifically. One man's optimism makes him overweening, while another's pessimism makes him over-anxious and despondent. Such are the forms which the [illegible] takes when reduced to a smaller scale. But even in these lesser proportions the essence of the conflict is easily recognized: the arrogance of the one and the despondency of the other share a common uncertainty as to their boundaries. The one is excessively expanded, the other excessively contracted. Their individual boundaries are in some way obliterated. If we now consider the fact that, as a result of psychic compensation, great humility stands very close to pride, and that "pride goeth before a fall," we can easily discover behind the haughtiness certain traits of an anxious sense of inferiority. In fact we can see clearly how his uncertainty forces the enthusiast to puff up his truths, of which he feels none too sure, and to win proselytes to them in order that his followers may prove to himself the value and trustworthiness of his own convictions. Nor is he altogether so happy in his fund of knowledge as to be able to hold out alone; at bottom he feels isolated by it, and the secret fear of being left alone with it induces him to trot out his opinions and interpretations in and out of season, because only when convincing someone else does he feel safe from gnawing doubts.

226 It is just the reverse with our despondent friend. The more he withdraws and hides himself, the greater becomes his secret need to be understood and recognized. Although he speaks of his inferiority he does not really believe it. There arises within him a defiant conviction of his unrecognized merits, and in consequence he is sensitive to the slightest disapprobation, always wearing the stricken air of one who is misunderstood and deprived of his rightful due. In this way he nurses a morbid pride and an insolent discontent—which is the very last thing he wants and for which his environment has to pay all the more dearly.

227 Both are at once too small and too big; their individual mean, never very secure, now becomes shakier than ever. It

seems at least grotesque to describe such a state as "godlike." But since each in his way steps beyond his human proportions, both of them are a little "superhuman" and therefore, figuratively speaking, godlike. If we wish to avoid the use of this metaphor, I would suggest that we speak instead of "psychic inflation." The term seems to me appropriate in so far as the state we are discussing involves an extension of the personality beyond individual limits, in other words, a state of being puffed up. In such a state a man fills a space which normally he cannot fill. He can only fill it by appropriating to himself contents and qualities which properly exist for themselves alone and should therefore remain outside our bounds. What lies outside ourselves belongs either to someone else, or to everyone, or to no one. Since psychic inflation is by no means a phenomenon induced exclusively by analysis, but occurs just as often in ordinary life, we can investigate it equally well in other cases. A very common instance is the humourless way in which many men identify themselves with their business or their titles. The office I hold is certainly my special activity; but it is also a collective factor that has come into existence historically through the cooperation of many people and whose dignity rests solely on collective approval. When, therefore, I identify myself with my office or title, I behave as though I myself were the whole complex of social factors of which that office consists, or as though I were not only the bearer of the office, but also and at the same time the approval of society. I have made an extraordinary extension of myself and have usurped qualities which are not in me but outside me. *L'état c'est moi* is the motto for such people.

228 In the case of inflation through knowledge we are dealing with something similar in principle, though psychologically more subtle. Here it is not the dignity of an office that causes the inflation, but very significant fantasies. I will explain what I mean by a practical example, choosing a mental case whom I happened to know personally and who is also mentioned in a publication by Maeder.[1] The case is characterized by a high degree of inflation. (In mental cases we can observe all the phenomena that are present only fleetingly in normal people, in a cruder and

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[1] A. Maeder, "Psychologische Untersuchungen an Dementia Praecox-Kranken," *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen*, II (1910), 209ff.

enlarged form.[4] The patient suffered from paranoid dementia with megalomania. He was in telephonic communication with the Mother of God and other great ones. In human reality he was a wretched locksmith's apprentice who at the age of nineteen had become incurably insane. He had never been blessed with intelligence, but he had, among other things, hit upon the magnificent idea that the world was his picture-book, the pages of which he could turn at will. The proof was quite simple: he had only to turn round, and there was a new page for him to see.

229 This is Schopenhauer's "world as will and idea" in its unadorned primitive concreteness of vision. A shattering idea indeed, born of extreme alienation and seclusion from the world, but so naïvely and simply expressed that at first one can only smile at the grotesqueness of it. And yet this primitive way of looking lies at the very heart of Schopenhauer's brilliant vision of the world. Only a genius or a madman could so disentangle himself from the bonds of reality as to see the world as his picture-book. Did the patient actually work out or build up such a vision, or did it just befall him? Or did he perhaps fall into it? His pathological disintegration and inflation point rather to the latter. It is no longer *he* that thinks and speaks, but *it* thinks and speaks within him: he hears voices. So the difference between him and Schopenhauer is that, in him, the vision remained at the stage of a mere spontaneous growth, while Schopenhauer abstracted it and expressed it in a language of universal validity. In so doing he raised it out of its subterranean beginnings into the clear light of collective consciousness. But it would be quite wrong to assume that the patient's vision had a purely personal character or value, as though it were something that belonged to him. If that were so, he would be a philosopher. A man is a philosopher of genius only when he succeeds in transmuting the primitive and merely natural vision into an abstract

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[4] When I was still a doctor at the psychiatric clinic in Zurich, I once took an intelligent layman through the sick-wards. He had never seen a lunatic asylum from the inside before. When we had finished our round, he exclaimed: "I tell you, it's just like Zurich in miniature! A quintessence of the population. It is as though all the types one meets every day on the streets had been assembled here in their classical purity. Nothing but oddities and choice specimens from top to bottom of society!" I had never looked at it from this angle, but my friend was not far wrong.

idea belonging to the common stock of consciousness. This is an achievement, and this achievement constitutes his personal value, for which he may take credit without necessarily succumbing to inflation. But the sick man's vision is an impersonal value, a natural growth against which he is powerless to defend himself, by which he is actually swallowed up and "wafted" clean out of the world. Far from his mastering the idea and expanding it into a philosophical view of the world, it is truer to say that the idea in its untrammelled growth blew *him* up to pathological proportions. The personal value lies entirely in the philosophical achievement, not in the primary vision. To the philosopher as well this vision comes as so much increment, accruing to him from the common human store in which, theoretically, every one of us shares. The golden apples drop from the same tree, whether they be gathered by an imbecile locksmith's apprentice or a Schopenhauer.

230 There is, however, yet another thing to be learnt from this example, namely that these transpersonal contents are not just inert or dead matter that can be annexed at will. Rather they are living entities which exert an attractive force upon the conscious mind. Identification with one's office or one's title is very attractive indeed, which is precisely why so many men are nothing more than the decorum accorded to them by society. In vain would one look for a personality behind the husk. Underneath all the padding one would find a very pitiable little creature. That is why the office—or whatever this outer husk may be—is so attractive: it offers easy compensation for personal deficiencies.

231 Outer attractions, such as offices, titles, and other social regalia are not the only things that cause inflation. These are simply impersonal quantities that lie outside in society, in the collective consciousness. But just as there is a society outside the individual, so there is a collective psyche outside the personal psyche, namely the collective unconscious, concealing, as the above example shows, elements that are no whit less attractive. And just as a man may suddenly step into the world on his professional dignity ("Messieurs, à présent je suis Roy"), so another may disappear out of it equally suddenly when it is his lot to behold one of those mighty images that put a new face upon the world. These are the magical *représentations collectives* which underlie

lovers [illegible] level. The language of the poet and mystic. I remember here another mental case who was neither a poet nor anything outstanding, but was just naturally quiet and rather sentimental. He had fallen in love with a girl, and as so often happens, he had failed to ask her whether his love was requited. His primitive *participation mystique* took it for granted that his agitations were plainly the agitations of the other, which on the lower levels of human psychology is naturally very often the case. Thus he built up a sentimental love-fantasy which precipitously collapsed when he discovered that the girl would have none of him. He was so desperate that he went straight off to drown himself. It was late at night, and the stars gleamed from the dark water. It seemed to him that the stars were swimming two by two down the river, and a wonderful feeling came over him. He forgot his suicidal intentions and gazed fascinated at the strange, sweet drama. And gradually he became aware that every star was a face, and that all these pairs were lovers, who were carried along locked in a dreaming embrace. An entirely new understanding came to him: all had changed—his fate, his disappointment, even his love, receded and fell away. The memory of the girl grew distant, blurred; but instead, he felt with complete certainty that untold riches were promised him. He knew that an immense treasure lay hidden for him in the neighbouring observatory. The result was that he was arrested by the police at four o'clock in the morning, attempting to break into the observatory.

242 What had happened? His poor head had glimpsed a Dantesque picture, whose loveliness he could never have grasped had he read it in a poem. But he saw it, and it transformed him. What had hurt him most was now far away; a new and undreamed-of world of stars, tracing their silent courses far beyond this grievous earth, had opened out to him the moment he crossed "Proserpine's threshold." The intimation of untold wealth—and could anyone fail to be touched by this thought?—came to him like a revelation. For his poor turnip-head it was too much. He did not drown in the river, but in an eternal image, and its beauty perished with him.

243 Just as one man may disappear in his social role, so another may be engulfed in an inner vision and be lost to his

[illegible] Many [illegible] transformations of personality, like sudden conversions and other far-reaching changes of mind, originate in the attractive power of a collective image,[1] which, as the present example shows, can cause such a high degree of inflation that the entire personality is disintegrated. This disintegration is a mental disease, of a transitory or a permanent nature, a "splitting of the mind" or "schizophrenia," in Bleuler's term.[2] The pathological inflation naturally depends on some innate weakness of the personality against the autonomy of collective unconscious contents.

234 We shall probably get nearest to the truth if we think of the conscious and personal psyche as resting upon the broad basis of an inherited and universal psychic disposition which is as such unconscious, and that our personal psyche bears the same relation to the collective psyche as the individual to society.

235 But equally, just as the individual is not merely unique and separate, but is also a social being, so the human psyche is not a self-contained and wholly individual phenomenon, but also a collective one. And just as certain social functions or instincts are opposed to the interests of single individuals, so the human psyche exhibits certain functions or tendencies which, on account of their collective nature, are opposed to individual needs. The reason for this is that every man is born with a highly differentiated brain and is thus assured of a wide range of possible mental functioning which he has neither acquired ontogenetically nor developed himself. To the degree that human brains are uniformly differentiated, the mental functioning thereby made possible is also collective and universal. This explains the interesting fact that the unconscious processes of the most widely separated peoples and races show a quite remarkable correspondence, which displays itself, among other things, in the extraordinary but well-authenticated analogies between the themes and forms of autochthonous myths. The universal similarity of

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[1] Cf. the definition of "Image" in my *Psychological Types* (Coll. Works, Vol. 6), Part [illegible], Def. 26. Léon Daudet, in *L'Hérédo* (Paris, 1916), calls this process "autofécondation intérieure," by which he means the reawakening of an ancestral soul.

[2] [illegible] *Dementia Praecox* [illegible] by [illegible] trans. by J. Zinkin as *Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias*, New York, 1950).

the brain yields the universal possibility of a similar mental functioning. This functioning is the collective psyche. In so far as differentiations exist that correspond to race, tribe, and even family, there exists also a collective psyche limited to race, tribe, or family over and above the "universal" collective psyche. To borrow an expression from Janet,* the collective psyche comprises *les parties inférieures* of the psychic functions, that is to say the deep-rooted, well-nigh automatic, hereditary elements that are ubiquitously present, hence the impersonal or transpersonal portions of the individual psyche. Consciousness plus the personal unconscious constitutes *les parties supérieures* of the psychic functions, those portions, therefore, that are ontogenetically acquired and developed. Consequently the individual who assimilates the pre-existing and unconscious heritage of the collective psyche into his own ontogenetic equipment as though it were a part of the latter extends the bounds of his personality in an illegitimate way, with corresponding results. Because the collective psyche comprises *les parties inférieures* of the psychic functions and is therefore the basis underlying every personality, it has the effect of crushing and devaluing the personality. This shows itself either in the aforementioned stifling of self-confidence or else in an unconscious heightening of the ego's importance to the point of a pathological will to power.

236 By raising the personal unconscious to consciousness the analysis makes the subject aware of things which he is generally aware of in others but never in himself. This discovery makes him therefore less unique and more collective. His collectivization is not always a step to the bad; it may sometimes be a step to the good. There are people who repress their good qualities and consciously give free rein to their infantile desires. The lifting of personal repression at first brings purely personal contents into consciousness; but attached to them are the collective elements of the unconscious, the ever-present instincts, qualities and ideas (images) as well as all those "statistical" fractions of average virtue and average vice which we recognize when we say "Everyone has in him something of the criminal, the genius and the saint." Thus a living picture emerges, containing pretty well everything that moves upon

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* Pierre Janet, *Les Névroses* (Paris, 1898).

[illegible] the world [illegible] good and [illegible] are fair and are foul. A sense of solidarity with the world is gradually built up, which is [illegible] as something extremely positive and in certain cases as [illegible] the decisive factor in the treatment of neurosis. I have [illegible] seen such cases [illegible] man [illegible] and even to [illegible] by coming to [illegible] into the unknown [illegible] were suited. I have seen not a few who, taking this condition as final, remained for years in a state of enterprising euphoria. I have often heard such cases referred to as shining examples of analytical therapy. But I must point out that [illegible] are so utterly lacking in differentiation from the world that nobody could pass them as fundamentally cured. In my way of thinking they are as much cured as not cured. I have had occasion to follow the lives of such patients and I must [illegible] that many of them showed symptoms of maladjustment which, if persisted in, lead gradually to the sterility and monotony so characteristic of those who have divested themselves of the ego. Here too I am speaking of the borderline cases and not of the less valuable, normal average persons for whom the question of adaptation is more technical than problematical. If I were more a therapist than an investigator, I would naturally be unable to check a certain optimism of judgment, because my eyes would then be glued to the number of cures. But my conscience as an investigator is concerned not with quantity but with quality. Nature is aristocratic, and one person of value outweighs ten lesser ones. My eye followed the valuable people, and from them I learned the dubiousness of the results of a purely personal analysis, and also to understand the reasons for this dubiousness.

237 If, in the assimilation of the unconscious, we make the mistake of including the collective psyche in the inventory of personal psychic functions, a dissolution of the personality into its paired opposites inevitably follows. Besides the pair of opposites already discussed, megalomania and the sense of inferiority, which are so painfully evident in neurosis, there are many others, from which I will single out only the specifically moral pair of opposites, namely good and evil. The specific virtues and vices of humanity are contained in the collective psyche like everything else. One man arrogates collective virtue to himself

as his personal merit, and the collective vices as his personal guilt. Both are as illusory as the megalomania and the inferiority, because the imaginary virtues and the imaginary wickednesses are simply the pairs of opposites contained in the collective psyche, which have become perceptible or have been rendered conscious artificially. How much these pairs of opposites are contained in the collective psyche is exemplified by primitives: one observer will extol the greatest virtues in them, while another will record the very worst impressions of the selfsame tribe. For the primitive, whose personal differentiation is, as we know, still in its infancy, both propositions are true, because his psyche is essentially collective and therefore for the most part unconscious. He is still more or less identical with the collective psyche, and accordingly has all the collective virtues and vices without any personal attribution and without inner contradiction. The contradiction arises only when the personal development of the psyche begins, and when reason discovers the irreconcilable nature of the opposites. The consequence of this discovery is the conflict of repression. We want to be good, and therefore must repress evil; and with that the paradise of the collective psyche comes to an end. Repression of the collective psyche was absolutely necessary for the development of personality. In primitives, development of personality, or more accurately, development of the person, is a question of magical prestige. The figure of the medicine man or chief leads the way: both make themselves conspicuous by the singularity of their ornaments and their mode of life, expressive of their social roles. The singularity of his outward tokens marks him off from the rest, and the segregation is still further enhanced by the possession of special ritual secrets. By these and similar means the primitive creates around him a shell, which might be called a persona (mask). Masks, as we know, are actually used among primitives in totem ceremonies, for instance as a means of enhancing or changing the personality. In this way the outstanding individual is apparently removed from the sphere of the collective psyche, and to the degree that he succeeds in identifying himself with his persona, he actually is removed. This removal means magical prestige. One could easily assert that the impelling motive in this development is the will to power. But that would be to forget that the building up of prestige is always a product of collective compromise: not only must there be one who wants prestige, there must also be a public seeking somebody on whom to confer prestige. That being so, it would be incorrect to say that a man creates prestige for himself out of his individual will to power; it is on the contrary an entirely collective affair. Since society as a whole needs the magically effective figure, it uses this need of the will to power in the individual, and the will to submit in the mass, as a vehicle, and thus brings about the creation of personal prestige. The latter is a phenomenon which, as the history of political beginnings shows, is of the utmost importance for the comity of nations.

238 The importance of personal prestige can hardly be overestimated, because the possibility of regressive dissolution in the collective psyche is a very real danger, not only for the outstanding individual but also for his followers. This possibility is most likely to occur when the goal of prestige—universal recognition—has been reached. The person then becomes a collective truth, and that is always the beginning of the end. To gain prestige is a positive achievement not only for the outstanding individual but also for the clan. The individual distinguishes himself by his deeds, the many by their abdication from power. So long as this attitude needs to be fought for and defended against hostile influences, the achievement remains positive; but as soon as there are no more obstacles and universal recognition has been attained, prestige loses its positive value and usually becomes a dead letter. A schismatic movement then sets in, and the whole process begins again from the beginning.

239 Because personality is of such paramount importance for the life of the community, everything likely to disturb its development is sensed as a danger. But the greatest danger of all is the premature dissolution of prestige by an invasion of the collective psyche. Absolute secrecy is one of the best known primitive means of exorcising this danger. Collective thinking and feeling and collective effort are far less of a strain than individual functioning and effort; hence there is always a great temptation to allow collective functioning to take the place of individual differentiation of the personality. Once the personality has been differentiated and safeguarded by magical prestige, its levelling down and eventual dissolution in the collective psyche (e.g., Peter's denial) occasions a "loss of soul" in the individual, because an important personal achievement has been

certain negative rules [illegible] allowed to [illegible] this [illegible] and [illegible] cults are to [illegible] melts altogether in [illegible] the [illegible] situation. So long as we regard these things from the causal point of view, as mere historical survivals or metastases of the incest taboo,[1] it is impossible to understand what all these measures are for. If, however, we approach the problem from the teleological point of view, much that was quite inexplicable becomes clear.

240 For the development of personality, then, strict differentiation from the collective psyche is absolutely necessary, since partial or blurred differentiation leads to an immediate melting away of the individual in the collective. There is now a danger that in the analysis of the unconscious the collective and the personal psyche may be fused together, with, as I have intimated, highly unfortunate results. These results are injurious both to the patient's life-feeling and to his fellow men, if he has any influence at all on his environment. Through his identification with the collective psyche he will infallibly try to force the demands of his unconscious upon others, for identity with the collective psyche always brings with it a feeling of universal validity—"godlikeness"—which completely ignores all differences in the personal psychology of his fellows. (The feeling of universal validity comes, of course, from the universality of the collective psyche.) A collective attitude naturally presupposes this same collective psyche in others. But that means a ruthless disregard not only of individual differences but also of differences of a more general kind within the collective psyche itself, as for example differences of race.[2] [illegible]

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[1] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, trans. by J. Strachey. [illegible]

[2] Thus it is a quite unpardonable mistake to accept the conclusions of a Jewish psychology as generally valid. Nobody would dream of taking Chinese or Indian psychology as binding upon ourselves. The cheap accusation of anti-Semitism that has been levelled at me on the ground of this criticism is about as intelligent as accusing me of an anti-Chinese prejudice. No doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of psychic development, where it is still impossible to distinguish between an Aryan, Semitic, Hamitic, or Mongolian mentality, all human races have a common collective psyche. But with the beginning of racial differentiation essential differences are developed in the collective psyche as well. For this reason we cannot transplant the spirit of a foreign race *in globo* into our own mentality without sensible injury to the latter, a fact which does not, however, deter sundry natures of feeble instinct from affecting Indian philosophy and the like.

its [illegible] presupposes the [illegible] of [illegible] in individuals, as a [illegible] element of [illegible] separation is [illegible] from the [illegible]. The carrier of differentiation is the individual. All the highest achievements of virtue, as well as the blackest villainies, are individual. The larger a community is, and the more the sum total of collective factors peculiar to every large community rests on conservative prejudices detrimental to individuality, the more will the individual be morally and spiritually crushed, and, as a result, the one source of moral and spiritual progress for society is choked up. Naturally the only thing that can thrive in such an atmosphere is sociality and whatever is collective in the individual. Everything individual in him goes under, i.e., is doomed to repression. The individual elements lapse into the unconscious, where, by the law of necessity, they are transformed into something essentially baleful, destructive, and anarchical. Socially, this evil principle shows itself in the spectacular crimes—regicide and the like—perpetrated by certain prophetically-inclined individuals; but in the great mass of the community it remains in the background, and only manifests itself indirectly in the inexorable moral degeneration of society. It is a notorious fact that the morality of society as a whole is in inverse ratio to its size; for the greater the aggregation of individuals, the more the individual factors are blotted out, and with them morality, which rests entirely on the moral sense of the individual and the freedom necessary for this. Hence every man is, in a certain sense, unconsciously a worse man when he is in society than when acting alone; for he is carried by society and to that extent relieved of his individual responsibility. Any large company composed of wholly admirable persons has the morality and intelligence of an unwieldy, stupid, and violent animal. The bigger the organization, the more unavoidable is its immorality and blind stupidity. (*Senatus bestia, senatores boni viri.*) Society, by automatically stressing all the collective qualities in its individual representatives, puts a premium on mediocrity, on everything that settles down to vegetate in an easy, irresponsible way. Individuality will inevitably be driven to the wall. This process begins in school, continues at the university, and rules all departments in which the State has a hand. In a small social body, the individuality of its members is better safeguarded, and the greater is their relative freedom and the possibility of conscious responsibility. Without freedom there can be no morality. Our admiration for great organizations dwindles when once we become aware of the other side of the wonder: the tremendous heaping up and accentuation of all that is primitive in man, and the unavoidable destruction of his individuality in the interests of the monstrosity that every great organization in fact is. The man of today, who resembles more or less the collective ideal, has made his heart into a den of murderers, as can easily be proved by the analysis of his unconscious, even though he himself is not in the least disturbed by it. And in so far as he is normally "adapted"* to his environment, it is true that the greatest infamy on the part of his group will not disturb him, so long as the majority of his fellows steadfastly believe in the exalted morality of their social organization. Now, all that I have said here about the influence of society upon the individual is identically true of the influence of the collective unconscious upon the individual psyche. But, as is apparent from my examples, the latter influence is as invisible as the former is visible. Hence it is not surprising that its inner effects are not understood, and that those to whom such things happen are called pathological freaks and treated as crazy. If one of them happened to be a real genius, the fact would not be noted until the next generation or the one after. So obvious does it seem to us that a man should drown in his own dignity, so utterly incomprehensible that he should seek anything other than what the mob wants, and in that he should vanish permanently from view. One could wish both of them a sense of humour, that—according to Schopenhauer—truly divine attribute of man which alone befits him to maintain his soul in freedom.

241 The collective instincts and fundamental forms of human thought and feeling whose activity is revealed by the analysis of the unconscious products, are, for the conscious personality, an acquisition which it cannot assimilate without considerable disturbance. It is therefore of the utmost importance in practical treatment to keep the integrity of the personality constantly in mind. For, if the collective psyche is taken to be the personal possession of the individual, it will result in a distortion or an

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* Cf. "adjustment" and "adaptation," *Psychological Types*, Coll. Works, Vol. 6, Par. [illegible], par. 8 (or 1923, p. 419).

constituent of the personality which it is very difficult to deal with. Hence it is essential to make a clear distinction between personal contents and those of the collective psyche. This distinction is far from easy, because the personal grows out of the collective psyche and is intimately bound up with it. So it is difficult to say exactly what contents are to be called personal and what collective. There is no doubt, for instance, that archaic symbolisms such as we frequently find in fantasies and dreams are collective factors. All basic instincts and basic forms of thinking and feeling are collective. Everything that all men agree in regarding as universal is collective, likewise everything that is universally understood, universally found, universally said and done. On closer examination one is always astonished to see how much of our so-called individual psychology is really collective. So much, indeed, that the individual traits are completely overshadowed by it. Since, however, individuation[6] is an ineluctable psychological necessity, we can see from the superior force of the collective what very special attention must be paid to this delicate plant "individuality" if it is not to be completely smothered.

241 Human beings have one faculty which, though it is of the greatest possible value for collective purposes, is most pernicious for individuation, and that is the faculty of imitation. Collective psychology can never dispense with imitation, for without it all mass organizations, the State and the social order, are impossible. Society is organized, indeed, less by law than by the propensity to imitation, implying equally suggestibility, suggestion, and mental contagion. But we see every day how people use, or rather abuse, the mechanism of imitation for the purpose of personal differentiation: they are content to ape some eminent personality, some striking characteristic or activity, thereby achieving an outward distinction from the circle in which they move. We could almost say that as a punishment for this the uniformity of their minds with that of their neighbours, already real enough, is intensified into an unconscious, compulsive bondage to the environment. As a rule these specious

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[6] Cf. [illegible] individuation is a process of differentiation having for its goal the development of the individual personality. [illegible] Since the individual is not only a single entity, but also, by his very existence, presupposes a collective relationship, the process of individuation does not lead to isolation, but to an intensified and more universal collective solidarity."

attempts at individual differentiation stiffen into a pose, and the imitator remains at the same level as he always was, only several degrees more sterile than before. In order to discover what is authentically individual in ourselves, profound reflection is needed; and suddenly we realize how uncommonly difficult the discovery of individuality in fact is.

III

THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE

243 In this chapter we come to a problem which, if overlooked, is liable to cause the greatest confusion. It will be remembered that in the analysis of the personal unconscious the first things to be added to consciousness are the personal contents, and I suggested that these contents, which have been repressed but are capable of becoming conscious, should be called the *personal unconscious*. I also showed that to annex the deeper layers of the unconscious, which I have called the *collective unconscious*, produces an extension of the personality leading to the state of inflation. This state is reached by simply continuing the analytical work, as in the case of the example previously referred to. By continuing the analysis we add to our personal consciousness certain impersonal, universal, and fundamental characteristics of humanity, thereby bringing about the inflation I have just described, which we might regard as one of the unpleasant consequences of becoming fully conscious.[1] The conscious per-

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[1] This phenomenon, which results from the extension of consciousness, is in no sense specific to analytical treatment. It occurs whenever people are overcome by knowledge or by some new realization. "Knowledge puffeth up," Paul writes to the Corinthians, for the new knowledge had turned the heads of many, as indeed constantly happens. The inflation has nothing to do with the kind of knowledge, but simply and solely with the fact that any new knowledge can so seize hold of a weak head that he no longer sees and hears anything else. He is hypnotized by it, and instantly believes he has solved the riddle of the universe. But that is equivalent to almighty self-conceit. That process is such a general reaction that, in Genesis, eating of the tree of knowledge is represented as a deadly sin. It may not be immediately apparent why greater consciousness followed by self-conceit should be such a dangerous thing. Genesis represents the act of becoming conscious as a taboo infringement, as though knowledge meant that a sacrosanct barrier had been impiously overstepped. I think that Genesis is right in so far as every step towards greater consciousness is a kind of Promethean guilt: through knowledge the gods are as it were robbed of their fire, that is, some-

sonality is a more or less arbitrary segment of the collective psyche.

244 It consists in a sum of psychic facts that are felt to be personal. The attribute "personal" means: pertaining exclusively to this particular person. A consciousness that is purely personal stresses its proprietary and original right to its contents with a certain anxiety, and in this way seeks to create a whole. But all those contents that refuse to fit into this whole are either overlooked and forgotten or repressed and denied. This is one way of educating oneself, but it is too arbitrary and too much of a violation. Far too much of our common humanity has to be sacrificed in the interests of an ideal image into which one tries to mould oneself. Hence these purely "personal" people are always very sensitive, for something may easily happen that will bring into consciousness an unwelcome portion of their real ("individual") character.

245 This arbitrary segment of collective psyche—often fashioned with considerable pains—I have called the *persona*. The word *persona* is really a very appropriate expression for it, since it originally meant the mask worn by an actor, signifying the role he played. For if we hazard the attempt to distinguish exactly between what is to be regarded as personal and what as impersonal psychic material, we soon find ourselves in the greatest dilemma, because fundamentally speaking we are bound to admit that what we said of the collective unconscious is also true of the persona's contents, that is, they are of a general character. Only by reason of the fact that the persona is a more or less accidental or arbitrary segment of collective psyche can we make the mistake of accepting it *in toto* as something "individual." But as its name shows, it is only a mask for the collective psyche, a mask that *feigns individuality*, and tries to make others

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being he was the property of the chthonic powers in the manner of a natural creature, and consequently subjected to the whims of the unconscious mind. The man who has usurped the new knowledge suffers, however, a transformation or enlargement of consciousness which no longer resembles that of his fellow men. He has raised himself above the human level of his age ("ye shall become like unto God"), but in so doing has alienated himself from humanity. The pain of this loneliness is the vengeance of the gods, for never again can he return to mankind. He is, as the myth says, chained to the lonely cliffs of the Caucasus, forsaken of God and man.

ing others and oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one is simply playing a part in which the collective psyche speaks.

246 When we analyse the persona we strip off the mask, and discover that what seemed to be individual is at bottom collective; in other words, that the persona was only a mask for the collective psyche. Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be. He takes a name, earns a title, represents an office, he is this or that. In a certain sense all this is real, yet in relation to the essential individuality of the person concerned it is only a secondary reality, a product of compromise, in making which others often have a greater share than he. The persona is a semblance, a two-dimensional reality, to give it a nickname.

247 It would be wrong to leave the matter as it stands without at the same time recognizing that there is, after all, something individual in the peculiar choice and delineation of the persona, and that despite the exclusive identity of the ego-consciousness with the persona the unconscious self, one's real individuality, is always present and makes itself felt indirectly if not directly. Although the ego-consciousness is at first identical with the persona—that compromise role in which we parade before the community—yet the unconscious self can never be repressed to the point of extinction. Its influence is chiefly manifest in the special nature of the contrasting and compensating contents of the unconscious. The purely personal attitude of the conscious mind evokes reactions on the part of the unconscious, and these, together with the personal repressions, contain the seeds of individual development in the guise of collective fantasies. Through the analysis of the personal unconscious, the conscious mind becomes suffused with collective material which brings with it the elements of individuality. I am well aware that this conclusion must be almost unintelligible to anyone not familiar with my views and technique, and particularly so to those who habitually regard the unconscious from the standpoint of Freudian theory. But if the reader will recall my example of the philosophy student, he can form a rough idea of what I mean. At the beginning of the treatment the patient was quite unconscious of the fact that her relation to her father was a fixation, and that she was therefore seeking a man like her father, whom she

could then [illegible] intellect [illegible] have been a mistake [illegible] pressing character as is so often encountered in intellectual women. Such an intellect is always trying to point out mistakes in others; it is pre-eminently critical, with a disagreeably personal undertone, yet it always wants to be considered objective. This invariably makes a man bad-tempered, particularly if, as so often happens, the criticism touches on some weak spot which, in the interests of fruitful discussion, were better avoided. But far from wishing the discussion to be fruitful, it is the unfortunate peculiarity of this feminine intellect to seek out a man's weak spots, fasten on them, and exasperate him. This is not usually a conscious aim, but rather has the unconscious purpose of forcing a man into a superior position and thus making him an object of admiration. The man does not as a rule notice that he is having the role of hero thrust upon him; he merely finds her taunts so odious that in future he will go a long way to avoid meeting the lady. In the end the only man who can stand her is the one who gives in at the start, and therefore has nothing wonderful about him.

238 My patient naturally found much to reflect upon in all this, for she had no notion of the game she was playing. Moreover, she [illegible] the regular romance that had been enacted between her and her father ever since childhood. It would lead us too far to describe in detail how, from her earliest years, with unconscious sympathy, she had played upon the shadow-side of her father which her mother never saw, and how, in advance of her years, she became her mother's rival. All this came to light in the analysis of the personal unconscious. Since, if only for professional reasons, I could not allow myself to be irritated, I inevitably became the hero and father-lover. The transference too consisted at first of contents from the personal unconscious. My role as a hero was just a sham, and so, as it turned me into the merest phantom, she was able to play her traditional role of the supremely wise, very grown-up, all-understanding mother-daughter-beloved—an empty role, a persona behind which her real and authentic being, her individual self, lay hidden. Indeed, to the extent that she at first completely identified herself with her role, she was altogether unconscious of her real self. She was still in her nebulous infan-

the world and had not yet discovered the real world at all. But as, through progressive analysis, she became conscious of the nature of her transference, the dreams I spoke of in Chapter I began to materialize. They brought up bits of the collective unconscious, and that was the end of her infantile world and of all the heroics. She came to herself and to her own real potentialities. This is roughly the way things go in most cases, if the analysis is carried far enough. That the consciousness of her individuality should coincide exactly with the reactivation of an archaic god-image is not just an isolated coincidence, but a very frequent occurrence which, in my view, corresponds to an unconscious law.

249 After this digression, let us turn back to our earlier reflections.

250 Once the personal repressions are lifted, the individuality and the collective psyche begin to emerge in a coalescent state, thus releasing the hitherto repressed personal fantasies. The fantasies and dreams which now appear assume a somewhat different aspect. An infallible sign of collective images seems to be the appearance of the "cosmic" element, i.e., the images in the dream or fantasy are connected with cosmic qualities, such as temporal and spatial infinity, enormous speed and extension of movement, "astrological" associations, telluric, lunar, and solar analogies, changes in the proportions of the body, etc. The obvious appearance of mythological and religious motifs in a dream also points to the activity of the collective unconscious. The collective element is very often announced by peculiar symptoms,[8] as for example by dreams where the dreamer is flying through space like a comet, or thinks he is the earth, or the sun, or a star; or else is inordinately large, or dwarfishly small; or has died, has come to a strange place, is a stranger to himself, is confused, mad, etc. Similarly, feelings of disorientation, of dizziness, and the like, may appear along with symptoms of inflation.

251 The wealth of possibilities in the collective psyche has a confusing and blinding effect. With the disintegration of the

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[8] It may not be superfluous to note that collective elements in dreams are not restricted to this stage of the analytical treatment. There are many psychological situations in which the activity of the collective unconscious can come to the surface. But this is not the place to enlarge upon these conditions.

persona there is a release of involuntary fantasy which is apparently nothing else than the specific activity of the collective psyche. This activity throws up contents whose existence one had never suspected before. But as the influence of the collective unconscious increases, so the conscious mind loses its power of leadership. Imperceptibly it becomes the led, while an unconscious and impersonal process gradually takes control. Thus, without noticing it, the conscious personality is pushed about like a figure on a chess-board by an invisible player. It is this player who decides the game of fate, not the conscious mind and its plans. This is how the resolution of the transference, apparently so impossible to the conscious mind, was brought about in my earlier example.

[illegible] To plunge into this process becomes unavoidable whenever the necessity arises of overcoming an apparently insuperable difficulty. It goes without saying that this necessity does not arise in every case of neurosis, since perhaps in the majority of cases the prime consideration is only the removal of temporary difficulties of adaptation. Certainly severe cases cannot be cured without a far-reaching "change of character" or of attitude. In by far the greater number, adaptation to external reality demands so much work that inner adaptation to the collective unconscious cannot be considered for a very long time. But when this inner adaptation becomes a problem, a strange, irresistible attraction proceeds from the unconscious and exerts a powerful influence on the conscious direction of life. The predominance of unconscious influences, together with the associated disintegration of the persona and the deposition of the conscious mind from power, constitute a state of psychic disequilibrium which, in analytical treatment, is artificially induced for the therapeutic purpose of resolving a difficulty that might block further development. There are of course innumerable obstacles that can be overcome with good advice and a little moral support, aided by goodwill and understanding on the part of the patient. Excellent curative results can be obtained in this way. Cases are not uncommon where there is no need to breathe a word about the unconscious. But again, there are difficulties to which one can foresee no satisfactory solution. If in these cases the psychic equilibrium is not already disturbed before treatment begins, it will certainly be upset during the analysis, and sometimes without any interference from the ego. It often seems as though the unconscious processes had only been waiting for a trustworthy person in order to give up and collapse. Such a loss of balance is similar to a psychotic disturbance; that is, it differs from the initial stages of mental illness only by the fact that it leads in the end to greater health, while the latter leads to yet greater destruction. It is a condition of panic, a letting go in face of apparently hopeless complications. Mostly it was preceded by desperate efforts to master the difficulty by force of will; then came the collapse, and the once guiding will crumbles completely. The energy thus freed disappears from consciousness and falls into the unconscious. As a matter of fact, it is at these moments that the first signs of unconscious activity appear. (I am thinking of the example of that young man who was weak in the head.) Obviously the energy that fell away from consciousness has activated the unconscious. The immediate result is a change of attitude. One can easily imagine that a stronger head would have taken the vision of the stars as a healing apparition, and would have looked upon human suffering *sub specie aeternitatis*, in which case his senses would have been restored.[*]

253 Had this happened, an apparently insurmountable obstacle would have been removed. Hence I regard the loss of balance as purposive, since it replaces a defective consciousness by the automatic and instinctive activity of the unconscious, which is aiming all the time at the creation of a new balance and will moreover achieve this aim, provided that the conscious mind is capable of assimilating the contents produced by the unconscious, i.e., of understanding and digesting them. If the unconscious simply rides roughshod over the conscious mind, a psychotic condition develops. If it can neither completely prevail nor yet let itself be understood, the result is a conflict that cripples all further advance. But with this question, namely the understanding of the unconscious, we come to a formidable difficulty which I have made the theme of my next chapter.

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[*] Théodore Flournoy, "Automatisme téléologique antisuicide: un cas de suicide empêché par une hallucination," *Archives de psychologie* (Geneva), VIII (1908), [illegible]; and Jung, *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox* (Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series No. 3), [illegible] 1936, p. 198.

IV

NEGATIVE ATTEMPTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE

1. *Regressive Restoration of the Persona*

254 A collapse of the conscious attitude is no small matter. It always feels like the end of the world, as though everything had tumbled back into original chaos. One feels delivered up, disoriented, like a rudderless ship that is abandoned to the moods of the elements. So at least it seems. In reality, however, one has fallen back upon the collective unconscious, which now takes over the leadership. We could multiply examples of cases where, at the critical moment, a "saving" thought, a vision, an "inner voice," came with an irresistible power of conviction and gave life a new direction. Probably we could mention just as many cases where the collapse meant a catastrophe that destroyed life, for at such moments morbid ideas are also liable to take root, or ideals wither away, which is no less disastrous. In the former case some psychic oddity develops, or a psychosis, i.e., a state of disorientation and demoralization. But once the unconscious contents break through into consciousness, filling it with their uncanny power of conviction, the question arises of how the individual will react. Will he be overpowered by these contents? Will he credulously accept them? Or will he reject them? (I am disregarding the ideal reaction, namely critical understanding.) The first case signifies paranoia or schizophrenia, the second may either become an eccentric with a taste for prophecy, or he may revert to an infantile attitude and be cut off from human society; the third signifies the regressive restoration of the persona. This formulation sounds very technical, and the reader may justifiably suppose that it has some-

faced with a complicated [illegible] problem such as can be dealt with in the course of [illegible]. It would, however, be a mistake to think that cases of this kind make their appearance only in analytical treatment. The process can be observed just as well, and even better, in other situations of life, namely in all those careers where there has been some violent and destructive stroke of fate. Everyone has presumably suffered such blows, but as a rule they are wounds that heal and leave no crippling mark. But here we are concerned with experiences that are destructive, that can smash a man completely or at least cripple him for good. Let us take as an example a business man who takes too great a risk and consequently becomes bankrupt. If he does not allow himself to be discouraged by this depressing experience, but, undismayed, keeps his former daring, perhaps with a little salutary caution added, his wound will be healed without permanent injury. But if, on the other hand, he goes to pieces, abjures all further risks, and laboriously tries to patch up his social reputation within the confines of a much more limited personality, doing inferior work with the mentality of a scared child, in a post far below him, then, technically speaking, he will have restored his persona in a regressive way. He will as a result of his fright have slipped back to an earlier phase of his personality; he will have demeaned himself, pretending that he is as he was before the crucial experience, though utterly unable even to think of repeating such a risk. Formerly perhaps he wanted more than he could accomplish; now he does not even dare to attempt what he has it in him to do.

255 Such experiences occur in every walk of life and in every possible form, hence in psychological treatment also. Here again it is a question of widening the personality, of taking a risk on one's circumstances or on one's nature. What the critical experience is in actual treatment can be seen from the case of our philosophy student: it is the transference. As I have already indicated, it is possible for the patient to slip over the reef of the transference unconsciously, in which case it does not become an experience and nothing fundamental happens. The doctor, for the sake of mere convenience, might well wish for such patients. But if they are intelligent, the patients soon discover the existence of this problem for themselves. If then the doctor, as in

the above case is evident [illegible] the former lover and consequently has a flood of demands [illegible] against him. He must perforce think out ways and means of parting the company without himself getting [illegible] to the patient. A sudden rupture of the transference may bring on a complete relapse [illegible] must be handled with great tact and foresight. Another possibility is the pious hope that in time the "nonsense" will stop of its own accord. Certainly everything stops in time, but it may be an unconscionably long time, and the difficulties may be so unbearable for both sides that one might just as well give up the idea of time as a healing factor at once.

256 A far better instrument for combating the transference would seem to be offered by the Freudian theory of neurosis. The dependence of the patient is explained as an infantile sexual demand that takes the place of a rational application of sexuality. A similar advantage is offered by the Adlerian theory, which explains the transference as an infantile power-aim, and as a "security measure." Both theories fit the neurotic mentality so neatly that every case of neurosis can be explained by both theories at once.[2] This highly remarkable fact, which any unprejudiced observer is bound to corroborate, can only rest on the circumstance that Freud's "infantile eroticism" and Adler's "power drive" are one and the same thing, regardless of the clash of opinion between the two schools. It is simply a fragment of uncontrolled, and at first uncontrollable, primordial instinct that comes to light in the phenomenon of transference. The archaic fantasy-forms that gradually reach the surface of consciousness are only a further proof of this.

257 We can try both theories to make the patient see how infantile, impossible, and absurd his demands are, and perhaps in the end he will actually come to his senses again. My patient, however, was not the only one who did not do this. It is true the doctor can always save his face with these theories and extricate himself from a painful situation more or less humanely. There are indeed patients with whom it is, or seems to be, unrewarding to go to greater lengths; but there are also cases where these procedures cause senseless psychic injury. In

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[1] Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution* (London, 1921).

[2] Cf. above, pars. 44ff., for an example of such a case.

the case of this student I hoped for something of the sort, and I therefore abandoned my rationalistic attempts in order, with [illegible] mistrust, to give nature a chance to correct what seemed to me to be her own foolishness. As already mentioned, this taught me something extraordinarily important, namely the existence of an unconscious self-regulation. Not only can the unconscious "wish," it can also cancel its own wishes. This realization, of such immense importance for the integrity of the personality, must remain sealed to anyone who cannot get over the idea that it is simply a question of infantilism. He will turn round on the threshold of his realization and tell himself: "It was all nonsense, of course. I am a crazy visionary! The best thing to do would be to bury the unconscious or throw it overboard with all its works." The meaning and purpose he so eagerly desired he will see only as infantile maunderings. He will understand that his longing was absurd; he learns to be tolerant with himself, resigned. What can he do? Rather than face the conflict he will turn back and, as best he can, regressively restore his shattered persona, discounting all those hopes and expectations that had blossomed under the transference. He will become smaller, more limited, more rationalistic than he was before. One could not say that this result would be an unqualified misfortune in all cases, for there are all too many who, on account of their notorious ineptitude, thrive better in a rationalistic system than in freedom. Freedom is one of the more difficult things. Those who can stomach this way out can say with Faust:

This earthly circle I know well enough.
Towards the Beyond the view has been cut off;
Fool—who directs that way his dazzled eye,
Contrives himself a double in the sky!
Let him look round him here, not stray beyond;
To a sound man this world must needs respond.
To roam into eternity is vain!
What he perceives, he can attain.
Thus let him walk along his earthly day;
Though phantoms haunt him, let him go his way.[5]

256 Such a solution would be perfect if a man were really able to shake off the unconscious so completely as to deprive it of

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[5] Faust, trans. by Louis MacNeice (London, 1951), p. 283 (Part II, Act V).

its energy and render it inactive. But experience has shown that the unconscious can be deprived of its energy only in part. It remains continually active, for it not only contains but is itself the source of the libido from which the psychic elements flow. It is therefore a delusion to think that by some sort of magical theory or method the unconscious can be finally drained of libido and thus, as it were, eliminated. We might yield to this illusion for a time, but the day comes when one has to say with Faust:

> But now such spectral din so throngs the air
> That none knows how to dodge it, none knows where.
> Though one day greet us with a rational gleam,
> The night entangles us in webs of dream.
> We come back happy from the fields of spring—
> And a bird croaks. Croaks what? Some evil thing.
> Enmeshed in superstition night and morn,
> It forms and shows itself and comes to warn.
> And we, so scared, stand without friend or kin,
> And the door creaks—and nobody comes in.[4]

Nobody of his own free will can strip the unconscious of its effective power. At best one can merely deceive oneself on this point. For, as Goethe says:

> Unheard by the outward ear
> In the heart I whisper fear;
> Changing shape from hour to hour
> I employ my savage power.[5]

Only one thing is effective against the unconscious, and that is hard outer necessity. (Those with rather more knowledge of the unconscious will see behind the outer necessity the same face which once gazed at them from within.) An inner necessity can change into an outer one, and so long as the outer necessity is real, and not just faked, psychic problems remain more or less ineffective. This is why Mephisto offers Faust, who is "sick of the madness of magic," the following advice:

> Right. There is one way that needs
> No money, no physician, and no witch.
> Pack up your things and get back to the land
> And there begin to dig and ditch,

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[4] Ibid., p. 281 (Part II, Act V).

[5] Ibid., p. 282 (Part II, Act V), modified.

> K[illegible] narrow [illegible]
> And live on fodder of the simplest kind,
> A beast among the beasts, [illegible]
> To [illegible] yourself."[6]

It is a well-known fact that the "simple life" cannot be faked, and therefore the unproblematical existence of a poor man who really is delivered over to fate cannot be bought by such imitations. Only the man who lives such a life not as a mere possibility, but is actually driven to it by the necessity of his own nature, will blindly pass over the problem without seeing it, since he lacks the capacity to grasp it. But once he has seen the Faustian problem, the escape into the "simple life" is closed for ever. There is of course nothing to stop him from taking a two-room cottage in the country, or from pottering about in a garden and eating raw turnips. But his soul laughs at the deception. Only what is really oneself has the power to heal.

259 The regressive restoration of the persona is a possible course only for the man who owes the critical failure of his life to his own inflatedness. With diminished personality, he turns back to the measure he can fill. But in every other case resignation and self-belittlement are an evasion, which in the long run can be kept up only at the cost of neurotic sickness. From the conscious point of view of the person concerned, his condition does not look like an evasion at all, but seems to be due to the impossibility of coping with the problem. Usually he is a lonely figure, with little or nothing to help him in our present-day culture. Even psychology has only purely reductive interpretations to offer, since it inevitably underlines the archaic and infantile character of these transitional states and makes them unacceptable to him. The fact that a medical theory may also serve the purpose of enabling the doctor to pull his own head more or less gracefully out of the noose does not occur to him. That is precisely why these reductive theories fit the essence of neurosis so beautifully—because they are of such great service to the doctor.

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[6] [Ibid., p. [illegible], Part I, Witch's Kitchen [illegible] modified.]

b. Identification with the Collective Psyche

260 The second possible mode of reaction is identification with the collective psyche. This would be equivalent to acceptance of the inflation, but now exalted into a system. That is to say, one would be the fortunate possessor of the great truth that was only waiting to be discovered, of the eschatological knowledge that means the healing of the nations. This attitude does not necessarily signify megalomania in direct form, but megalomania in the milder and more familiar form it takes in the reformer, the prophet, and the martyr. Weak-minded persons run no small risk of succumbing to this temptation, since as a rule they have more than their fair share of ambition, vanity, and misplaced naïveté. Opening the portals of the collective psyche means renewal of life for the individual, no matter whether this renewal is felt as pleasant or unpleasant. Everybody wants to hold fast to this renewal: one man because it enhances his life-feeling, another because it promises an increase in knowledge, a third because he has discovered the key that will transform his whole life. Therefore all those who do not want to deprive themselves of the great treasures that are buried in the collective psyche will strive in one way or another to maintain the newly won connection with the fundamental sources of life.[1] Identification would seem to be the shortest road to this, for the dissolution of the persona in the collective psyche is a direct invitation to wed oneself with the abyss and blot out all memory in that embrace. This piece of mysticism is characteristic of all better men, and is just as innate in every individual as the "longing for the mother," the nostalgia for the source from which we sprang.

261 As I have shown elsewhere, there lies at the root of the regressive longing, which Freud conceives as "infantile fixation" or the "incest wish," a special value and a special need. This is brought out in myths, where it is precisely the strongest and

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[1] I would like to call attention here to an interesting remark of Kant's. In his lectures on psychology (*Vorlesungen über Psychologie*, Leipzig, 1889), he speaks of the "treasure lying within the field of obscure representations, that deep abyss of human knowledge forever beyond our reach." This treasure, as I have shown in my *Symbols of Transformation* (Coll. Works, Vol. 5), is the aggregate of all those primordial images in which the libido is invested, or rather, which are self-representations of the libido.

best man among the people, the hero, who gives way to the regressive longing and deliberately exposes himself to the danger of being devoured by the monster of the maternal abyss. But if he is a hero, he is a hero because, in the final reckoning, he does not allow himself to be devoured, but conquers the monster, not once but many times. Victory over the collective psyche alone yields the true value—the capture of the hoard, the invincible weapon, the magic talisman, or whatever it be that the myth deems most desirable. Therefore, whoever identifies with the collective psyche—or, in mythological terms, lets himself be devoured by the monster—and vanishes in it, attains the treasure that the dragon guards, but he does so in spite of himself and to his own greatest harm.

262 Probably no one who was conscious of the absurdity of this identification would have the courage to make a principle of it. But the danger is that very many people lack the necessary humour, or that it fails them at this particular juncture; they are seized by a sort of pathos, everything seems pregnant with meaning, and all effective self-criticism is checked. I would not deny in general the existence of genuine prophets, but in the name of caution I would begin by doubting each individual case; for it is far too serious a matter for us lightly to accept a man as a genuine prophet. Every respectable prophet strives manfully against the unconscious pretensions of his role. When therefore a prophet appears at a moment's notice, we would be better advised to contemplate a possible psychic disequilibrium.

263 But besides the possibility of becoming a prophet, there is another alluring joy, subtler and apparently more legitimate: the joy of becoming a prophet's disciple. This, for the vast majority of people, is an altogether ideal technique. Its advantages are: the *odium dignitatis*, the superhuman responsibility of the prophet, turns into the so much sweeter *otium indignitatis*. The disciple is unworthy; modestly he sits at the Master's feet and guards against having ideas of his own. Mental laziness becomes a virtue; one can at least bask in the sun of a semidivine being. He can enjoy the archaism and infantilism of his unconscious fantasies without loss to himself, for all responsibility is laid at the Master's door. Through his deification of the Master, the disciple, apparently without noticing it, waxes in stature; moreover, does he not possess the great truth—not his

own discovery, of course, but received straight from the Master's hands? Naturally the disciples always stick together, not out of love, but for the very understandable purpose of effortlessly confirming their own convictions by engendering an air of collective agreement.

264 Now this is an identification with the collective psyche that seems altogether more commendable: somebody else has the honour of being a prophet, but also the dangerous responsibility. For one's own part, one is a mere disciple, but nonetheless a joint guardian of the great treasure which the Master has found. One feels the full dignity and burden of such a position, deeming it a solemn duty and a moral necessity to revile others not of a like mind, to enlist proselytes and to hold up a light to mankind in general, exactly as though one were the prophet oneself. And these people, who creep about behind an apparently modest persona, are the very ones who, when inflated by identification with the collective psyche, suddenly burst upon the world scene. For, just as the prophet is a primordial image from the collective psyche, so also is the disciple of the prophet a primordial image.

265 In both cases inflation is brought about by the collective unconscious, and the independence of the individuality suffers injury. But since by no means all individualities have the strength to be independent, the disciple-fantasy is perhaps the best they can accomplish. The gratifications of the accompanying inflation at least do something to make up for the loss of spiritual freedom. Nor should we underestimate the fact that the life of a real or imagined prophet is full of sorrows, disappointments, and privations, so that the hosanna-shouting band of disciples has the value of a compensation. All this is so humanly understandable that it would be a matter for astonishment if it led to any further destination whatever.

PART TWO

INDIVIDUATION —self

I

THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

266 There is a destination, a possible goal, beyond the alternative stages dealt with in our last chapter. That is the way of individuation. Individuation means becoming a single, homogeneous being, and, in so far as "individuality" embraces our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming one's own self. We could therefore translate individuation as "coming to selfhood" or "self-realization."

267 The possibilities of development discussed in the preceding chapters were, at bottom, alienations of the self, ways of divesting the self of its reality in favour of an external role or in favour of an imagined meaning. In the former case the self retires into the background and gives place to social recognition; in the latter, to the auto-suggestive meaning of a primordial image. In both cases the collective has the upper hand. Self-divestiture in favour of the collective corresponds to a social ideal; it even passes for social duty and virtue, although it can also be misused for egotistical purposes. Egoists are called "selfish," but this, naturally, has nothing to do with the concept of "self" as I am using it here. On the other hand, self-realization seems to stand in opposition to self-divestiture. This misunderstanding is quite general, because we do not sufficiently distinguish between individualism and individuation. Individualism means deliberately stressing and giving prominence to some supposed peculiarity, rather than to collective considerations and obligations. But individuation means precisely the better and

more complete fulfilment of the collective qualities of the human being, since adequate consideration of the peculiarity of the individual is more conducive to a better social achievement than when the peculiarity is neglected or suppressed. The idiosyncrasy of an individual is not to be understood as any strangeness in his substance or in his components, but rather as a unique combination, or gradual differentiation, of functions and faculties which in themselves are universal. Every human face has a nose, two eyes, etc., but these universal factors are variable, and it is this variability which makes individual peculiarities possible. Individuation, therefore, can only mean a process of psychological development that fulfils the individual qualities given; in other words, it is a process by which a man becomes the definite, unique being he in fact is. In so doing he does not become "selfish" in the ordinary sense of the word, but is merely fulfilling the peculiarity of his nature, and this, as we have said, is vastly different from egotism or individualism.

268 Now in so far as the human individual, as a living unit, is composed of purely universal factors, he is wholly collective and therefore in no sense opposed to collectivity. Hence the individualistic emphasis on one's own peculiarity is a contradiction of this basic fact of the living being. Individuation, on the other hand, aims at a living co-operation of all factors. But since the universal factors always appear only in individual form, a full consideration of them will also produce an individual effect, and one which cannot be surpassed by anything else, least of all by individualism.

269 The aim of individuation is nothing less than to divest the self of the false wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and of the suggestive power of primordial images on the other. From what has been said in the previous chapter it should be sufficiently clear what the persona means psychologically. But when we turn to the other side, namely to the influence of the collective unconscious, we find we are moving in a dark interior world that is vastly more difficult to understand than the psychology of the persona, which is accessible to everyone. Everyone knows what is meant by "putting on official airs" or "playing a social role." Through the persona a man tries to appear as this or that, or he hides behind a mask, or he may even build up

a definite personality as a whole. So the problem of the persona should present no great difficulties.

It is, however, another thing to describe in a way that can be generally understood those subliminal processes which invade the conscious mind with such overwhelming force. Perhaps we can best portray these influences with the help of examples of mental illness, creative inspiration, and religious conversion. A most excellent account, taken from the life, speaking of such an inner transformation, is to be found in H. G. Wells' *Christina Alberta's Father*.[1] Changes of a similar kind are also described in Léon Daudet's eminently readable *L'Hérédo*. A wide range of material is contained in William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*.[2] Although in many cases of this kind there are certain external factors which either directly condition the change or at least provide the occasion for it, yet it is not always the case that the external factor offers a sufficient explanation of these changes of personality. We must recognize the fact that they can also arise from subjective inner causes, opinions and convictions, where external stimuli play no part at all, or a very insignificant one. In pathological changes of personality this can even be said to be the rule. The cases of psychosis that present a clear and simple reaction to some overwhelming outside event belong to the exceptions. Hence, for psychiatry, the essential aetiological factor is the inherited or acquired pathological make-up. The same is probably true of most creative intuitions, for we are hardly likely to suppose a purely causal connection between the falling apple and Newton's theory of gravitation. Similarly all religious conversions that cannot be traced back directly to suggestion and contagious example rest upon independent interior processes culminating in a change of personality. As a rule these processes have the peculiarity of being subliminal, i.e., unconscious, in the first place, and of reaching consciousness only gradually. The moment of irruption can, however, be very sudden, so that consciousness is instantaneously flooded with extremely strange and apparently quite unsuspected contents. That is how it looks to the layman and even to the person concerned, but the experienced observer knows that psychological events are never sudden. In reality not, however, to their state. [illegible] that we have now discovered the real [illegible] of the unconscious processes. We [illegible] [illegible] than [illegible] as if [illegible]

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[1] London and New York, 1925.

[2] London and Cambridge, Mass., 1902.

273 No [illegible] can [illegible] ever the [illegible] self be unconscious. We do know, however, that the unconscious never rests. It seems to be always at work, for even when asleep we dream. There are many people who declare that they never dream, but the probability is that they simply do not remember their dreams. It is significant that people who talk in their sleep mostly have no recollection either of the dream which started them talking, or even of the fact that they dreamed at all. Not a day passes but we make some slip of the tongue, or something slips our memory which at other times we know perfectly well, or we are seized by a mood whose cause we cannot trace, etc. These things are all symptoms of some consistent unconscious activity which becomes directly visible at night in dreams, but only occasionally breaks through the inhibitions imposed by our daytime consciousness.

274 So far as our present experience goes, we can lay it down that the unconscious processes stand in a compensatory relation to the conscious mind. I expressly use the word "compensatory" and not the word "contrary" because conscious and unconscious are not necessarily in opposition to one another, but complement one another to form a totality, which is the self. According to this definition the self is a quantity that is supraordinate to the conscious ego. It embraces not only the conscious but also the unconscious psyche, and is therefore, so to speak, a personality which we also are. It is easy enough to think of ourselves as possessing part-souls. Thus we can, for instance, see ourselves as a persona without too much difficulty. But it transcends our powers of imagination to form a clear picture of what we are as a self, for in this operation the part would have to comprehend the whole. There is little hope of our ever being able to reach even approximate consciousness of the self, since however much we may make conscious there will always exist an indeterminate and indeterminable amount of unconscious material which belongs to the totality of the self. Hence the self will always remain a supraordinate quantity.

275 The unconscious processes that compensate the conscious ego contain all those elements that are necessary for the self-

the eruption has been preparing for many years, often for half a lifetime, and already in childhood all sorts of remarkable signs could have been detected which hinted, in more or less symbolic fashion, at abnormal future developments. I am reminded, for instance, of a mental case who refused all nourishment and created quite extraordinary difficulties in connection with nasal feeding. In fact an anaesthetic was necessary before the tube could be inserted. The patient was able in some remarkable way to swallow his tongue by pressing it back into the throat, a fact that was quite new and unknown to me at the time. In a lucid interval I obtained the following history from the man. As a boy he had often revolved in his mind the idea of how he could take his life, even if every conceivable measure were employed to prevent him. He first tried to do it by holding his breath, until he found that by the time he was in a semiconscious state he had already begun to breathe again. So he gave up these attempts and thought: perhaps it would work if he refused food. This fantasy satisfied him until he discovered that food could be poured into him through the nasal cavity. He therefore considered how this entrance might be closed, and thus it was that he hit upon the idea of pressing his tongue backwards. At first he was unsuccessful, and so he began a regular training until at last he succeeded in swallowing his tongue in much the same way as sometimes happens accidentally during anaesthesia, evidently in his case by artificially relaxing the muscles at the root of the tongue.

271 In this strange manner the boy paved the way for his future psychosis. After the second attack he became incurably insane. This is only one example among many others, but it suffices to show how the subsequent, apparently sudden irruption of alien contents is really not sudden at all, but is rather the result of an unconscious development that has been going on for years.

272 The great question now is: in what do these unconscious processes consist? And how are they constituted? Naturally, so long as they are unconscious, nothing can be said about them. But sometimes they manifest themselves, partly through symptoms, partly through actions, opinions, affects, fantasies, and dreams. Aided by such observational material we can draw indirect conclusions as to the momentary state and constitution of the unconscious processes and their development. We should

regulation of the psyche as a whole. On the personal level these are the not consciously recognized personal motives which appear in dreams, or the meanings of daily situations which we have overlooked, or conclusions we have failed to draw, or affects we have not permitted, or criticisms we have spared ourselves. But the more we become conscious of ourselves through self-knowledge, and act accordingly, the more the layer of the personal unconscious that is superimposed on the collective unconscious will be diminished. In this way there arises a consciousness which is no longer imprisoned in the petty, oversensitive, personal world of the ego, but participates freely in the wider world of objective interests. This widened consciousness is no longer that touchy, egotistical bundle of personal wishes, fears, hopes, and ambitions which always has to be compensated or corrected by unconscious counter-tendencies; instead, it is a function of relationship to the world of objects, bringing the individual into absolute, binding, and indissoluble communion with the world at large. The complications arising at this stage are no longer egotistic wish-conflicts, but difficulties that concern others as much as oneself. At this stage it is fundamentally a question of collective problems, which have activated the collective unconscious because they require collective rather than personal compensation. We can now see that the unconscious produces contents which are valid not only for the person concerned, but for others as well, in fact for a great many people and possibly for all.

276 The Elgonyi, natives of the Elgon forests of central Africa, explained to me that there are two kinds of dreams: the ordinary dream of the little man, and the "big vision" that only the great man has, e.g., the medicine-man or chief. Little dreams are of no account, but if a man has a "big dream" he summons the whole tribe in order to tell it to everybody.

277 How is a man to know whether his dream is a "big" or a "little" one? He knows it by an instinctive feeling of significance. He feels so overwhelmed by the impression it makes that he would never think of keeping the dream to himself. He has to tell it, on the psychologically correct assumption that it is of general significance. Even with us the collective dream has a feeling of importance about it that impels communication. It springs from a conflict of relationship and must therefore be

but it is our conscious relationships themselves that it compensates, these and not least our inner personal quirks.

278 The processes of the collective unconscious are concerned not only with the more or less personal relations of an individual to his family or to a wider social group, but with his relations to society and to the human community in general. The more general and impersonal the condition which releases the unconscious reaction, the more significant, bizarre, and overwhelming will be the compensatory manifestation. It impels not just private communication, but drives people to revelations and confessions, and even to a dramatic representation of their fantasies.

279 I will explain by an example how the unconscious manages to compensate relationships. A somewhat arrogant gentleman once came to me for treatment. He ran a business in partnership with his younger brother. Relations between the two brothers were very strained, and this was one of the essential causes of my patient's neurosis. From the information he gave me, the real reason for the tension was not altogether clear. He had all kinds of criticisms to make of his brother, whose gifts he certainly did not show in a very favourable light. The brother frequently came into his dreams, always in the role of a Bismarck, Napoleon, or Julius Caesar. His house looked like the Vatican or Yildiz Kiosk. My patient's unconscious evidently had the need to exalt the rank of the younger brother. From this I concluded that he was setting himself too high and his brother too low. The further course of analysis entirely justified this inference.

280 Another patient, a young woman who clung to her mother in an extremely sentimental way, always had very sinister dreams about her. She appeared in the dreams as a witch, as a ghost, as a pursuing demon. The mother had spoilt her beyond all reason and had so blinded her by tenderness that the daughter had no conscious idea of her mother's harmful influence. Hence the compensatory criticism exercised by the unconscious.

281 I myself once happened to put too low a value on a patient, both intellectually and morally. In a dream I saw a castle perched on a high cliff, and on the topmost tower was a balcony, and there sat my patient. I did not hesitate to tell her this dream at once, naturally with the best results.

282 We all know how apt we are to make fools of ourselves in front of the very people we have unduly underrated. Naturally the case can also be reversed, as once happened to a friend of mine. While still a callow student he had written to Virchow, the pathologist, craving an audience with "His Excellency." When, quaking with fear, he presented himself and tried to give his name, he blurted out, "My name is Virchow." Whereupon His Excellency, smiling mischievously, said, "Ah! So your name is Virchow too?" The feeling of his own nullity was evidently too much for the unconscious of my friend, and in consequence it instantly prompted him to present himself as equal to Virchow in grandeur.

283 In these more personal relations there is of course no need for any very collective compensations. On the other hand, the figures employed by the unconscious in our first case are of a definitely collective nature: they are universally recognized heroes. Here there are two possible interpretations: either my patient [illegible] is a man of acknowledged and far-reaching collective importance, or my patient is overestimating his own importance [illegible] to his [illegible] everybody else as well. For the first assumption there was no support at all, while for the second there was the evidence of one's own eyes. Since the man's extreme arrogance affected not only himself but a far wider social group, the compensation availed itself of a collective image.

284 The same is true of the second case. The "witch" is a collective image; hence we must conclude that the blind dependence of the young woman applied as much to the wider social sphere as it did to her father personally. This was indeed the case, in so far as she was still living in an exclusively infantile world, where the world was identical with her parents. These examples deal with relations within the personal orbit. There are, however, impersonal relations which occasionally need unconscious compensation. In such cases collective images appear with a more or less mythological character. Moral, philosophical, and religious problems are, on account of their universal validity, the most likely to call for mythological compensation. In the aforementioned novel by H. G. Wells we find a classical type of compensation: Mr. Preemby, a midget personality, discovers that he is really a reincarnation of Sargon, King of Kings.

Happily the genius of the author rescues poor old Sargon from pathological absurdity, and even gives the reader a chance to appreciate the tragic and eternal meaning in this lamentable affair. Mr Percival, a complete nonentity, recognizes himself as the point of intersection of ages past and future. This knowledge is not too dearly bought at the cost of a little madness, provided that Prometheus is not devoured by the monster of a primordial image, which is what normally happens to him.

185 The universal [illegible] is another aspect of our imposition [illegible] on the world. More than any other therefore [illegible] produces [illegible] compensations. One of my patients [illegible] as the main symptom of a severe [illegible] neurosis the following dream: *He [illegible]* *[illegible]* *He begins to run. But [illegible]* *Because he [illegible] he dies. In deadly terror he wakes [illegible].* This dream was repeated [illegible].

186 It is a notorious fact that [illegible] neuroses by reason of their [illegible] and [illegible] not only [illegible] but are [illegible] against [illegible] used personality [illegible] I [illegible] sive, as though [illegible] in the background. After this [illegible] and its essential cause was that the patient had [illegible] to keep himself in a [illegible]. For this purpose he [illegible] severed [illegible] the world and [illegible] everything [illegible] ness of human existence. [illegible] scrupulous [illegible] avoidance of innumerable [illegible] and [illegible] previously. Even before the [illegible] existence [illegible] showed him that [illegible] wanted [illegible] down to earth, there would have to be a pact with evil.

287 Elsewhere I have described a dream that illustrates the compensation of a religious problem in a young theological student.[16] He was involved in all sorts of difficulties of belief, a not uncommon occurrence in the man of today. In his dream he was the pupil of the "white magician," who, however, was dressed in black. After having instructed him up to a certain point, the white magician told him that they now needed the "black magician." The black magician appeared, but clad in a white robe. He declared that he had found the keys of paradise, but needed the wisdom of the white magician in order to understand how to use them. This dream obviously contains the problem of opposites which, as we know, has found in Taoist philosophy a solution very different from the views prevailing in the West. The figures employed by the dream are impersonal collective images corresponding to the nature of the impersonal religious problem. In contrast to the Christian view, the dream stresses the relativity of good and evil in a way that immediately calls to mind the Taoist symbol of Yin and Yang.

288 We should certainly not conclude from these compensations that, as the conscious mind becomes more deeply engrossed in universal problems, the unconscious will bring forth correspondingly far-reaching compensations. There is what one might call a legitimate and an illegitimate interest in impersonal problems. Excursions of this kind are legitimate only when they arise from the deepest and truest needs of the individual; illegitimate when they are either mere intellectual curiosity or a flight from unpleasant reality. In the latter case the unconscious produces all too human and purely personal compensations, whose manifest aim is to bring the conscious mind back to ordinary reality. People who go illegitimately mooning after the infinite often have absurdly banal dreams which endeavour to damp down their ebullience. Thus, from the nature of the compensation, we can at once draw conclusions as to the seriousness and rightness of the conscious strivings.

289 There are certainly not a few people who are afraid to admit that the unconscious could ever have "big" ideas. They will object, "But do you really believe that the unconscious is

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[16] "The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," Coll. Works, Vol. 9, Part I, pars. 86ff. (or 1959 and 1940, pp. 84ff.).

capable of [illegible] like a constructive criticism of our Western mentality. Of course if we take the [illegible] intellectualism and impute rational intentions to the unconscious, the thing becomes absurd. But it would never do to foist our conscious psychology upon the unconscious. Its mentality is an instinctive one; it has no differentiated functions, and it does not "think" as we understand "thinking." It simply creates an image that answers to the conscious situation. This image contains as much thought as feeling, and is anything rather than a product of rationalistic reflection. Such an image would be better described as an artist's vision. We tend to forget that a problem like the one which underlies the dream last mentioned cannot, even to the conscious mind of the dreamer, be an intellectual problem, but is profoundly emotional. For a moral man the ethical problem is a passionate question which has its roots in the deepest instinctual processes as well as in his most idealistic aspirations. The problem for him is devastatingly real. It is not surprising, therefore, that the answer likewise springs from the depths of his nature. The fact that everyone thinks his psychology is the measure of all things, and, if he also happens to be a fool, will inevitably think that such a problem is beneath his notice, should not trouble the psychologist in the least, for he has to take things objectively, as he finds them, without twisting them to fit his subjective suppositions. The richer and more capacious natures can legitimately be gripped by an impersonal problem, and to the extent that this is so, their unconscious can answer in the same style. And just as the conscious mind can put the question, "Why is there this frightful conflict between good and evil?," so the unconscious can reply, "Look closer! Each needs the other. The best, just because it is the best, holds the seed of evil, and there is nothing so bad but good can come of it."

[illegible] It might then dawn on the dreamer that the apparently insoluble conflict is, perhaps, a prejudice, a frame of mind conditioned by time and place. The seemingly complex dream-image might easily reveal itself as plain, instinctive common sense, as the mere adumbration of a rational idea which a maturer mind could just as well have thought consciously. At all events Chinese philosophy thought of it ages ago. The singularly apt, plastic configuration of thought is the prerogative of that primithe natural spirit which is alive in all of us and is only obscured by a one-sided conscious development. If we consider the unconscious compensations from this angle, we might justly be accused of judging the unconscious too much from the conscious standpoint. And indeed, in pursuing these reflections I have always started from the view that the unconscious simply reacts to the conscious contents, albeit in a very significant way, but that it lacks initiative. It is, however, far from my intention to give the impression that the unconscious is merely reactive in all cases. On the contrary, there is a host of experiences which seem to prove that the unconscious is not only spontaneous but can actually take the lead. There are innumerable cases of people who lingered on in a petty unconsciousness, only to become neurotic in the end. Thanks to the neurosis contrived by the unconscious, they are shaken out of their apathy, and this in spite of their own laziness and often desperate resistance.

Yet it would, in my view, be wrong to suppose that in such cases the unconscious is working to a deliberate and concerted plan and is striving to realize certain definite ends. I have found nothing to support this assumption. The driving force, so far as it is possible for us to grasp it, seems to be in essence only an urge towards self-realization. If it were a matter of some general teleological plan, then all individuals who enjoy a surplus of unconsciousness would necessarily be driven towards higher consciousness by an irresistible urge. That is plainly not the case. There are vast masses of the population who, despite their notorious unconsciousness, never get anywhere near a neurosis. The few who are smitten by such a fate are really persons of the "higher" type who, for one reason or another, have remained too long on a primitive level. Their nature does not in the long run tolerate persistence in what is for them an unnatural torpor. As a result of their narrow conscious outlook and their cramped existence they save energy; bit by bit it accumulates in the unconscious and finally explodes in the form of a more or less acute neurosis. This simple mechanism does not necessarily conceal a "plan." A perfectly understandable urge towards self-realization would provide a quite satisfactory explanation. We could also speak of a retarded maturation of the personality.

292 Since it is highly probable that we are still a long way from the summit of absolute consciousness, presumably everyone is capable of wider consciousness, and we may assume accordingly that the unconscious processes are constantly supplying us with contents which, if clearly recognized, would extend the range of consciousness. Looked at in this way, the unconscious appears as a field of experience of unlimited extent. If it were merely reactive to the conscious mind, we might aptly call it a psychic mirror-world. In that case, the real source of all contents and activities would lie in the conscious mind, and there would be absolutely nothing in the unconscious except the distorted reflections of conscious contents. The creative process would be shut up in the conscious mind, and anything new would be nothing but conscious invention or cleverness. The empirical facts give the lie to this. Every creative man knows that spontaneity is the very essence of creative thought. Because the unconscious is not just a reactive mirror-reflection, but an independent, productive activity, its realm of experience is a self-contained world, having its own reality, of which we can only say that it affects us as we affect it—precisely what we say about our experience of the outer world. And just as material objects are the constituent elements of this world, so psychic factors constitute the objects of that other world.

293 The idea of psychic objectivity is by no means a new discovery. It is in fact one of the earliest and most universal acquisitions of humanity: it is nothing less than the conviction as to the concrete existence of a spirit-world. The spirit world was certainly never an invention in the sense that fire-boring was an invention; it was far rather the experience, the conscious acceptance of a reality in no way inferior to that of the material world. I doubt whether primitives exist anywhere who are not acquainted with magic or a magical substance.* "Magic" is simply another word for "psychic." It would also appear that practically all primitives are aware of the existence of spirits. "Spirit" is a psychic phenomenon. Just as we distinguish our own bodily existence from bodies that are strange to us, so primi-

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* In cases of reports to the contrary, it must always be borne in mind that the fear of spirits is sometimes so great that people will actually deny that there are any spirits to fear. I have come across this myself among the dwellers on Mount Elgon.

as is shown by the primitive notion of souls, that distinguish between their own souls and the spirits which are felt as strange and as not belonging. They are the objects of outward perception, whereas one's own soul, or one of several souls where a plurality is assumed, though believed to be essentially akin to the spirits, is not usually an object of so-called sensible perception. After death the soul, or one of the plurality of souls, becomes a spirit which survives the dead man, and often it shows a marked deterioration of character that partially contradicts the notion of personal immortality. The Bataks[4] of Sumatra go so far as to assert that the people who were good in this life turn into malign and dangerous spirits. Nearly everything that the primitives say about the tricks which the spirits play on the living, and the general picture they give of the revenants, corresponds down to the last detail with the phenomena established by spiritualistic experience. And just as the communications from the "Beyond" can be seen to be the activities of broken-off bits of the psyche, so these primitive spirits are manifestations of unconscious complexes.[5] The importance that modern psychology attaches to the "parental complex" is a direct continuation of primitive man's experience of the dangerous power of the ancestral spirits. Even the error of judgment which leads him unthinkingly to assume that the spirits are realities of the external world is carried on in our assumption (which is only partially correct) that the real parents are responsible for the parental complex. In the old trauma theory of Freudian psychoanalysis, and in other quarters as well, this assumption even passed for a scientific explanation. (It was in order to avoid this confusion that I advocated the term "parental imago.")[6]

294 The simple soul is of course quite unaware of the fact that his nearest relations, who exercise immediate influence over him, create in him an image which is only partly a replica of themselves, while its other part is compounded of elements derived from himself. The imago is built up of parental influences

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[4] Warneck, Die Religion der Batak. (Religions-Urkunden der Völker, ed. by J. Böhmer, Abt. IV, Bd. I, Leipzig, 1909.)

[5] Cf. "The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits."

[6] [The term was adopted by psychoanalysis, but in analytical psychology it has been replaced by "primordial image of the parent" or "archetype of the parent."—EDITORS]

plus the specific reactions of the child. It is therefore an image that reflects the object with very considerable qualifications. Naturally the simple soul believes that his parents are as he sees them. The image is unconsciously projected, and when the parents die, the projected image goes on working as though it were a spirit existing on its own. The primitive then speaks of parental spirits who return by night (revenants), while the modern man calls it a father or mother complex.

295 The more limited a man's field of consciousness is, the more numerous the psychic contents (imagos) which meet him as quasi-external apparitions, either in the form of spirits, or as magical potencies projected upon living people (magicians, witches, etc.). At a rather higher stage of development, where the idea of the soul already exists, not all the imagos continue to be projected (where this happens, even trees and stones talk), but one or the other complex has come near enough to consciousness to be felt as no longer strange, but as somehow "belonging." Nevertheless, the feeling that it "belongs" is not at first sufficiently strong for the complex to be sensed as a subjective content of consciousness. It remains in a sort of no man's land between conscious and unconscious, in the half-shadow, in part belonging or akin to the conscious subject, in part an autonomous being, and meeting consciousness as such. At all events it is not necessarily obedient to the subjective intentions, it may even be of a higher order, more often than not a source of inspiration or warning, or of "supernatural" information. Psychologically such a content could be explained as a partly autonomous complex that is not yet fully integrated. The archaic souls, the *ba* and *ka* of the Egyptians, are complexes of this kind. At a still higher level, and particularly among the civilized peoples of the West, this complex is invariably of the feminine gender—*anima* and ψυχή—a fact for which deeper and cogent reasons are not lacking.

II

ANIMA AND ANIMUS

26 Among all possible spirits the spirits of the parents are in practice the most important; hence the universal incidence of the ancestor cult. In its original form it served to conciliate the revenants, but on a higher level of culture it became an essentially moral and educational institution, as in China. For the child, the parents are his closest and most influential relations. But as he grows older this influence is split off; consequently the parental imagos are increasingly shut away from consciousness, and on account of the restrictive influence they sometimes continue to exert, they easily acquire a negative aspect. In this way the parental imagos remain as alien elements somewhere "outside" the psyche. In place of the parents, woman now takes up her position as the most immediate environmental influence in the life of the adult man. She becomes his companion, she belongs to him in so far as she shares his life and is more or less of the same age. She is not of a superior order, either by virtue of age, authority, or physical strength. She is, however, a very influential factor and, like the parents, she produces an imago of a relatively autonomous nature—not an imago to be split off like that of the parents, but one that has to be kept associated with consciousness. Woman, with her very dissimilar psychology, is and always has been a source of information about things for which a man has no eyes. She can be his inspiration; her intuitive capacity, often superior to man's, can give him timely warning, and her feeling, always directed towards the personal, can show him ways which his own less personally accented feeling would never have discovered. What Tacitus says about the Germanic women is exactly to the point in this respect.[1]

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[1] Cf. Tacitus, Germania (Loeb Classical Library), pars. 18, 19.

297 Here woman stands out as one of the main sources for the feminine quality of the soul. But it does not seem to be the only source. No man is so entirely masculine that he has nothing feminine in him. The fact is, rather, that very masculine men have—carefully guarded and hidden—a very soft emotional life, often incorrectly described as "feminine." A man counts it a virtue to repress his feminine traits as much as possible, just as a woman, at least until recently, considered it unbecoming to be "mannish." The repression of feminine traits and inclinations naturally causes these contrasexual demands to accumulate in the unconscious. No less naturally, the imago of woman (the soul-image) becomes a receptacle for these demands, which is why a man, in his love-choice, is strongly tempted to win the woman who best corresponds to his own unconscious femininity—a woman, in short, who can unhesitatingly receive the projection of his soul. Although such a choice is often regarded and felt as altogether ideal, it may turn out that the man has manifestly married his own worst weakness. This would explain some highly remarkable conjunctions.

298 It seems to me, therefore, that apart from the influence of woman there is also the man's own femininity to explain the feminine nature of the soul-complex. There is no question here of any linguistic "accident," of the kind that makes the sun feminine in German and masculine in other languages. We have in this matter the testimony of art from all ages, and besides that the famous question: *habet mulier animam?* Most men, probably, who have any psychological insight at all will know what Rider Haggard means by "She-who-must-be-obeyed," and will also recognize the chord that is struck when they read Benoît's description of Antinéa.[1] Moreover they know at once the kind of woman who most readily embodies this mysterious factor, of which they have so vivid a premonition.

299 The wide recognition accorded to such books shows that there must be some supra-individual quality in this image of the anima, something that does not owe a fleeting existence simply to its individual uniqueness, but is far more typical, with roots that go deeper than the obvious surface attachments I have

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[1] H. Rider Haggard, *She* (London, 1887); and Pierre Benoît, *L'Atlantide* (Paris, 1920), trans. by Mary C. Tongue and Mary Ross as *Atlantida* (New York, 1920).

primordial character. Rider Haggard and Benoît gave unmistakable evidence of this supposition in the historical aspect of their anima figures.

300 As we know, there is no human experience, nor would experience be possible at all, without the intervention of a subjective aptitude. What is this subjective aptitude? Ultimately it consists in an innate psychic structure which allows man to have experiences of this kind. Thus the whole nature of man presupposes woman, both physically and spiritually. His system is tuned in to woman from the start, just as it is prepared for a quite definite world where there is water, light, air, salt, carbohydrates, etc. The form of the world into which he is born is already inborn in him as a virtual image. Likewise parents, wife, children, birth, and death are inborn in him as virtual images, as psychic aptitudes. These *a priori* categories have by nature a collective character; they are images of parents, wife, and children in general, and are not individual predestinations. We must therefore think of these images as lacking in solid content, hence as unconscious. They only acquire solidity, influence, and eventual consciousness in the encounter with empirical facts, which touch the unconscious aptitude and quicken it to life. They are in a sense the deposits of all our ancestral experiences, but they are not the experiences themselves. So at least it seems to us, in the present limited state of our knowledge. (I must confess that I have never yet found infallible evidence for the inheritance of memory images, but I do not regard it as positively precluded that in addition to these collective deposits which contain nothing specifically individual, there may also be inherited memories that are individually determined.)

301 An inherited collective image of woman exists in a man's unconscious, with the help of which he apprehends the nature of woman. This inherited image is the third important source for the femininity of the soul.

302 As the reader will have grasped, we are not concerned here with a philosophical, much less a religious, concept of the soul, but with the psychological recognition of the existence of a semi-conscious psychic complex, having partial autonomy of function. Clearly, this connotation has as much or as little to do with philosophical or religious conceptions of the soul,

as psychology has as much or as little to do with philosophy or religion. I have [illegible] absolutes, nor do I seek to [illegible] or to the meaning [illegible] what exactly the [illegible] I must, however, restrain both [illegible] from [illegible] what the psychologist ought to mean by soul. The idea of personal immortality is so firmly attached [illegible] for science no more than a psychological [illegible] which is already included in the idea of a [illegible] of psychic [illegible] the soul as the [illegible] sees [illegible] but seeing [illegible] as [illegible] meaning of immortality is simply a psychic phenomenon which transcends the limits of consciousness. "Beyond the grave" or "on the other side of death" means psychologically "beyond consciousness." There is positively nothing else it could mean, since statements about immortality can only be made by the living, who, as such, are not exactly in a position to pontificate about conditions "beyond the grave."

The autonomy of the soul-complex naturally lends support to the idea of an invisible, personal entity that apparently lives in a world very different from ours. Consequently, once the activity of the soul is felt to be that of an autonomous entity having no ties with our mortal substance, it is but a step to imagining that this entity must lead an entirely independent existence, perhaps in a world of invisible things. Yet it is not immediately clear why the invisibility of this independent entity should simultaneously imply its immortality. The quality of immortality might easily derive from another fact to which I have already alluded, namely the characteristically historical aspect of the soul. Rider Haggard has given one of the best descriptions of this in *She*. When the Buddhists say that progressive perfection through meditation awakens memories of former incarnations, they are no doubt referring to the same psychological reality, the only difference being that they ascribe the historical factor not to the soul but to the Self (*atman*). It is altogether in keeping with the thoroughly extraverted attitude of the Western mind so far, that immortality should be ascribed, both by feeling and tradition, to a soul which we distinguish more or less from our ego, and which also differs tion, the ego on account of its feminine qualities. It would be entirely logical if, by deepening the neglected, introverted side of our spiritual culture, there were to take place in us a transformation more akin to the Eastern frame of mind, where the quality of immortality would transfer itself from the ambiguous figure of the soul (anima) to the self. For it is essentially the overvaluation of the material object without that constellates a spiritual and immortal figure within (obviously for the purpose of compensation and self-regulation). Fundamentally, the historical factor does not attach only to the archetype of the feminine, but to all archetypes whatsoever, i.e., to every inherited unit, mental as well as physical. Our life is indeed the same as it ever was. At all events, in our sense of the word it is not transitory; for the same physiological and psychological processes that have been man's for hundreds of thousands of years still endure, instilling into our inmost hearts this profound intuition of the "eternal" continuity of the living. But the self, as an inclusive term that embraces our whole living organism, not only contains the deposit and totality of all past life, but is also a point of departure, the fertile soil from which all future life will spring. This premonition of futurity is as clearly impressed upon our innermost feelings as is the historical aspect. The idea of immortality follows legitimately from these psychological premises.

304 In the Eastern view the concept of the anima, as we have stated it here, is lacking, and so, logically, is the concept of a persona. This is certainly no accident, for, as I have already indicated, a compensatory relationship exists between persona and anima.

305 The persona is a complicated system of relations between individual consciousness and society, fittingly enough a kind of mask, designed on the one hand to make a definite impression upon others, and, on the other, to conceal the true nature of the individual. That the latter function is superfluous could be maintained only by one who is so identified with his persona that he no longer knows himself; and that the former is unnecessary could only occur to one who is quite unconscious of the true nature of his fellows. Society expects, and indeed must expect, every individual to play the part assigned to him as perfectly as possible, so that a man who is a parson must not only

carry out his official functions objectively, but must at all times and in all circumstances play the role of parson in a flawless manner. Society demands this as a kind of surety; each must stand at his post, here a cobbler, there a poet. No man is expected to be both. Nor is it advisable to be both, for that would be "queer." Such a man would be "different" from other people, not quite reliable. In the academic world he would be a dilettante, in politics an "unpredictable" quantity, in religion a free-thinker—in short, he would always be suspected of unreliability and incompetence, because society is persuaded that only the cobbler who is not a poet can supply workmanlike shoes. To present an unequivocal face to the world is a matter of practical importance: the average man—the only kind society knows anything about—must keep his nose to one thing in order to achieve anything worth while, two would be too much. Our society is undoubtedly set on such an ideal. It is therefore not surprising that everyone who wants to get on must take these expectations into account. Obviously no one could completely submerge his individuality in these expectations; hence the construction of an artificial personality becomes an unavoidable necessity. The demands of propriety and good manners are an added inducement to assume a becoming mask. What goes on behind the mask is then called "private life." This painfully familiar division of consciousness into two figures, often preposterously different, is an incisive psychological operation that is bound to have repercussions on the unconscious.

306 The construction of a collectively suitable persona means a formidable concession to the external world, a genuine self-sacrifice which drives the ego straight into identification with the persona, so that people really do exist who believe they are what they pretend to be. The "soullessness" of such an attitude is, however, only apparent, for under no circumstances will the unconscious tolerate this shifting of the centre of gravity. When we examine such cases critically, we find that the excellence of the mask is compensated by the "private life" going on behind it. The pious Drummond once lamented that "bad temper is the vice of the virtuous." Whoever builds up too good a persona for himself naturally has to pay for it with irritability. Bismarck had hysterical weeping fits, Wagner indulged in correspondence about the belts of silk dressing-gowns, Nietzsche

[illegible] describing. Goethe held conversations with Eckermann, etc. But there are subtler things than the banal lapses of heroes. I once made the acquaintance of a very venerable personage—in fact, one might easily call him a saint. I stalked round him for three whole days, but never a mortal failing did I find in him. My feeling of inferiority grew ominous, and I was beginning to think seriously of how I might better myself. Then, on the fourth day, his wife came to consult me. . . . Well, nothing of the sort has ever happened to me since. But this I did learn: that any man who becomes one with his persona can cheerfully let all disturbances manifest themselves through his wife without her noticing it, though she pays for her self-sacrifice with a bad neurosis.

306 These identifications with a social role are a very fruitful source of neuroses. A man cannot get rid of himself in favour of an artificial personality without punishment. Even the attempt to do so brings on, in all ordinary cases, unconscious reactions in the form of bad moods, affects, phobias, compulsive ideas, backslidings, vices, etc. The social "strong man" is in his private life often a mere child where his own states of feeling are concerned; his public discipline (which he demands quite particularly of others) goes miserably to pieces in private. His "happiness in his work" assumes a woeful countenance at home; his "spotless" public morality looks strange indeed behind the mask—we will not mention deeds, but only fantasies, and the wives of such men would have a pretty tale to tell. As to his selfless altruism, his children have decided views about that.

307 To the degree that the world invites the individual to identify with the mask, he is delivered over to influences from within. "High rests on low," says Lao-tzu. An opposite forces its way up from inside; it is exactly as though the unconscious suppressed the ego with the very same power which drew the ego into the persona. The absence of resistance outwardly, against the lure of the persona, means a similar weakness inwardly, against the influence of the unconscious. Outwardly an effective and powerful role is played, while inwardly an effeminate weakness develops in the face of every influence coming from the unconscious. Moods, vagaries, timidity, even a limp sexuality (culminating in impotence), gradually gain the upper hand.

309 The persona, the ideal picture of a man as he should be, is inwardly compensated by feminine weakness, and as the individual outwardly plays the strong man, so he becomes inwardly a woman, i.e., the anima,[1] for it is the anima that reacts to the persona. But because the inner world is dark and invisible to the extraverted consciousness, and because a man is all the less capable of conceiving his weaknesses the more he is identified with the persona, the persona's counterpart, the anima, remains completely in the dark and is at once projected, so that our hero comes under the heel of his wife's slipper. If this results in a considerable increase of her power, she will acquit herself none too well. She becomes inferior, thus providing her husband with the welcome proof that it is not he, the hero, who is inferior in private, but his wife. In return the wife can cherish the illusion, so attractive to many, that at least she has married a hero, unperturbed by her own uselessness. This little game of illusion is often taken to be the whole meaning of life.

310 Just as, for the purpose of individuation, or self-realization, it is essential for a man to distinguish between what he is and how he appears to himself and to others, so it is also necessary for the same purpose that he should become conscious of his invisible system of relations to the unconscious, and especially of the anima, so as to be able to distinguish himself from her. One cannot of course distinguish oneself from something unconscious. In the matter of the persona it is easy enough to make it clear to a man that he and his office are two different things. But it is very difficult for a man to distinguish himself from his anima, the more so because she is invisible. Indeed, he has first to contend with the prejudice that everything coming from inside him springs from the truest depths of his being. The "strong man" will perhaps concede that in private life he is singularly undisciplined, but that, he says, is just his weakness with which, as it were, he proclaims his solidarity. Now there is in this tendency a cultural heritage that is not to be despised; for when a man recognizes that his ideal persona is responsible for his anything but ideal anima, his ideals are shattered, the world becomes ambiguous, he becomes ambiguous even to himself. He is seized by doubts about good-

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[1] *Psychological Types*, Coll. Works, Vol. 6, Part II, Def. 48.

ness, and what is worse, he doubts his own good intentions. When one considers how much of our private [illegible] good intentions is bound up with vast hypocritical assumptions, it will readily be understood that it is pleasanter and more in keeping with our present view of the world to deplore a personal weakness than to shatter ideals.

But since the conventions always act as collective ruminants no less than the factors that regulate the life of society, and are no less collective, I might just as well learn to distinguish between what I want and what the unconscious thrusts upon me, as to see what my office demands and what I myself desire. At first the only thing that is at all clear is the incompatibility of the demands from without and from within, with the ego standing between them as between hammer and anvil. But over against this ego, tossed like a shuttlecock between the outer and inner demands, there stands some scarcely definable exponent, which I would on no account label with the misleading name of conscience, although, taken in its best sense, the word fits that exponent very aptly indeed. What we have made of this conscience Spitteler has described with unsurpassable humour.[4] Hence we should strenuously avoid this particular signification. We should do far better to realize that the tragic counterplay between inside and outside (depicted in Job and *Faust* as the wager with God) represents at bottom the energetics of the life process, the polar tension that is necessary for self-regulation. However different to all intents and purposes these opposing forces may be, their fundamental meaning and desire is the life of the individual: they always fluctuate round this centre of balance. Just because they are inseparably related through opposition, they also unite in a mediatory meaning, which, willingly or unwillingly, is born out of the individual and is therefore divined by him. He has a strong feeling of what should be and what could be. To depart from this divination means error, aberration, illness.

It is probably no accident that our modern notions of personal and personality derive from the word *persona*. I can assert that my ego is personal or a personality, and in exactly the same sense I can say that my persona is a personality with which I identify myself more or less. The fact that I [illegible] possess two personalities is not so remarkable. Since every autonomous or even relatively autonomous complex has the peculiarity of appearing as a personality, i.e., of being personified. This can be observed most readily in the so-called spiritualistic manifestations of automatic writing and the like. The sentences produced are always personal statements and are propounded in the first person singular, as though behind every utterance there stood an actual personality. A naïve intelligence at once thinks of spirits. The same sort of thing is also observable in the hallucinations of the insane, although these, more clearly than the first, can often be recognized as mere thoughts or fragments of thoughts whose connection with the conscious personality is immediately apparent to everyone.

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[4] *Prometheus and Epimetheus.* [illegible]

313 The tendency of the relatively autonomous complex to direct personification also explains why the persona exercises such a "personal" effect that the ego is all too easily deceived as to which is the "true" personality.

314 Now, everything that is true of the persona and of all autonomous complexes in general also holds true of the anima. She likewise is a personality, and this is why she is so easily projected upon a woman. So long as the anima is unconscious she is always projected, for everything unconscious is projected. The first bearer of the soul-image is always the mother; later it is borne by those women who arouse the man's feelings, whether in a positive or a negative sense. Because the mother is the first bearer of the soul-image, separation from her is a delicate and important matter of the greatest educational significance. Accordingly among primitives we find a large number of rites designed to organize this separation. The mere fact of becoming adult, and of outward separation, is not enough; impressive initiations into the "men's house" and ceremonies of rebirth are still needed in order to make the separation from the mother (and hence from childhood) entirely effective.

315 Just as the father acts as a protection against the dangers of the external world and thus serves his son as a model persona, so the mother protects him against the dangers that threaten from the darkness of his psyche. In the puberty initiations, therefore, the initiate receives instruction about these things of "the other side," so that he is put in a position to dispense with his mother's protection.

316 The modern civilized man has to forgo this primitive but nonetheless admirable system of education. The consequence is that the anima, in the form of the mother-imago, is transferred to the wife; and the man, as soon as he marries, becomes childish, sentimental, dependent, and subservient, or else truculent, tyrannical, hypersensitive, always thinking about the prestige of his superior masculinity. The last is of course merely the reverse of the first. The safeguard against the unconscious, which is what his mother meant to him, is not replaced by anything in the modern man's education; unconsciously, therefore, his ideal of marriage is so arranged that his wife has to take over the magical rôle of the mother. Under the cloak of the ideally exclusive marriage he is really seeking his mother's protection, and thus he plays into the hands of his wife's possessive instincts. His fear of the dark incalculable power of the unconscious gives his wife an illegitimate authority over him, and forges such a dangerously close union that the marriage is permanently on the brink of explosion from internal tension—or else, out of protest, he flies to the other extreme, with the same results.

317 I am of the opinion that it is absolutely essential for a certain type of modern man to recognize his distinction not only from the persona, but from the anima as well. For the most part our consciousness, in true Western style, looks outwards, and the inner world remains in darkness. But this difficulty can be overcome easily enough, if only we will make the effort to apply the same concentration and criticism to the psychic material which manifests itself, not outside, but in our private lives. So accustomed are we to keep a shamefaced silence about this other side—we even tremble before our wives, lest they betray us!—and, if found out, to make rueful confessions of "weakness," that there would seem to be only one method of education, namely, to crush or repress the weaknesses as much as possible or at least hide them from the public. But that gets us nowhere.

318 Perhaps I can best explain what has to be done if I use the persona as an example. Here everything is plain and straightforward, whereas the anima is dark, to Western eyes anyway. When the anima continually thwarts the good intentions of the conscious mind, by contriving a private life that

stands in sorry contrast to the dazzling persona. It is exactly the same as when a naive individual, who has not the least of a persona, encounters the most painful difficulties in his passage through the world. There are indeed people who lack a developed persona—"Canadians who know not Europe's sham politeness"—blundering from one social solecism to the next, perfectly harmless and innocent, soulful bores or appealing children, or, if they are women, spectral Cassandras dreaded for their tactlessness, eternally misunderstood, never knowing what they are about, always taking forgiveness for granted, blind to the world, hopeless dreamers. From them we can see how a neglected persona works, and what one must do to remedy the evil. Such people can avoid disappointments and an infinity of sufferings, scenes, and social catastrophes only by learning to see how men behave in the world. They must learn to understand what society expects of them; they must realize that there are factors and persons in the world far above them; they must know that what they do has a meaning for others, and so forth. Naturally all this is child's play for one who has a properly developed persona. But if we reverse the picture and confront the man who possesses a brilliant persona with the anima, and for the sake of comparison set him beside the man with no persona, then we shall see that the latter is just as well informed about the anima and her affairs as the former is about the world. The use which either makes of his knowledge can just as easily be abused, in fact it is more than likely that it will be.

31 The man with the persona is blind to the existence of inner realities, just as the other is blind to the reality of the world, which for him has merely the value of an amusing or fantastic playground. But the fact of inner realities and their unqualified recognition is obviously the sine qua non for a serious consideration of the anima problem. If the external world is, for me, simply a phantasm, how should I take the trouble to establish a complicated system of relationship and adaptation to it? Equally, the "nothing but fantasy" attitude will never persuade me to regard my anima manifestations as anything more than fatuous weakness. If, however, I take the line that the world is outside and inside, that reality falls to the share of both, I must logically accept the upsets and annoyances

that comes from the [illegible] as [illegible] appears. [illegible] family [illegible] adaptation [illegible] No more than the [illegible] moral repression [illegible] weaknesses. He [illegible] can be tackled by will and made [illegible]. Take, for example, a spotless man of honour and public benefactor, whose tantrums and explosive moodiness terrify his wife and children. What is the anima doing here?

310 We can see it at once if we just allow things to take their natural course. Wife and children will become estranged; a vacuum will form about him. At first he will deplore the hard-heartedness of his family, and will behave if possible even more vilely than before. That will make the estrangement absolute. If the good spirits have not utterly forsaken him, he will after a time notice his isolation, and in his loneliness he will begin to understand how he caused the estrangement. Perhaps, aghast at himself, he will ask, "What sort of devil has got into me?"—without of course seeing the meaning of this metaphor. Then follow remorse, reconciliation, oblivion, repression, and, in next to no time, a new explosion. Clearly, the anima is trying to enforce a separation. This tendency is in nobody's interest. The anima comes between them like a jealous mistress who tries to alienate the man from his family. An official post or any other advantageous social position can do the same thing, but there we can understand the force of the attraction. Whence does the anima obtain the power to wield such charms? On the analogy with the persona there must be values or some other important and influential factors lying in the background like seductive promises. In such matters we must guard against rationalizations. Our first thought is that [illegible] the man [illegible] another woman. [illegible] even be arranged by the anima as the most effective means to the desired end. Such an arrangement should not be mis[illegible] as an end in itself, for the blameless gentleman who is correctly married according to the law can be just as correctly divorced according to the law, which does not alter his fundamental attitude one iota. The old picture has merely received a new frame.

321 As a matter of fact this [illegible] is a very [illegible] the [illegible] of the disorientation, a separation [illegible] of happening, a [illegible]. Therefore it is more reasonable not to assume that such [illegible] was possible; [illegible] is [illegible] purpose of the separation. We would do better to [illegible] should [illegible] tendencies of the anima. The next step is what I would call the objectivation of the anima, that is, the strict refusal to regard the trend towards separation as a weakness of one's own. Only when this has been done can one face the anima with the question, "Why do you want this separation?" To put the question in this personal way has the great advantage of recognizing the anima as a personality, and of making a relationship possible. The more personally she is taken the better.

322 To anyone accustomed to proceed purely intellectually and rationally, this may seem altogether too ridiculous. It would indeed be the height of absurdity if a man tried to have a conversation with his persona, which he recognized merely as a psychological means of relationship. But it is absurd only for the man who has a persona. If he has none, he is in no way different from the primitive who, as we know, has only one foot in what we commonly call reality. With the other foot he stands in a world of spirits, which is quite real to him. Our model case behaves, in the world, like a modern European; but in the world of spirits he is the child of a troglodyte. He must therefore submit to living in a kind of prehistoric kindergarten until he has got the right idea of the powers and factors which rule that other world. Hence he is quite right to treat the anima as an autonomous personality and to address personal questions to her.

323 I mean this as an actual technique. We know that practically every one has not only the peculiarity, but also the faculty, of holding a conversation with himself. Whenever we are in a predicament we ask ourselves (or whom else?), "What shall I do?" either aloud or beneath our breath, and we (or who else?) supply the answer. Since it is our intention to learn what we can about the foundations of our being, this little matter of living in a metaphor should not bother us. We have to accept it as a symbol of our primitive backwardness (or of such naturalness as is still, mercifully, left to us) that we can, like the Negro, discourse personally with our snake. The psyche not

being a unity, but a contradictory multiplicity of complexes, the dissociation required for our discussions with the anima is not so terribly difficult. The art of it [illegible] consists in allowing our invisible partner to make herself heard, in putting the mechanism of expression momentarily at her disposal, without being overcome by the distaste one naturally feels at playing such an apparently ridiculous game with oneself, or by doubts as to the genuineness of the voice of one's interlocutor. This latter point is technically very important: we are so in the habit of identifying ourselves with the thoughts that come to us that we invariably assume we have made them. Curiously enough, it is precisely the most impossible thoughts for which we feel the greatest subjective responsibility. If we were more conscious of the inflexible universal laws that govern even the wildest and most wanton fantasy, we might perhaps be in a better position to see these thoughts above all others as objective occurrences, just as we see dreams, which nobody supposes to be deliberate or arbitrary inventions. It certainly requires the greatest objectivity and absence of prejudice to give the "other side" the opportunity for perceptible psychic activity. As a result of the repressive attitude of the conscious mind, the other side is driven into indirect and purely symptomatic manifestations, mostly of an emotional kind, and only in moments of overwhelming affectivity can fragments of the unconscious come to the surface in the form of thoughts or pictures. The inevitable accompanying symptom is that the ego momentarily identifies with these utterances, only to revoke them in the same breath. And, indeed, the things one says when in the grip of an affect sometimes seem very strange and daring. But they are easily forgotten, or wholly denied. This mechanism of deprecation and denial naturally has to be reckoned with if one wants to adopt an objective attitude. The habit of rushing in to correct and criticize is already strong enough in our tradition, and it is as a rule further reinforced by fear—a fear that can be confessed neither to oneself nor to others, a fear of insidious truths, of dangerous knowledge, of disagreeable verifications, in a word, fear of all those things that cause so many of us to flee from being alone with ourselves as from the plague. We say that it is egoistic or "morbid" to be preoccupied with oneself; one's own company is the worst, "it makes you melancholy"—such are the glowing testimonials accorded to our human make-up. They are evidently deeply ingrained in the Western mind. Whoever thinks in this way has obviously never asked himself what possible pleasure other people could find in the company of such a miserable coward. Starting from the fact that in a state of affect one often surrenders involuntarily to the truths of the other side, would it not be far better to make use of an affect so as to give the other side an opportunity to speak? It could therefore be said just as truly that one should cultivate the art of conversing with oneself in the setting provided by an affect, as though the affect itself were speaking without regard to our rational criticism. So long as the affect is speaking, criticism must be withheld. But once it has presented its case, we should begin criticizing as conscientiously as though a real person closely connected with us were our interlocutor. Nor should the matter rest there, but statement and answer must follow one another until a satisfactory end to the discussion is reached. Whether the result is satisfactory or not, only subjective feeling can decide. Any humbug is of course quite useless. Scrupulous honesty with oneself and no rash anticipation of what the other side might conceivably say are the indispensable conditions of this technique for educating the anima.

324 There is, however, something to be said for this characteristic fear of the Western mind of the other side. It is not entirely without justification, quite apart from the fact that it is real. We can understand at once the fear that the child and the primitive have of the great unknown. We have the same childish fear of our inner side, where we likewise touch upon a great unknown world. All we have is the affect, the fear, without knowing that this is a world-fear—for the world of affects is invisible. We have either purely theoretical prejudices against it, or superstitious ideas. One cannot even talk about the unconscious before many educated people without being accused of mysticism. The fear is legitimate in so far as our rational Weltanschauung with its scientific and moral certitudes—so hotly believed in because so deeply questionable—is shattered by the facts of the other side. If only one could avoid them, then the emphatic advice of the Philistine to "let sleeping dogs lie" would be the only truth worth advocating. And here I would expressly point out that I am not recommending the above technique as either necessary

or even useful to any person not driven to it by necessity. The stages, as I said, are many, and there are greybeards who die as innocent as babes in arms, and in this year of grace troglodytes are still being born. There are truths which belong to the future, truths which belong to the past, and truths which belong to no time.

325 I can imagine someone using this technique out of a kind of holy inquisitiveness, some youth, perhaps, who would like to set wings to his lame feet, not because of lameness, but because he yearns for the sun. But a grown man, with too many illusions behind him, will submit to this inner humiliation and surrender only if forced, for why should he let the terrors of childhood again have their way with him? It is no light matter to stand between a day-world of exploded ideals and discredited values, and a night-world of apparently senseless fantasy. The weirdness of this standpoint is in fact so great that there is probably nobody who does not reach out for security, even though it be a reaching back to the mother who shielded his childhood from the terrors of night. Whoever is afraid must needs be dependent; a weak thing needs support. That is why the primitive mind, from deep psychological necessity, begot religious instruction and embodied it in magician and priest. *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus* is still a valid truth today—for those who can go back to it. For the few who cannot, there is only dependence upon a human being, a humbler and a prouder dependence, a weaker and a stronger support, so it seems to me, than any other. What can one say of the Protestant? He has neither church nor priest, but only God—and even God becomes doubtful.

326 The reader may ask in some consternation: "But what on earth does the anima do, that such double insurances are necessary before one can come to terms with her?" I would recommend my reader to study the comparative history of religion so intently as to fill these dead chronicles with the emotional life of those who lived these religions. Then he will get some idea of what lives on the other side. The old religions with their sublime and ridiculous, their friendly and fiendish symbols did not drop from the blue, but were born of this human soul that dwells within us at this moment. All those things, their primal forms, live on in us and may at any time burst in upon us with annihilating force, in the guise of mass-suggestions against

which the inner world has its exteriorness. Our learned men have only changed their names. [illegible] Or has anyone ever believed that the World War [illegible] was an ingenious invention? Just as outwardly we live in a world where a whole continent may be submerged at any moment, or a pole be shifted, or a new pestilence break out, so inwardly we live in a world where at any moment something similar may occur, albeit in the form of an idea, but no less dangerous and untrustworthy for that. Failure to adapt to this inner world is a negligence entailing just as serious consequences as ignorance and ineptitude in the outer world. It is after all only a tiny fraction of humanity, living mainly on that thickly populated peninsula of Asia which juts out into the Atlantic Ocean, and calling themselves "cultured," who, because they lack all contact with nature, have hit upon the idea that religion is a peculiar kind of mental disturbance of undiscoverable purport. Viewed from a safe distance, say from central Africa or Tibet, it would certainly look as if this fraction had projected its own unconscious mental derangements upon nations still possessed of healthy instincts.

327 Because the things of the inner world influence us all the more powerfully for being unconscious, it is essential for anyone who intends to make progress in self-culture (and does not all culture begin with the individual?) to objectivate the effects of the anima and then try to understand what contents underlie those effects. In this way he adapts to, and is protected against, the invisible. No adaptation can result without concessions to both worlds. From a consideration of the claims of the inner and outer worlds, or rather, from the conflict between them, the possible and the necessary follows. Unfortunately our Western mind, lacking all culture in this respect, has never yet devised a concept, nor even a name, for the *union of opposites through the middle path*, that most fundamental item of inward experience, which could respectably be set against the Chinese concept of Tao. It is at once the most individual fact and the most universal, the most legitimate fulfilment of the meaning of the individual's life.

328 In the course of my exposition so far, I have kept exclusively to masculine psychology. The anima, being of feminine gender, is exclusively a figure that compensates the masculine

consciousness. In woman the compensating figure is of a masculine character, and can therefore appropriately be termed the animus. If it was no easy task to describe what is meant by the anima, the difficulties become almost insuperable when we set out to describe the psychology of the animus.

329 The fact that a man naïvely ascribes his anima reactions to himself, without seeing that he really cannot identify himself with an autonomous complex, is repeated in feminine psychology, though if possible in even more marked form. This identification with an autonomous complex is the essential reason why it is so difficult to understand and describe the problem, quite apart from its inherent obscurity and strangeness. We always start with the naïve assumption that we are masters in our own house. Hence we must first accustom ourselves to the thought that, even in our most intimate psychic life, we live in a kind of house which has doors and windows to the world, but that, although the objects or contents of this world act upon us, they do not belong to us. For many people this hypothesis is by no means easy to conceive, just as they do not find it at all easy to understand and to accept the fact that their neighbour's psychology is not necessarily identical with their own. My reader may think that the last remark is something of an exaggeration, since in general one is aware of individual differences. But it must be remembered that our individual conscious psychology develops out of an original state of unconsciousness and therefore of non-differentiation (termed by Lévy-Bruhl *participation mystique*). Consequently, consciousness of differentiation is a relatively late achievement of mankind, and presumably but a relatively small sector of the indefinitely large field of original identity. Differentiation is the essence, the *sine qua non* of consciousness. Everything unconscious is undifferentiated, and everything that happens unconsciously proceeds on the basis of non-differentiation—that is to say, there is no determining whether it belongs or does not belong to the self. It cannot be established *a priori* whether it concerns me, or another, or both. Nor does feeling give us any sure clues in this respect.

330 An inferior consciousness cannot *eo ipso* be ascribed to women; it is merely different from masculine consciousness. But, just as a woman is often clearly conscious of things which a man is still groping for in the dark, so there are naturally fields of experience in a man which, for woman, are still wrapped in

the shadowy existence of merely objective things in which she has little interest. Personal relationships are as a rule more important and interesting to her than objective facts and their interconnections. The wide fields of commerce, politics, technology, and science, the whole realm of the applied masculine mind, she relegates to the penumbra of consciousness; while, on the other hand, she develops a minute consciousness of personal relationships, the infinite nuances of which usually escape the man entirely.

331 We must therefore expect the unconscious of woman to show aspects essentially different from those found in man. If I were to attempt to put in a nutshell the difference between man and woman in this respect, i.e., what it is that characterizes the animus as opposed to the anima, I could only say this: as the anima produces *moods*, so the animus produces *opinions*; and as the moods of a man issue from a shadowy background, so the opinions of a woman rest on equally unconscious prior assumptions. Animus opinions very often have the character of solid convictions that are not lightly shaken, or of principles whose validity is seemingly unassailable. If we analyse these opinions, we immediately come upon unconscious assumptions whose existence must first be inferred; that is to say, the opinions are apparently conceived as though such assumptions existed. But in reality the opinions are not thought out at all; they exist ready made, and they are held so positively and with so much conviction that the woman never has the shadow of a doubt about them.

332 One would be inclined to suppose that the animus, like the anima, personifies itself in a single figure. But this, as experience shows, is true only up to a point, because another factor unexpectedly makes its appearance which brings about an essentially different situation from that existing in a man. The animus does not appear as one person, but as a plurality of persons. In H. G. Wells' novel *Christina Alberta's Father*, the heroine, in all that she does or does not do, is constantly under the surveillance of a supreme moral authority, which tells her with remorseless precision and dry matter-of-factness what she is doing and for what motives. Wells calls this authority a "Court of Conscience." This collection of condemnatory judges, a sort of College of Preceptors, corresponds to a personification of the animus. The animus is rather like an assembly of fathers

and dignitaries of some kind who lay down incontestable, "rational," *ex cathedra* judgments. On closer examination these exacting judgments turn out to be largely sayings and opinions scraped together more or less unconsciously from childhood on, and compressed into a canon of average truth, justice, and reasonableness, a compendium of preconceptions which, whenever a conscious and competent judgment is lacking (as not infrequently happens), instantly obliges with an opinion. Sometimes these opinions take the form of so-called sound common sense, sometimes they appear as principles which are like a travesty of education: "People have always done it like this," or "Everybody says it is like that."

333 It goes without saying that the animus is just as often projected as the anima. The men who are particularly suited to these projections are either walking replicas of God himself, who know all about everything, or else they are misunderstood word-mongers with a vast and windy vocabulary at their command, who translate common or garden reality into the terminology of the sublime. It would be insufficient to characterize the animus merely as a conservative, collective conscience; he is also a neologist who, in flagrant contradiction to his correct opinions, has an extraordinary weakness for difficult and unfamiliar words which act as a pleasant substitute for the odious task of reflection.

334 Like the anima, the animus is a jealous lover. He is an adept at putting, in place of the real man, an opinion about him, the exceedingly disputable grounds for which are never submitted to criticism. Animus opinions are invariably collective, and they override individuals and individual judgments in exactly the same way as the anima thrusts her emotional anticipations and projections between man and wife. If the woman happens to be pretty, these animus opinions have for the man something rather touching and childlike about them, which makes him adopt a benevolent, fatherly, professorial manner. But if the woman does not stir his sentimental side, and competence is expected of her rather than appealing helplessness and stupidity, then her animus opinions irritate the man to death, chiefly because they are based on nothing but opinion for opinion's sake, and "everybody has a right to his own opinions." Men can be pretty venomous here, for it is an inescapable fact that

[illegible] and in always [illegible] a recourse [illegible] particular.

335 In intellectual women the animus encourages a critical disputatiousness and would-be highbrowism, which, however, consists essentially in harping on some irrelevant weak point and nonsensically making it the main one. Or a perfectly lucid discussion gets tangled up in the most maddening way through the introduction of a quite different and if possible perverse point of view. Without knowing it, such women are solely intent upon exasperating the man and are, in consequence, the more completely at the mercy of the animus. "Unfortunately I am always right," one of these creatures once confessed to me.

336 However, all these traits, as familiar as they are unsavoury, are simply and solely due to the extraversion of the animus. The animus does not belong to the function of conscious relationship; his function is rather to facilitate relations with the unconscious. Instead of the woman merely associating opinions with external situations—situations which she ought to think about consciously—the animus, as an associative function, should be directed inwards, where it could associate the contents of the unconscious. The technique of coming to terms with the animus is the same in principle as in the case of the anima; only here the woman must learn to criticize and hold her opinions at a distance; not in order to repress them, but, by investigating their origins, to penetrate more deeply into the background, where she will then discover the primordial images, just as the man does in his dealings with the anima. The animus is the deposit, as it were, of all woman's ancestral experiences of man—and not only that, he is also a creative and procreative being, not in the sense of masculine creativity, but in the sense that he brings forth something we might call the λόγος σπερματικός, the spermatic word. Just as a man brings forth his work as a complete creation out of his inner feminine nature, so the inner masculine side of a woman brings forth creative seeds which have the power to fertilize the feminine side of the man. This would be the *femme inspiratrice* who, if falsely cultivated, can turn into the worst kind of dogmatist and high-handed pedagogue—a regular "animus hound," as one of my women patients aptly expressed it.

337 A woman possessed by the animus is always in danger of

[illegible] personal, just as a [illegible] the risk of [illegible]. These [illegible] has been [illegible]. The reason for this perversion is clearly the failure to give adequate recognition to an inner world which stands autonomously opposed to the outer world, and makes just as serious demands on our capacity for adaptation.

338 Whereas I regard the plurality of the animus as distinguished from the "unipersonal" anima, this remarkable fact seems to me to be a correlate of the conscious attitude. The conscious attitude of woman is in general far more exclusively personal than that of man. Her world is made up of fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, husbands and children. The rest of the world consists likewise of families, who nod to each other but are, in the main, interested essentially in themselves. The man's world is the nation, the state, business concerns, etc. His family is simply a means to an end, one of the foundations of the state, and his wife is not necessarily *the* woman for him (at any rate not as the woman means it when she says "my man"). The general means more to him than the personal; his world consists of a multitude of co-ordinated factors, whereas her world, outside her husband, terminates in a sort of cosmic mist. A passionate exclusiveness therefore attaches to the man's anima, and an indefinite variety to the woman's animus. Whereas the man has, floating before him, in clear outlines, the significant form of a Circe or a Calypso, the animus is better expressed as a bevy of Flying Dutchmen or unknown wanderers from over the sea, never quite clearly grasped, protean, given to persistent and violent motion. These expressions appear especially in dreams, though in concrete reality they can be famous tenors, boxing champions, or great men in far-away, unknown cities.

339 These two crepuscular figures of the dark hinterland of the psyche—truly the semi-grotesque "guardians of the threshold," to use the pompous jargon of theosophy—can assume an almost inexhaustible number of shapes, enough to fill whole volumes. Their complicated transformations are as rich and strange as the world itself, as manifold as the limitless variety of their conscious correlate, the persona. They inhabit the twilight

sphere and we can [illegible] anima and animus is essentially [illegible] function [illegible] has [illegible] a personality [illegible] but in reality we can see [illegible] persona [illegible] by making [illegible] unconscious. It is because we are not using them purposefully as functions that they remain personified complexes. So long as they are in this state they must be accepted as relatively independent personalities. They cannot be integrated into consciousness while their contents remain unknown. The purpose of the dialectical process is to bring these contents into the light; and only when this task has been completed, and the conscious mind has become sufficiently familiar with the unconscious processes reflected in the anima, will the anima be felt simply as a function.

340 I do not expect every reader to grasp right away what is meant by animus and anima. But I hope he will at least have gained the impression that it is not a question of anything "metaphysical," but far rather of empirical facts which could equally well be expressed in rational and abstract language. I have purposely avoided too abstract a terminology because, in matters of this kind, which hitherto have been so inaccessible to our experience, it is useless to present the reader with an intellectual formulation. It is far more to the point to give him some conception of what the actual possibilities of experience are. Nobody can really understand these things unless he has experienced them himself. I am therefore much more interested in pointing out the possible ways to such experience than in devising intellectual formulae which, for lack of experience, must necessarily remain an empty web of words. Unfortunately there are all too many who learn the words by heart and add the experiences in their heads, thereafter abandoning themselves, according to temperament, either to credulity or to criticism. We are concerned here with a new questioning, a new—and yet age-old—field of psychological experience. We shall be able to establish relatively valid theories about it only when the corresponding psychological facts are known to a sufficient number of people. The first things to be discovered are always facts, not theories. Theory-building is the outcome of discussion among many

III

THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE FIGURES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

341 I owe it to the reader to give him a detailed example of the specific activity of animus and anima. Unfortunately this material is so enormous and demands so much explanation of symbols that I cannot include such an account within the compass of this essay. I have, however, published some of these products with all their symbolical associations in a separate work,[1] and to this I must refer the reader. In that book I said nothing about the animus, because at that time this function was still unknown to me. Nevertheless, if I advise a woman patient to associate her unconscious contents, she will always produce the same kind of fantasy. The masculine hero figure who almost unfailingly appears is the animus, and the succession of fantasy-experiences demonstrates the gradual transformation and dissolution of the autonomous complex.

342 This transformation is the aim of the analysis of the unconscious. If there is no transformation, it means that the determining influence of the unconscious is unabated, and that it will in some cases persist in maintaining neurotic symptoms in spite of all our analysis and all our understanding. Alternatively, a compulsive transference will take hold, which is just as bad as a neurosis. Obviously in such cases no amount of suggestion, good will, and purely reductive understanding has helped to break the power of the unconscious. This is not to say—once again I would like to emphasize this point very clearly—that all psychotherapeutic methods are, by and large, useless. I merely want to stress the fact that there are not a few cases where the doctor has to make up his mind to deal fundamentally with the

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[1] *Symbols of Transformation*, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 5.

unconscious is to come to a real settlement with it. This is a very different thing from interpretation. In the latter case it is taken for granted that the doctor knows beforehand, so as to be able to interpret. But in the case of a real settlement it is not a question of interpretation: it is a question of releasing unconscious processes and letting them come into the conscious mind in the form of fantasies. We can try our hand at interpreting these fantasies if we like. In many cases it may be quite important for the patient to have some idea of the meaning of the fantasies produced. But it is of vital importance that he should experience them to the full and, in so far as intellectual understanding belongs to the totality of experience, also understand them. Yet I would not give priority to understanding. Naturally the doctor must be able to assist the patient in his understanding, but, since he will not and indeed cannot understand everything, the doctor should assiduously guard against clever feats of interpretation. For the important thing is not to interpret and understand the fantasies, but primarily to experience them. Alfred Kubin has given a very good description of the unconscious in his book *Die andere Seite*,[1] that is, he has described what he, as an artist, experienced of the unconscious. It is an artistic experience which, in the deeper meaning of human experience, is incomplete. I would like to recommend an attentive reading of this book to everyone who is interested in these questions. He will then discover the incompleteness I speak of: the vision is experienced artistically, but not humanly. By human experience I mean that the person of the author should not just be included passively in the vision, but that he should face the figures of the vision actively and reactively, with full consciousness. I would level the same criticism at the authoress of the fantasies dealt with in the book mentioned above; she, too, merely stands opposite the fantasies forming themselves out of the unconscious, perceiving them, or at most passively enduring them. But a real settlement with the unconscious demands a firmly opposed conscious standpoint.

343 I will try to explain what I mean by an example. One of my patients had the following fantasy: *He sees his fiancée running down the road towards the river. It is winter, and the river is frozen. She runs out on the ice, and he follows her. She goes*

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[1] Munich, 1908.

s[illegible]. Then there are cracks and crevasses appear, and he is afraid she is going to jump in. And that is what happens: she jumps into the crack, and he watches her sadly.

344 This fragment, although torn out of its context, clearly shows the attitude of the conscious mind: it perceives and passively endures, the fantasy image is merely seen and felt, it is two-dimensional, as it were, because he himself is not sufficiently involved. Therefore the fantasy remains a flat image, concrete and affecting perhaps, but unreal, like a dream. This unreality comes from the fact that he himself is not playing an active part. If the fantasy happened in reality, he would not be at a loss for some means of preventing the girl from committing suicide. He could, for instance, easily overtake her and restrain her bodily from jumping into the crack. Were he to act in reality as he acted in the fantasy, he would obviously be paralysed, either with horror, or by the unconscious thought that he really has no objection to her committing suicide. The fact that he remains passive in the fantasy merely expresses his attitude to the activity of the unconscious in general: he is fascinated and stupefied by it. In reality he suffers from all sorts of depressive ideas and convictions; he thinks he is no good, that he has some hopeless hereditary taint, that his brain is degenerating, etc. These negative feelings are so many autosuggestions which he accepts without argument. Intellectually, he can understand them perfectly and recognize them as untrue, but nevertheless the feelings persist. They cannot be attacked by the intellect because they have no intellectual or rational basis; they are rooted in an unconscious, irrational fantasy-activity which is not amenable to conscious criticism. In these cases the unconscious must be given an opportunity to produce its fantasies, and the above fragment is just such a product of unconscious fantasy activity. Since the case was one of psychogenic depression, the depression itself was due to fantasies of whose existence the patient was totally unconscious. In genuine melancholia, extreme exhaustion, poisoning, etc., the situation would be reversed: the patient has such fantasies because he is in a depressed condition, but in a case of psychogenic depression he is depressed because he has such fantasies. My patient was a very intelligent young man who had been enlightened as to the causes of his neurosis by a lengthy analysis. However, intellectual understanding

made no difference to the depression. In cases of this sort the doctor should spare himself the useless trouble of delving still further into the causality. For when a more or less exhaustive understanding is at hand, all the discovery of causes and every further bit of causality will be of no avail either. The unconscious has simply gained an unassailable ascendancy; it wields an attractive force that can invalidate all conscious contents—in other words, it can withdraw libido from the conscious world and thereby produce a depression, an *abaissement du niveau mental* (Janet). But as a result of this we must, according to the law of energy, expect an accumulation of value, i.e. libido, in the unconscious.

345 Libido can never be apprehended except in a definite form; that is to say, it is identical with fantasy-images. And we can only release it from the grip of the unconscious by bringing up the corresponding fantasy-images. That is why, in a case like this, we give the unconscious a chance to bring its fantasies to the surface. This is how the foregoing fragment was produced. It is a single episode from a long and very intricate series of fantasy-images, corresponding to the quota of energy that was lost to the conscious mind and its contents. The patient's conscious world has become cold, empty, and grey; but the unconscious is activated, powerful, and rich. It is characteristic of the nature of the unconscious psyche that it is sufficient unto itself and knows no human considerations. Once a thing has fallen into the unconscious it is retained there, regardless of whether the conscious mind suffers or not. The latter can hunger and freeze, while everything in the unconscious becomes verdant and blossoms.

346 So at least it appears at first. But when we look deeper, we find that this unconcern of the unconscious has a meaning, indeed a purpose and a goal. There are psychic goals that lie beyond the conscious goals; in fact, they may even be inimical to them. But we find that the unconscious has an inimical or inconsiderate bearing towards the conscious only when the latter adopts a false or pretentious attitude.

347 The conscious attitude of my patient was so one-sidedly intellectual and rationalistic that nature herself rose up against him and annihilated his whole world of conscious values. But he cannot de-intellectualize himself and make himself depend

[illegible] for the very simple reason that he is [illegible]. The unconscious is unconscious. Therefore we have no alternative [illegible] over [illegible] up to the unconscious and give it the opportunity of achieving conscious content in the form of fantasies. If formerly my patient, clinging to this conscious world and defended himself with rationalizations against what he regarded as his illness, he must now [illegible] entirely, and when a fit of depression comes upon him, he must no longer force himself to some kind of work in order to forget, but must accept his depression and give it a hearing.

348 Now this is the direct opposite of succumbing to a mood, which is so typical of neurosis. It is no weakness, no spineless surrender, but a hard achievement, the essence of which consists in keeping your objectivity despite the temptations of the mood, and in making the mood your object, instead of allowing it to become the dominating subject. So the patient must try to get his mood to speak to him; his mood must tell him all about itself and show him through what kind of fantastic analogies it is expressing itself.

349 The foregoing fragment is a bit of visualized mood. If he had not succeeded in keeping his objectivity in relation to his mood, he would have had in place of the fantasy image only a crippling sense that everything was going to the devil, that he was incurable, etc. But because he gave his mood a chance to express itself in an image, he succeeded in converting at least a small sum of libido, of unconscious creative energy in eidetic form, into a conscious content and thus withdrawing it from the sphere of the unconscious.

350 But this effort is not enough. For the fantasy to be completely experienced requires not just perception and passivity, but active participation. The patient would comply with this demand if he conducted himself in the fantasy as he would doubtless conduct himself in reality. He would never remain an idle spectator while his fiancée tried to drown herself; he would leap up and stop her. This should also happen in the fantasy. If he succeeds in behaving in the fantasy as he would behave in a similar situation in reality, he would prove that he was taking the fantasy seriously, i.e., assigning absolute reality value to the unconscious. In this way he would have won a vic-

[illegible] over his one-sided intellectualism and indirectly, would have asserted the validity of the irrational standpoint of the unconscious.

351 That would be the complete experience of the unconscious demanded of them. But one must not underestimate what that [illegible] means. [illegible] world is menaced by fantastic unreality. It is almost insuperably difficult to forget, even for a moment, that all this is only fantasy, [illegible] imagination that must strike one as altogether arbitrary and artificial. How can one assert that anything of this kind is "real" and take it seriously?

352 We can hardly be expected to believe in a sort of double life in which we conduct ourselves on one plane as modest average citizens, while on another we have unbelievable adventures and perform heroic deeds. In other words, we must not concretize our fantasies. But there is in man a strange propensity to do just this, and all his aversion to fantasy and his critical depreciation of the unconscious come solely from the deep-rooted fear of this tendency. Concretization and the fear of it are both primitive superstitions, but they still survive in the liveliest form among so-called enlightened people. In his civic life a man may function as a shoemaker, but as the member of a sect he puts on the dignity of an archangel. To all appearances he is a small tradesman, but among the freemasons he is a mysterious grandee. Another sits all day in his office; at evening, in his circle, he is a reincarnation of Julius Caesar, fallible as a man, but in his official capacity infallible. These are all unintentional concretizations.

353 As against this, the scientific credo of our time has developed a superstitious phobia about fantasy. But the real is what works. The fantasies of the unconscious work, there can be no doubt about that. Even the cleverest philosopher can be the victim of a thoroughly idiotic agoraphobia. Our famous scientific reality does not afford us the slightest protection against the so-called irreality of the unconscious. Something works behind the veil of fantastic images, whether we give this something a good name or a bad. It is something real, and for this reason its manifestations must be taken seriously. But first the tendency to concretization must be overcome; in other words, we must not take the fantasies literally when we approach the question of

terpreting them. While we are in the grip of the actual experience the fantasies cannot be taken literally enough. But when it comes to understanding them, we must on no account mistake the semblance, the fantasy image as such, for the operative process underlying it. The semblance is not the thing itself, but only its expression.

354 The patient is not experiencing the suicide scene "on another plane" (though in every other respect it is just as concrete as a real suicide); he experiences something real which looks like a suicide. The two opposing "realities," the world of the conscious and the world of the unconscious, do not quarrel for supremacy, but each makes the other relative. That the reality of the unconscious is very relative indeed will presumably arouse no violent contradiction; but that the reality of the conscious world could be doubted will be accepted with less alacrity. And yet both "realities" are psychic experience, psychic semblances painted on an inscrutably dark back-cloth. To the critical intellect, nothing is left of *absolute* reality.

355 Of the essence of things, of absolute being, we know nothing. But we experience various effects: from "outside" by way of the senses, from "inside" by way of fantasy. We would never think of asserting that the colour "green" had an independent existence of its own; similarly we ought never to imagine that a fantasy experience exists in and for itself, and is therefore to be taken quite literally. It is an expression, an appearance standing for something unknown but real. The fantasy-fragment I have mentioned coincides in time with a wave of depression and desperation, and this event finds expression in the fantasy. The patient really does have a fiancée; for him she represents the one emotional link with the world. Snap that link, and it would be the end of his relation to the world. This would be an altogether hopeless aspect. But his fiancée is also a symbol for his anima, that is, for his relation to the unconscious. Hence the fantasy simultaneously expresses the fact that, without any hindrance on his part, his anima is disappearing again into the unconscious. This aspect shows that once again his mood is stronger than he is. It throws everything to the winds while he looks on without lifting a hand. But he could easily step in and arrest the anima.

356 I give preference to this latter aspect, because the patient is an introvert whose life-relationship is ruled by inner facts. Were he an extravert, I would have to give preference to the first aspect, because for the extravert life is governed primarily by his relation to human beings. He might, in the trough of a mood, do away with his fiancée and himself too, whereas the introvert harms himself most when he casts off his relation to the anima, i.e., to the object within.

[redacted] So my patient's fantasy clearly reveals the negative movement of the unconscious, a tendency to recoil from the conscious world so energetically that it sucks away the libido from consciousness and leaves the latter empty. But by making the fantasy conscious we stop this process from happening unconsciously. If the patient were himself to participate actively in the way described above, he would possess himself of the libido invested in the fantasy, and would thus gain added influence over the unconscious.

358 Continual conscious realization of unconscious fantasies, together with active participation in the fantastic events, has, as I have witnessed in a very large number of cases, the effect firstly of extending the conscious horizon by the inclusion of numerous unconscious contents; secondly of gradually diminishing the dominant influence of the unconscious; and thirdly of bringing about a change of personality.

[redacted] This change of personality is naturally not an alteration of the original hereditary disposition, but rather a transformation of the general attitude. Those sharp cleavages and antagonisms between conscious and unconscious, such as we see so clearly in the endless conflicts of neurotic natures, nearly always rest on a noticeable one-sidedness of the conscious attitude, which gives absolute precedence to one or two functions, while the others are unjustly thrust into the background. Conscious realization and experience of fantasies assimilates the unconscious inferior functions to the conscious mind—a process which is naturally not without far-reaching effects on the conscious attitude.

360 For the moment I will refrain from discussing the nature of this change of personality, since I only want to emphasize the fact that an important change does take place. I have called this change, which is the aim of our analysis of the unconscious, the transcendent function. This remarkable capacity of the

human soul for change, expressed in the transcendent function, is the principal object of late medieval alchemical philosophy, where it was expressed in terms of alchemical symbolism. Herbert Silberer, in his very able book *Problems of Mysticism and Its Symbolism*, has already pointed out the psychological content of alchemy. It would be an unpardonable error to accept the current view and reduce these "alchemical" strivings to a mere matter of alembics and melting-pots. This side certainly existed; it represented the tentative beginnings of exact chemistry. But alchemy also had a spiritual side which must not be underestimated and whose psychological value has not yet been sufficiently appreciated: there was an "alchemical" philosophy, the groping precursor of the most modern psychology. The secret of alchemy was in fact the transcendent function, the transformation of personality through the blending and fusion of the noble with the base components, of the differentiated with the inferior functions, of the conscious with the unconscious.[1]

361 But just as the beginnings of scientific chemistry were hopelessly distorted and confused by fantastic conceits and whimsicalities, so alchemical philosophy, hampered by the inevitable concretizations of the still crude and undifferentiated intellect, never advanced to any clear psychological formulation, despite the fact that the liveliest intuition of profound truths kept the medieval philosopher passionately attached to the problems of alchemy. No one who has been through the process of assimilating the unconscious will deny that it gripped his very vitals and changed him.

362 I would not blame my reader at all if he shakes his head dubiously at this point, being quite unable to imagine how such a *quantité négligeable* as the foolish fantasy given above could ever have the slightest influence on anybody. I admit at once that in considering the transcendent function and the extraordinary influence attributed to it, the fragment we have quoted is anything but illuminating. But it is—and here I must appeal to the benevolent understanding of my reader—exceedingly difficult to give any examples, because every example has the unfortunate characteristic of being impressive and significant only to the individual concerned. Therefore I always advise my patients not to cherish the naïve belief that what is of

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[1] Cf. *Psychology and Alchemy*, Coll. Works, Vol. 12.

to indicate its significance to the personality also has objective significance.

363 The vast majority of people are quite incapable of putting themselves individually into the mind of another. This is indeed a singularly rare art, and truth to tell, it does not take us very far. Even the man whom we think we know best and who assures us himself that we understand him through and through is at bottom a stranger to us. He is different. The most we can do, and the best, is to have at least some inkling of his otherness, to respect it, and to guard against the outrageous stupidity of wishing to interpret it.

364 I can, therefore, produce nothing convincing, nothing that would convince the reader as it convinces the man whose deepest experience it is. We must simply believe it by reason of its analogy with our own experience. Ultimately, when all else fails, the end-result is plain beyond a doubt: the perceptible change of personality. With these reservations in mind, I would like to present the reader with another fantasy-fragment, this time of a woman. The difference from the previous example leaps to the eye: here the experience is total, the observer takes an active part and thus makes the process her own. The material in this case is very extensive, culminating in a profound transformation of personality. The fragment comes from a late phase of personal development and is an organic part of a long and continuous series of transformations which have as their goal the attainment of the mid-point of the personality.

365 It may not be immediately apparent what is meant by a "mid-point of the personality." I will therefore try to outline this problem in a few words. If we picture the conscious mind, with the ego as its centre, as being opposed to the unconscious, and if we now add to our mental picture the process of assimilating the unconscious, we can think of this assimilation as a kind of approximation of conscious and unconscious, where the centre of the total personality no longer coincides with the ego, but with a point midway between the conscious and the unconscious. This would be the point of new equilibrium, a new centering of the total personality, a virtual centre which, on account of its focal position between conscious and unconscious, ensures for the personality a new and more solid foundation. I freely admit that visualizations of this kind are no more than the

as attempts of the unskilled mind to give expression to unconscious and well-nigh inexpressible psychological facts. I could say the same thing in the words of St. Paul: "Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." Or I might invoke Lao-tzu and appropriate his concept of Tao, the Middle Way and creative centre of all things. In all these the same thing is meant. Speaking as a psychologist with a scientific conscience, I must say at once that these things are psychic factors of undeniable power. They are not the inventions of an idle mind but definite psychic events obeying definite laws and having their legitimate causes and effects, which can be found among the most widely differing peoples and races today, as thousands of years ago. I have no theory as to what constitutes the nature of these processes. One would first have to know what constitutes the nature of the psyche. I am content simply to state the facts.

[illegible] Coming now to our example: it concerns a fantasy of intensely visual character, something which in the language of the ancients would be called a "vision." Not a "vision seen in a dream," but a vision perceived by intense concentration on the background of consciousness, a technique that is perfected only after long practice.[4] Told in her own words, this is what the patient saw:

I climbed the mountain and came to a place where I saw seven red stones in front of me, seven on either side, and seven behind me. I stood in the middle of this quadrangle. The stones were flat like steps. I tried to lift the four stones nearest me. In doing so I discovered that these stones were the pedestals of four statues of gods buried upside down in the earth. I dug them up and arranged them about me so that I was standing in the middle of them. Suddenly they leaned towards one another until their heads touched, forming something like a tent over me. I myself fell to the ground and said, "Fall upon me if you must! I am tired." Then I saw that beyond, encircling the four gods, a ring of flame had formed. After a time I got up from the ground and overthrew the statues of the gods. Where they fell, four trees shot up. At that blue flames leapt up from the ring of fire and began to burn the foliage of the trees. Seeing this I said, "This must stop. I must go into the fire myself so

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[4] This technique is elsewhere called "active imagination."—EDITORS.

that the leaves should not be burned. Then I stepped into the fire. The trees vanished and the fiery ring drew together to one immense blue flame that carried me up from the earth."

367 Here the vision ended. Unfortunately I cannot see how I can make completely clear to the reader the extraordinarily interesting meaning of this vision. The fragment is an excerpt from a long sequence, and one would have to explain everything that happened before and afterwards, in order to grasp the significance of the picture. At all events the unprejudiced reader will recognize at once the idea of a "mid-point" that is reached by a kind of climb (mountaineering = effort, struggle, etc.). He will also recognize without difficulty the famous mediaeval conundrum of the squaring of the circle, which belongs to the field of alchemy. Here it takes its rightful place as a symbol of individuation. The total personality is indicated by the four cardinal points, the four gods, i.e., the four functions which give bearings in psychic space,[*] and also by the circle enclosing the whole. Overcoming the four gods who threaten to smother the individual signifies liberation from identification with the four functions, a fourfold *nirdvandva* (free from opposites) followed by an approximation to the circle, to undivided wholeness. This in its turn leads to further exaltation.

368 I must content myself with these hints. Anyone who takes the trouble to reflect upon the matter will be able to form a rough idea of how the transformation of personality proceeds. Through her active participation the patient merges herself in the unconscious processes, and she gains possession of them by allowing them to possess her. In this way she joins the conscious to the unconscious. The result is ascension in the flame, transmutation in the alchemical heat, the genesis of the "subtle spirit." That is the transcendent function born of the union of opposites.

369 I must recall at this point a serious misunderstanding to which my readers often succumb, and doctors most commonly. They invariably assume, for reasons unknown, that I never write about anything except my method of treatment. This is far from being the case. I write about *psychology*. I must therefore expressly emphasize that my method of treatment does not consist in causing my patients to indulge in strange fantasies

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[*] Cf. *Psychological Types*, Coll. Works, Vol. 6,

for the purpose of obtaining secret personalities and other nonsense of that kind. I merely point out in passing that there are certain cases where such a development proves necessary, not because I force anyone to it, but because it springs from inner necessity. For many of my patients these things are and must remain a closed book. Indeed, even if it were possible for them to tread this path, it would be a disastrously wrong turning, and I would be the first to hold them back. The way of the transcendent function is an individual destiny. But on no account should one imagine that this way is equivalent to the life of a psychic anchorite, to alienation from the world. Quite the contrary, for such a way is possible and profitable only when the specific worldly tasks which these individuals set themselves are carried out in reality. Fantasies are no substitute for living; they are fruits of the spirit which fall to him who pays his tribute to life. The shirker experiences nothing but his own morbid fear, and it yields him no meaning. Nor will this way ever be known to the man who has found his way back to Mother Church. There is no doubt that the *mysterium magnum* is hidden in her forms, and in these he can live his life sensibly. Finally, the normal man will never be burdened either with this knowledge, for he is everlastingly content with the little that lies within his reach. Wherefore I entreat my reader to understand that I write about things which actually happen, and am not propounding methods of treatment.

370 These two examples of fantasy represent the positive activity of anima and animus. To the degree that the patient takes an active part, the personified figure of anima or animus will disappear. It becomes the function of relationship between conscious and unconscious. But when the unconscious contents—these same fantasies—are not "realized," they give rise to a negative activity and personification, i.e., to the autonomy of animus and anima. Psychic abnormalities then develop, states of possession ranging in degree from ordinary moods and "ideas" to psychoses. All these states are characterized by one and the same fact that an unknown "something" has taken possession of a smaller or greater portion of the psyche and asserts its hateful and harmful existence undeterred by all our insight, reason, and energy, thus proclaiming the power of the unconscious over the conscious mind, the sovereign power of pos-

[illegible]. In this [illegible] possession [illegible] of the psyche generally [illegible] an [illegible] psychology. The woman's incubus consists of a host of masculine demons; the man's succubus is a vampire.

371 This particular concept of a soul, which, according to the [illegible] exists by itself [illegible] disappears in a [illegible] has, as a [illegible] the remotest connection with the Christian concept of the soul.

372 The second case is a typical example of the kind of character possessed by the collective unconscious. Although the form is entirely [illegible] none the less collective, being composed of [illegible] images and ideas common to the generality of men. For the patients, therefore, [illegible] assimilated to the rest of mankind. In [illegible] unconscious [illegible] the individual is in [illegible] unconscious [illegible] with other individuals; in other words, he is not differentiated, but assimilated.

373 Here one may ask, perhaps, why it is so desirable that a man should be differentiated. Not only is it desirable, it is absolutely essential because through contamination with others he falls into situations and commits actions which bring him into discord with himself. From all states of unconscious contamination and non-differentiation there is begotten a compulsion to be and to act in a way contrary to one's own nature. Accordingly a man can neither be at one with himself nor accept responsibility for himself. He feels himself to be in a degrading, unfree, unethical condition. But the disharmony with himself is precisely the neurotic and intolerable condition from which he seeks to be delivered, and deliverance from this condition will come only when he can be and act as he feels is conformable with his true self. People have a feeling for these things, dim and uncertain at first, but growing ever stronger and clearer with progressive development. When a man can say of his states and actions, "As I am, so I act," he can be at one with himself, even though it be difficult, and he can accept responsibility for himself even though he struggle against it. We must recognize that nothing is harder to bear with than oneself. ("You sought the heaviest burden, and found yourself," says Nietzsche.) Yet even this most difficult of achievements becomes possible if we can distinguish ourselves from the un-

conscious contents. The introvert discovers these contents in himself, the extravert finds them projected upon human objects. In both cases the unconscious contents are the cause of blinding illusions which falsify ourselves and our relations to our fellowmen, making both unreal. For these reasons individuation is indispensable for certain people, not only as a therapeutic necessity, but as a high ideal, an idea of the best we can do. Nor should I omit to remark that it is at the same time the primitive Christian ideal of the Kingdom of Heaven which "is within you." The idea at the bottom of this ideal is that right action comes from right thinking, and that there is no cure and no improving of the world that does not begin with the individual himself. To put the matter drastically: the man who is pauper or parasite will never solve the social question.

IV

THE MANA-PERSONALITY

374 My empirical material for the discussion that now follows is taken from cases where the condition that was presented in the previous chapter as the immediate goal has been achieved, namely the conquest of the anima as an autonomous complex, and her transformation into a function of relationship between the conscious and the unconscious. With the attainment of this goal it becomes possible to disengage the ego from all its entanglements with collectivity and the collective unconscious. Through this process the anima forfeits the daemonic power of an autonomous complex; she can no longer exercise the power of possession, since she is depotentiated. She is no longer the guardian of treasures unknown; no longer Kundry, daemonic Messenger of the Grail, half divine and half animal; no longer is the soul to be called "Mistress," but a psychological function of an intuitive nature, akin to what the primitives mean when they say, "He has gone into the forest to talk with the spirits" or "My snake spoke with me" or, in the mythological language of infancy, "A little bird told me."

375 Those of my readers who know Rider Haggard's description of "She-who-must-be-obeyed" will surely recall the magical power of this personality. "She" is a mana personality, a being full of some occult and bewitching quality (mana), endowed with magical knowledge and power. All these attributes naturally have their source in the naïve projection of an unconscious self-knowledge which, expressed in less poetic terms, would run somewhat as follows: "I recognize that there is some psychic factor active in me which eludes my conscious will in the most incredible manner. It can put extraordinary ideas into my head, induce in me unwanted and unwelcome moods and emotions, lead me to astonishing actions for which I can accept no responsibility, upset my relations with other people in a very

irritating way, etc. I feel powerless against this fact, and what is worse, I am in love with it, so that all I can do is marvel. (Poets have called this the "artistic temperament," unpoetical folk excuse themselves in other ways.)

376 Now when the anima loses her mana, what becomes of it? Clearly the man who has mastered the anima acquires her mana, in accordance with the primitive belief that when a man kills the mana-person he assimilates his mana into his own body.

377 Well then: who is it that has integrated the anima? Obviously the conscious ego, and therefore the ego has taken over the mana. Thus the ego becomes a mana-personality. But the mana-personality is a dominant of the collective unconscious, the well-known archetype of the mighty man in the form of hero, chief, magician, medicine-man, saint, the ruler of men and spirits, the friend of God.

378 This masculine collective figure who now rises out of the dark background and takes possession of the conscious personality entails a psychic danger of a subtle nature, for by inflating the conscious mind it can destroy everything that was gained by coming to terms with the anima. It is therefore of no small practical importance to know that in the hierarchy of the unconscious the anima occupies the lowest rank, only one of many possible figures, and that her subjugation constellates another collective figure which now takes over her mana. Actually it is the figure of the magician, as I will call it for short, who attracts the mana to himself, i.e., the autonomous valency of the anima. Only in so far as I unconsciously identify with this figure can I imagine that I myself possess the anima's mana. But I will infallibly do so under these circumstances.

379 The figure of the magician has an equally dangerous equivalent in women: a sublime, matriarchal figure, the Great Mother, the All-Merciful, who understands everything, forgives everything, who always acts for the best, living only for others, and never seeking her own interests, the discoverer of the great love, just as the magician is the mouthpiece of the ultimate truth. And just as the great love is never appreciated, so the great wisdom is never understood. Neither, of course, can stand the sight of the other.

380 Here is cause for serious misunderstanding, for without a doubt it is a question of an inflation. The ego has appropriated

something that does not belong to it. But who has appropriated the mana? If it was really the ego that conquered the anima, then the mana does indeed belong to it, and it would be correct to conclude that one has become important. But why does not this importance, the mana, work upon others? That would surely be an essential criterion. It does not work because one has not in fact become important, but has merely become adulterated with another archetype, another unconscious figure. Hence we must conclude that the ego never conquered the anima at all and therefore has not acquired the mana. All that has happened is a new adulteration, this time with a figure of the same sex corresponding to the father-imago, and possessed of even greater power.

> From the power that binds all creatures none is free
> Except the man who wins self-mastery.[1]

Thus he becomes a superman, superior to all powers, a demigod at the very least. "I and the Father are one"—this mighty avowal in all its awful ambiguity is born of just such a psychological moment.

389 In the face of this, our pitiably limited ego, if it has but a spark of self-knowledge, can only draw back and rapidly drop all pretence of power and importance. It was a delusion: the conscious mind has not become master of the unconscious, and the anima has forfeited her tyrannical power only to the extent that the ego was able to come to terms with the unconscious. This accommodation, however, was not a victory of the conscious over the unconscious, but the establishment of a balance of power between the two worlds.

390 Hence the "magician" could only take possession of the ego because the ego dreamed of victory over the anima. That dream was an encroachment, and every encroachment of the ego is followed by an encroachment from the unconscious:

> Changing shape from hour to hour
> I employ my savage power.[2]

Consequently, if the ego drops its claim to victory, possession by the magician ceases automatically. But what happens to the mana? Who, or what, becomes mana when even the magician can no longer work it? So far we only know that neither the conscious nor the unconscious has mana, for it is certain that when the ego makes no claim to power there is no possession, that is to say, the unconscious too loses its ascendancy. In this situation the mana must have fallen to something that is both conscious and unconscious, or else neither. This something is the desired "mid-point" of the personality, that ineffable something betwixt the opposites, or else that which unites them, or the result of conflict, or the product of energic tension: the coming to birth of personality, a profoundly individual step forward, the next stage.

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[1] Goethe, "Die Geheimnisse: Ein Fragment." [illegible]

[2] *Faust*, trans. by Louis MacNeice, p. 28[illegible] (Part II, Act V), modified.

383 I do not expect the reader to have followed all this rapid survey of the whole problem in all its parts. He may regard it as a kind of preliminary statement leading up to the more closely reasoned analysis which now follows.

384 The starting-point of our problem is the condition which results when the unconscious contents that are the efficient cause of the animus and anima phenomena have become sufficiently assimilated to the conscious mind. This can best be represented in the following way: the unconscious contents are in the first instance things belonging to the personal sphere, similar perhaps to the fantasies of [illegible] patient quoted above. Subsequently, fantasies from the impersonal unconscious develop, containing essentially collective symbolism, more or less akin to the visions of my woman patient, etc. These fantasies are not so wild and unregulated as a naïve intelligence might think; they pursue definite, unconscious lines of direction which converge upon a definite goal. We could therefore most fittingly describe these later series as processes of initiation, since these form their closest analogies. All primitive groups and tribes that are in any way organized have their rites of initiation, often very highly developed, which play an extraordinarily important part in their social and religious life.[1] Through these ceremonies boys are made men and girls women. The Kavirondos stigmatize those who do not submit to circumcision and excision as "animals." This shows that the initiation ceremonies are a magical means of leading man from the animal state to the human state. They are clearly transformation mysteries

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[1] Cf. Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies* (New York, 1908).

of the greatest spiritual significance. Very often the initiands are subjected to excruciating treatment, and at the same time the tribal mysteries are imparted to them—the laws and hierarchy of the tribe on the one hand, and on the other the cosmogonic and mythical doctrines. Initiations have survived among all civilized peoples. In Greece the ancient Eleusinian mysteries were preserved, it seems, right into the seventh century of our era. Rome was flooded with mystery religions. Of these Christianity was one, and even in its present form it still preserves the old initiation ceremonies, somewhat faded and degenerated, in the rites of baptism, confirmation, and communion. Hence nobody is in a position to deny the enormous historical importance of initiations.

385 Modern man has absolutely nothing to compare with this (consider the testimony of the ancients in regard to the Eleusinian mysteries). Freemasonry, *l'Église gnostique de France*, legendary Rosicrucians, theosophy, and so forth are all feeble substitutes for something that were better marked up in red letters on the historical casualty list. The fact is that the whole symbolism of initiation rises up, clear and unmistakable, in the unconscious contents. The objection that this is antiquated superstition and altogether unscientific is about as intelligent as remarking, in the presence of a cholera epidemic, that it is merely an infectious disease and exceedingly unhygienic. The point is not—I cannot emphasize this enough—whether the initiation symbols are objectively true, but whether these unconscious contents are or are not the equivalents of initiation practices, and whether they do or do not influence the human psyche. Nor is it a question of whether they are desirable or not. It is enough that they exist and that they work.

386 Since it is not possible in this connection to put before the reader in detail these sometimes very lengthy sequences of images, I trust he will be content with the few examples already given and for the rest accept my statement that they are logically constructed, purposive sequences. I must own that I use the word "purposive" with some hesitation. This word needs to be used cautiously and with reserve. For in mental cases we come across dream sequences, and in neurotics fantasy sequences, which run on in themselves with no apparent aim or purpose. The young man whose suicide fantasy I gave above

was in a fair way to produce a string of aimless fantasies unless he could learn to take an active part and to intervene consciously. Only thus could there be orientation to a goal. From one point of view the unconscious is a purely natural process without design, but from another it has that potential directedness which is characteristic of all energy processes. When the conscious mind participates actively and experiences each stage of the process, or at least understands it intuitively, then the next image always starts off on the higher level that has been won, and purposiveness develops.

387 The immediate goal of the analysis of the unconscious, therefore, is to reach a state where the unconscious contents no longer remain unconscious and no longer express themselves indirectly as animus and anima phenomena; that is to say, a state in which animus and anima become functions of relationship to the unconscious. So long as they are not, they are autonomous complexes, disturbing factors that break through conscious control and act like true "disturbers of the peace." Because this is such a well-known fact my term "complex," as used in this sense, has passed into common speech. The more "complexes" a man has, the more he is possessed; and when we try to form a picture of the personality which expresses itself through his complexes we must admit that it resembles nothing so much as a hysterical woman—i.e., the anima! But if such a man makes himself conscious of his unconscious contents, as they appear firstly in the factual contents of his personal unconscious, and then in the fantasies of the collective unconscious, he will get to the roots of his complexes, and in this way rid himself of his possession. With that the anima phenomenon comes to a stop.

388 That superior power, however, which caused the possession—for what I cannot shake off must in some sense be superior to me—should, logically, disappear with the anima. One should then be "complex-free," psychologically house-trained, so to speak. Nothing more should happen that is not sanctioned by the ego, and when the ego wants something, nothing should be capable of interfering. The ego would thus be assured of an unassailable position, the steadfastness of a superman or the sublimity of a perfect sage. Both figures are ideal images: Napoleon on the one hand, Lao-tzu on the other. Both are con-

sistent with the idea of the extraordinarily potent, which has [illegible] term that [illegible] of [illegible] therefore [illegible] a person [illegible] It [illegible] of the [illegible] to an [illegible] power which has taken shape in the human psyche [illegible] just this kind of experience. Primitive man does not analyse, does not work out why another is superior to him. If another is cleverer and stronger than he, then he has mana, he is possessed of a stronger power; and by the same token he can lose this power, perhaps because someone has walked over him in his sleep, or stepped on his shadow.

389 Historically, the mana-personality evolves into the hero and the godlike being,[5] whose earthly form is the priest. How very much the doctor is still mana is the whole plaint of the analyst! But in so far as the ego apparently draws to itself the power belonging to the anima, the ego does become a mana-personality. This development is an almost regular phenomenon. I have never yet seen a fairly advanced development of this kind where at least a temporary identification with the archetype of the mana-personality did not take place. It is the most natural thing in the world that this should happen, for not only does one expect it oneself, but everybody else expects it too. One can scarcely help admiring oneself a little for having seen more deeply into things than others, and the others have such an urge to find a tangible hero somewhere, or a superior wise man, a leader and father, some undisputed authority, that they build temples to little tin gods with the greatest promptitude and burn incense upon the altars. This is not just the lamentable stupidity of idolaters incapable of judging for themselves, but a natural psychological law which says that what has once been will always be in the future. And so it will be, unless consciousness puts an end to the naive concretization of primordial images. I do not know whether it is desirable that consciousness should alter the eternal laws; I only know that occasionally it does alter them and that this measure is a vital necessity for some people—which, however, does not always

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[4] F. R. Lehmann, *Mana* (Leipzig, 1922).

[5] According to an ancient report, the Merovingian King could cure epilepsy with his mana by the laying on of hands.

prevent these same people from setting themselves up as the anointed ones and making the God-like gesture. It is indeed hard to see how one can escape the sovereign power of the primordial images.

390 Actually I do not believe it can be escaped. One can only alter one's attitude and thus save oneself from naively falling into an archetype and being forced to act a part at the expense of one's humanity. Possession by an archetype turns a man into a flat collective figure, a mask behind which he can no longer develop as a human being, but becomes increasingly stunted. One must therefore be conscious of the danger of falling victim to the dominant of the mana-personality. The danger lies not only in oneself becoming a father-mask, but in being overpowered by this mask when worn by another. Master and pupil are in the same boat in this respect.

391 The dissolution of the anima means that we have gained insight into the driving forces of the unconscious, but not that we have made these forces ineffective. They can attack us at any time in new form. And they will infallibly do so if the conscious attitude has a flaw in it. It is a question of might against might. If the ego presumes to wield power over the unconscious, the unconscious reacts with a subtle attack, deploying the dominant of the mana-personality, whose enormous prestige casts a spell over the ego. Against this the only defence is full confession of one's weakness in face of the powers of the unconscious. By opposing no force to the unconscious we do not provoke it to attack.

392 It may seem to the reader rather comical to hear me speak of the unconscious in this personal way. I hope I shall not arouse the prejudice that I regard the unconscious as something personal. The unconscious consists of natural processes that lie outside the sphere of the human personality. Only our conscious mind is "personal." Therefore when I speak of "provoking" the unconscious I do not mean that it is offended and—like the gods of old—rises up to take offence in jealousy or anger or revenge. What I mean is more like an error in psychic diet which upsets the equilibrium of my digestion. The unconscious reacts automatically like my stomach, which, in a manner of speaking, wreaks its revenge upon me. When I presume to have power over the unconscious, that is like a dietary solecism, an un-

seems a danger which in the interests of one's own well-being were better avoided. My importance is no guarantee of anything, far from it, in view of the far-reaching and devastating general effects of a dissociated unconscious. In this respect it would be more fitting to speak of the wrath of the unappeased gods.

393 In differentiating the ego from the archetype of the mana-personality one is now forced, exactly as in the case of the anima, to make conscious those contents which are specific of the mana-personality. Historically, the mana-personality is always in possession of the secret name, or of some esoteric knowledge, or has the prerogative of a special way of acting—*quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi*—in a word, it has an individual distinction. Conscious realization of the contents composing it means, for the man, the second and real liberation from the father, and, for the woman, liberation from the mother, and with it comes the first genuine sense of his or her true individuality. This part of the process corresponds exactly to the aim of the concretistic primitive initiations up to and including baptism, namely, severance from the "carnal" (or animal) parents, and rebirth *in novam infantiam*, into a condition of immortality and spiritual childhood, as formulated by certain mystery cults of the ancient world, among them Christianity.

394 It is now quite possible that, instead of identifying with the mana-personality, one will concretize it as an extramundane "Father in Heaven," complete with the attribute of absoluteness—something that many people seem very partial to. This would be tantamount to giving the unconscious a preponderance that was just as absolute (if one's faith could be pushed that far!), so that all value would flow over to that side.[6] The

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[6] "Absolute" means "detached." To assert that God is absolute amounts to placing him outside all connection with mankind. Man cannot affect him, or he man. Such a God would be of no consequence at all. We can in fairness only speak of a God who affects man and can be affected by him. The Christian idea of God as a "Father in Heaven" puts it very nicely, in my opinion. Quite apart from the fact that a man can know even less about God than an ant can know of the contents of the British Museum, this urge to regard God as "absolute" derives solely from the fear that God might become "psychological." This would naturally be dangerous. An absolute God, on the other hand, does not concern us in the least, whereas a "psychological" God would be real. This kind of God could reach man. The Church seems to be a magical instrument for protecting man against this eventuality, since it is written: "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

logical result. Also, the only thing left behind here is a miserable, inferior, worthless, and sinful little heap of humanity. This solution, as we know, has become an historical world-view. As I am moving here on psychological ground only and feel no inclination whatever to dictate my eternal truths to the world at large, I must observe, by way of criticizing this solution, that if I shift all the highest values over to the side of the unconscious, thus converting it into a *summum bonum*, I am then placed in the unfortunate position of having to discover a devil of equal weight and dimensions who could act as the psychological counterbalance to my *summum bonum*. Under no circumstances, however, will my modesty allow me to identify myself with the devil. That would be altogether too presumptuous and would, moreover, bring me into unbearable conflict with my highest values. Nor, with my moral deficit, can I possibly afford it.

395 On psychological grounds, therefore, I would recommend that no God be constructed out of the archetype of the mana-personality. In other words, I must not be concretized. Only thus can I avoid projecting my values and non-values into God and Devil, and only thus can I preserve my human dignity, my specific gravity, which I need so much if I am not to become the unresisting shuttlecock of unconscious forces. In his dealings with the visible world a man must certainly be mad to suppose that he is master of this world. Here we follow, quite naturally, the principle of non-resistance to all superior forces, up to a certain individual limit, beyond which the most peaceful citizen becomes a bloody revolutionary. Our bowing down before law and order is a commendable example of what our general attitude to the collective unconscious should be ("Render unto Caesar . . ."). Thus far our obeisance would not be too difficult. But there are other factors in the world to which our conscience does not give its unqualified assent, and yet we bow to them. Why? Because in practice it is more expedient than the reverse. Similarly there are factors in the unconscious with regard to which we must be wise ("Resist not evil." "Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness." "The children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light." *Ergo*: "Be ye therefore wise as serpents and harmless as doves.")

396 The mana-personality is on one side a being of superior wisdom, on the other a being of superior will. By making conscious the contents that underlie this personality, we find ourselves obliged to face the fact that we both know more and want more than other people. This uncomfortable kinship with the gods, as we know, struck so deep into poor Angelus Silesius' bones that it sent him hurtling out of his super-Protestantism, past the precarious halfway house of the Lutherans, back to the nethermost womb of the dark Mother—unfortunately very much to the detriment of his lyrical gifts and the equilibrium of his nerves.

397 And yet Christianity, Paul after him, wrestled with the same problem, as a number of clues still make evident. Meister Eckhart, Goethe in his *Faust*, Nietzsche in his *Zarathustra* have again brought this problem somewhat closer to us. Goethe and Nietzsche try to solve it by the idea of mastery, the former through the figure of the magician and ruthless man of will who makes a pact with the devil, the latter through the master-man and supreme sage who knows neither God nor devil. With Nietzsche man stands alone, as he himself did, neurotic, financially dependent, godless and worldless. This is no ideal for a real man who has a family to support and taxes to pay. Nothing can argue the reality of the world out of existence, there is no miraculous way round it. Similarly, nothing can argue the effects of the unconscious out of existence. Or can the neurotic philosopher prove to us that he has no neurosis? He cannot prove it even to himself. Therefore we stand with our souls suspended between formidable influences from within and from without, and somehow we must be fair to both. This we can do only after the measure of our individual capacities. Hence we must bethink ourselves not so much of what we "ought" to do as of what we *can* and *must* do.

398 Thus the dissolution of the mana-personality through conscious assimilation of its contents leads us, by a natural route, back to ourselves as an actual, living something, poised between two world-pictures and their darkly discerned potencies. This "something" is strange to us and yet so near, wholly ourselves and yet unknowable, a virtual centre of so mysterious a constitution that it can claim anything—kinship with beasts and gods, with crystals and with stars—without moving us to wonder, without even exciting our disapprobation. This some-

making claims all that and more, and having nothing in our hands that could fairly be opposed to these claims, it is surely wiser to listen to this voice.

399 I have called this centre the self. Intellectually the self is no more than a psychological concept, a construct that serves to express an unknowable essence which we cannot grasp as such, since by definition it transcends our powers of comprehension. It might equally well be called the "God within us." The beginnings of our whole psychic life seem to be inextricably rooted in this point, and all our highest and ultimate purposes seem to be striving towards it. This paradox is unavoidable, as always, when we try to define something that lies beyond the bourn of our understanding.

400 I hope it has become sufficiently clear to the attentive reader that the self has as much to do with the ego as the sun with the earth. They are not interchangeable. Nor does it imply a deification of man or a dethronement of God. What is beyond our understanding is in any case beyond its reach. When, therefore, we make use of the concept of a God we are simply formulating a definite psychological fact, namely the independence and sovereignty of certain psychic contents which express themselves by their power to thwart our will, to obsess our consciousness and to influence our moods and actions. We may be outraged at the idea of an inexplicable mood, a nervous disorder, or an uncontrollable vice being, so to speak, a manifestation of God. But it would be an irreparable loss for religious experience if such things, perhaps even evil things, were artificially segregated from the sum of autonomous psychic contents. It is an apotropaic euphemism[1] to dispose of these things with a "nothing but" explanation. In that way they are merely repressed, and as a rule only an apparent advantage is gained, a new twist given to illusion. The personality is not enriched by it, only impoverished and smothered. What seems evil, or at least meaningless and valueless to contemporary experience and knowledge, might on a higher level of experience and knowledge appear as the source of the best—everything depending, naturally, on the use one makes of one's seven devils. To explain them as meaningless robs the personality of its proper shadow, and with this it loses its form. The living form needs

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[1] Giving a bad thing a good name in order to avert its disfavour.

deep shade if it is to appear plastic. Without shade it remains a two-dimensional phantom, a more or less well brought-up child.

401 Here I am alluding to a problem that is far more significant than these few simple words would seem to suggest: mankind is, in essentials, psychologically still in a state of childhood—a stage that cannot be skipped. The vast majority needs authority, guidance, law. This fact cannot be overlooked. The Pauline overcoming of the law falls only to the man who knows how to put his soul in the place of conscience. Very few are capable of this ("Many are called, but few are chosen"). And these few tread this path only from inner necessity, not to say suffering, for it is sharp as the edge of a razor.

402 The conception of God as an autonomous psychic content makes God into a moral problem—and that, admittedly, is very uncomfortable. But if this problem does not exist, God is not real, for nowhere can he touch our lives. He is then either an historical and intellectual bogey or a philosophical sentimentality.

403 If we leave the idea of "divinity" quite out of account and speak only of "autonomous contents," we maintain a position that is intellectually and empirically correct, but we silence a note which, psychologically, should not be missing. By using the concept of a divine being we give apt expression to the peculiar way in which we experience the workings of these autonomous contents. We could also use the term "daemonic," provided that this does not imply that we are still holding up our sleeves some concretized God who conforms exactly to our wishes and ideas. Our intellectual conjuring tricks do not help us to make a reality of the God we desire, any more than the world accommodates itself to our expectations. By affixing the attribute "divine" to the workings of autonomous contents, we are admitting their relatively superior force. And it is this superior force which has at all times constrained men to ponder the inconceivable, and even to impose the greatest sufferings upon themselves in order to give these workings their due. It is a force as real as hunger and the fear of death.

404 The self could be characterized as a kind of compensation for the conflict between inside and outside. This formulation would not be unfitting, since the self has somewhat the

character of a result, of a goal attained, something that has come to pass very gradually and is experienced with much travail. So too the self is our life's goal, for it is the completest expression of that fateful combination we call individuality, the full flowering not only of the single individual, but of the group, in which each adds his portion to the whole.

405 Sensing the self as something irrational, as an indefinable existent, to which the ego is neither opposed nor subjected, but merely attached, and about which it revolves very much as the earth revolves round the sun—thus we come to the goal of individuation. I use the word "sensing" in order to indicate the apperceptive character of the relation between ego and self. In this relation nothing is knowable, because we can say nothing about the contents of the self. The ego is the only content of the self that we do know. The individuated ego senses itself as the object of an unknown and supraordinate subject. It seems to me that our psychological inquiry must come to a stop here, for the idea of a self is itself a transcendental postulate which, although justifiable psychologically, does not allow of scientific proof. This step beyond science is an unconditional requirement of the psychological development I have sought to depict, because without this postulate I could give no adequate formulation of the psychic processes that occur empirically. At the very least, therefore, the self can claim the value of an hypothesis analogous to that of the structure of the atom. And even though we should once again be enmeshed in an image, it is none the less powerfully alive, and its interpretation quite exceeds my powers. I have no doubt at all that it is an image, but one in which we are contained.

406 I am greatly conscious that in this essay I have made no ordinary demands on the understanding of my reader. Though I have done my utmost to smooth the path of understanding, there is one great difficulty which I cannot eliminate: namely, the fact that the experiences which form the basis of my discussion are unknown to most people and are bound to seem strange. Consequently I cannot expect my readers to follow all my conclusions. Although every author naturally prefers to be understood by his public, still the interpretation of my observations is of less importance to me than the indication of a wide field of experience, at present hardly explored, which it is the aim

of this book to bring within reach of many. In this field, hitherto so dark, it seems to me that there lie the answers to many riddles which the psychology of consciousness has never even approached. I would not pretend to have formulated these answers with any degree of finality. I shall, therefore, be well satisfied if my essay may be counted as a tentative attempt at an answer.

APPENDICES

1

NEW PATHS IN PSYCHOLOGY[1]

I

THE BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

407 Like all sciences, psychology has gone through its epoch of scholasticism, and something of this spirit has lasted on into the present. Against this kind of philosophical psychology it must be objected that it makes *ex cathedra* decisions as to how the psyche shall be constituted and what qualities must belong to it in this world and in the next. The spirit of modern scientific investigation has to a large extent dispensed with these fantasies and put in their place an exact empirical method. From this there arose the experimental psychology of today, or what the French call "psychophysiology." The father of this movement was the dual-minded Fechner, who, in his *Elemente der Psychophysik*[2] dared to introduce the physical point of view into the conception of psychic phenomena. This idea was a fertilizing force. Fechner's younger contemporary and, we might say, the perfecter of his work, was Wundt, whose great erudition, industry, and genius for devising new methods of experimental research have created the dominant trend in modern psychology.

408 Until quite recently experimental psychology was essentially academic. The first notable attempt to enlist at least some of its numerous experimental methods in the service of practical psychology came from the psychiatrists of the former

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[1] Translation of "Neue Bahnen der Psychologie," *Raschers Jahrbuch für Schweizer Art und Kunst* (Zurich, 1912).

[2] Leipzig, 1860.

Here belong such names as Kraepelin, Aschaffenburg, and others. For, as may easily be imagined, the medical doctor was the first to feel the pressing need for exact knowledge of the psychic processes. Next came the pedagogues, making their own demands on psychology. From this source has recently grown up an "experimental pedagogy," in which field Meumann in Germany and Binet in France have rendered signal service.

409 If he wants to help his patient, the doctor, and above all the "specialist for nervous diseases," must have psychological knowledge; for nervous disorders and all that is embraced by the term "nervousness," hysteria, etc., are of psychic origin and therefore logically require psychic treatment. Cold water, light, fresh air, electricity, and so forth have at best a transitory effect and sometimes none at all. Often they are disreputable artifices, calculated to work upon suggestibility. But the patient is sick in mind, and in the highest and most complex of the mind's functions, and these can scarcely be said to belong any more to the province of medicine. Here the doctor must also be a psychologist, which means that he must have knowledge of the human psyche. The doctor cannot evade this demand. So he naturally turns for help to psychology, since his psychiatry text-books have nothing to offer. The experimental psychology of today, however, does not even begin to give him any connected insight into what are practically the most important psychic processes. That is not its aim. It tries to isolate the very simplest and most elementary processes which border on physiology, and studies them in isolation. It is not disposed towards the infinite variety and mobility of individual psychic life, and for this reason its findings and facts are so many details lacking organic cohesion. Therefore anyone who wants to know the human psyche will learn next to nothing from experimental psychology. He would be better advised to put away his scholar's gown, bid farewell to his study, and wander with human heart through the world. There, in the horrors of prisons, lunatic asylums and hospitals, in drab suburban pubs, in brothels and gambling-hells, in the salons of the elegant, the Stock Exchanges, Socialist meetings, churches, revivalist gatherings and ecstatic sects, through love and hate, through the experience of passion in every form in his own body, he would reap richer stores of knowledge than text-books a foot thick could give him, and he will know how to doctor the

sick with real knowledge of the human soul. He may be pardoned if his respect for the wisdom and achievements of experimental psychology is no longer excessive. For between what science calls psychology and what the practical needs of daily life demand from psychology there is a great gulf fixed.

410 This deficiency became the starting point for a new psychology whose inception we owe first and foremost to Sigmund Freud of Vienna, the brilliant physician and investigator of functional nervous disorders. One could describe the psychology inaugurated by him as "analytical psychology." Bleuler suggested the name "depth psychology," in order to indicate that the Freudian psychology was concerned with the deeper regions or hinterland of the psyche, also called the unconscious. Freud himself was content just to name his method of investigation: he called it psychoanalysis. And such is the name by which this movement is generally known.

411 Before we enter upon a closer presentation of our subject, something must be said about its relation to science as known hitherto. Here we encounter a curious spectacle which proves yet again the truth of Anatole France's remark: "Les savants ne sont pas curieux." The first work of any magnitude[3] in this field awakened only the faintest echo, in spite of the fact that it introduced an entirely new and fundamental conception of the neuroses. A few writers spoke of it appreciatively and then, on the next page, proceeded to explain their hysterical cases in the same old way. They behaved very much like a man who, having eulogized the idea or fact that the earth was a sphere, calmly continues to represent it as flat. Freud's next publications[4] remained absolutely unnoticed, although they put forward observations which were of incalculable importance for psychiatry. When in the year 1900 Freud wrote the first real psychology of dreams,[5] a Stygian darkness still brooded over this field. People began to laugh, and when about the middle of the last decade he started to throw light on the psy-

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[3] Josef Breuer and Freud, Studien über Hysterie (Leipzig and Vienna, 1895). [Trans. by A. A. Brill as Studies in Hysteria, New York, 1936.—EDITORS.]

[4] Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre (5 vols., Vienna, 1906–22). [Most of these papers are to be found in the English Collected Papers, Vol. I, London and Toronto, 1924.]

[5] Die Traumdeutung (Vienna, 1900). [Trans. by A. A. Brill as *The Interpretation of Dreams*, London, 1913; more recent expanded version, London, 1932.]

[illegible] laughter [turned] to [illegible] some times of the [illegible] kind, and this has lasted [illegible] very recently. How carefully his works had been studied is shown by the naive remark of one of the most eminent neurologists of Paris at an International Congress in 1907, which I heard with my own ears: "I have not read Freud's works (he knew no German), but as for his theories, they are nothing but a *mauvaise plaisanterie*."

412 Accordingly we must look more closely into this new psychology.

413 Already in Charcot's time it was known that the neurotic symptom is "psychogenic," i.e., originates in the psyche. It was also known, thanks mainly to the work of the Nancy school, that all hysterical symptoms can be produced in exactly the same way by suggestion. But what was not known was how an hysterical symptom arises from the psyche; the psychic causal factors were completely unknown. In the early eighties Dr. Breuer, an old Viennese practitioner, made a discovery which became the real starting-point of the new psychology. He had a young, very intelligent woman patient suffering from hysteria, who manifested the following symptoms among others: she had a spastic (rigid) paralysis of the right arm, and occasional fits of absent-mindedness or twilight states; she had also lost the power of speech inasmuch as she could no longer command her mother tongue and could only express herself in English (systematic aphasia). They tried at that time, and still try, to account for these disorders with anatomical theories, although the cortical centre for the arm function was as little disturbed here as in the corresponding centre of a normal person. The symptomatology of hysteria is full of anatomical impossibilities. One lady, who had completely lost her hearing because of an hysterical affection, used often to sing. Once, when she was singing, her doctor secretly seated himself at the piano and softly accompanied her. In passing from one stanza to the next he made a sudden change of key, whereupon the patient, without noticing it, went on singing in the changed key. Thus she hears and does not hear. The various forms of systematic blindness offer similar phenomena: a man suffering from total hysterical blindness

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[1] *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* (Vienna, 1905; trans. by A. A. Brill as *Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory*, New York, 1910).

[illegible] in the [illegible], but [illegible] was only partial [illegible] and remained so for a long time. He could see everything with the exception of people's heads. He saw all the people round him without heads. Thus he sees and does not see. From a large number of like experiences it has long been concluded that only the conscious mind of the patient does not see and hear, but that the sense function is otherwise in working order. This state of affairs directly contradicts the nature of an organic disorder, which always affects the function in some way.

414 After this digression, let us come back to the Breuer case. There were no organic causes for the disorder, so it had to be regarded as hysteria, i.e., psychogenic. Breuer had observed that if, during her twilight states (whether spontaneous or artificially induced), he got the patient to tell him of the reminiscences and fantasies that thronged in upon her, her condition was eased for several hours afterwards. He made systematic use of this discovery for further treatment. The patient devised the appropriate name "talking cure" for it, or, jokingly, "chimney sweeping."

415 The patient had become ill when nursing her father in his fatal illness. Naturally her fantasies were mainly concerned with these disturbing days. Reminiscences of this period came to the surface during her twilight states with photographic fidelity; so vivid were they, down to the last detail, that we can hardly assume the waking memory to have been capable of such plastic and exact reproduction. (The name "hypermnesia" has been given to this intensification of the powers of memory, which not infrequently occurs in restricted states of consciousness.) Remarkable things now came to light. One of the many stories told ran somewhat as follows:

One night, watching by the sick man, who had a high fever, she was tense with anxiety because a surgeon was expected from Vienna to perform an operation. Her mother had left the room for a while, and Anna, the patient, sat by the sickbed with her right arm hanging over the back of the chair. She fell into a sort of waking dream and saw a black snake coming, apparently out of the wall, towards the sick man as though to bite him. (It is quite likely that there really were snakes in the meadow at the back of the house, which had already given the girl a fright, and which now provided the material for the hallucination.)

She wanted to drive the creature away, but felt paralysed; her right arm, hanging over the back of the chair, had "gone to sleep": it had become anaesthetic and paretic, and as she looked at it the fingers changed into little serpents with death's-heads. Probably she made efforts to drive away the snake with her paralysed right hand, so that the anaesthesia and paralysis became associated with the snake hallucination. When the snake had disappeared, she was so frightened that she wanted to pray, but all speech failed her, she could not utter a word, until finally she remembered an English nursery rhyme, and then she was able to go on thinking and praying in English.

408 Such was the scene in which the paralysis and the speech disturbance originated, and with the narration of this scene the disturbance itself was removed. In this manner the case was finally cured.

409 I must content myself with this one example. In the book I have mentioned by Breuer and Freud there is a wealth of similar examples. It can readily be understood that scenes of this kind make a powerful impression, and people are therefore inclined to impute causal significance to them in the genesis of the symptom. The view of hysteria then current, which derived from the English theory of the "nervous shock," energetically championed by Charcot, was well qualified to explain Breuer's discovery. Hence there arose the so-called trauma theory, which says that the hysterical symptom, and, in so far as the symptoms constitute the illness, hysteria in general, derive from psychic injuries or traumata whose imprint persists unconsciously for years. Freud, now collaborating with Breuer, was able to furnish abundant confirmation of this discovery. It turned out that none of the hundreds of hysterical symptoms arose by chance, but psychic occurrences always caused them. So far the new conception opened up an extensive field for empirical work. But Freud's inquiring mind could not long remain on this superficial level, for already deeper and more difficult problems were beginning to emerge. It is obvious enough that moments of extreme anxiety such as Breuer's patient experienced may leave an abiding impression. But how did she come to experience them at all, since they already clearly bear a morbid stamp? Could the strain of nursing bring it about? If so, there ought to be many more occurrences of the kind, for there are unfor

tunately very many exhausting cases to nurse, and the nervous health of the nurse is not always of the best. To this problem medicine gives an excellent answer: The x in the calculation is predisposition. One is just "predisposed" that way. But for Freud the problem was: what constitutes the predisposition? This question leads logically to an examination of the previous history of the psychic trauma. It is a matter of common observation that exciting scenes have quite different effects on the various persons involved, or that things which are indifferent or even agreeable to one person arouse the greatest horror in others—witness frogs, snakes, mice, cats, etc. There are cases of women who will assist at bloody operations without turning a hair, while they tremble all over with fear and loathing at the touch of a cat. I remember a young woman who suffered from acute hysteria following a sudden fright. She had been to an evening party and was on her way home about midnight in the company of several acquaintances, when a cab came up behind them at full trot. The others got out of the way, but she, as though spellbound with terror, kept to the middle of the road and ran along in front of the horses. The cabman cracked his whip and swore; it was no good, she ran down the whole length of the road, which led across a bridge. There her strength deserted her, and to avoid being trampled on by the horses she would in her desperation have leapt into the river had not the passers-by prevented her. Now, this same lady had happened to be in St. Petersburg on the bloody twenty-second of January, in the very street which was cleared by the volleys of the soldiers. All round her people were falling to the ground dead or wounded; she, however, quite calm and clear-headed, espied a gate leading into a yard through which she made her escape into another street. These dreadful moments caused her no further agitation. She felt perfectly well afterwards—indeed, rather better than usual.

418 Essentially similar reactions can frequently be observed. Hence it necessarily follows that the intensity of a trauma has very little pathogenic significance in itself; it must depend on the particular circumstances. Here we have the key to the predisposition. We have therefore to ask ourselves: What are the particular circumstances of the scene with the cab? The patient's fear began with the sound of the trotting horses; for an instant it

seemed to her [illegible] some terrible [illegible] her death [illegible] something as if [illegible] the next moment she lost all sense of what she was doing.

4 [illegible] the horses. The pa[illegible] unaccountable [illegible] the first [illegible] horses [illegible] We [illegible] here, for instance, that she [illegible] had a [illegible] accident with horses. This was actually found to be the case. As a [illegible] about seven she was out [illegible] suddenly the horses took fright and at a wild gallop made [illegible] precipitous bank of a deep [illegible] The coachman [illegible] down and [illegible] likewise, but she was in such deadly fear that she could hardly make up her mind. Nevertheless she [illegible] the horses crashed with the carriage into the depths below. That such an event would leave a very deep impression [illegible] proof. Yet it does not [illegible] should [illegible] So far we only know that the [illegible] had a [illegible] the pathological aspect of [illegible] to pene[illegible] further knowledge is needed [illegible] with increasing experience [illegible] all the cases [illegible] so far there existed, apart from [illegible] experiences, another special class of disturbance which can only be construed as a disturbance [illegible] of love. Admittedly love is an elastic concept that stretches from heaven to hell and combines in itself [illegible] and low.[1] With this discovery [illegible] underwent a considerable change. If [illegible] the specific [illegible] had [illegible] experiences, now the [illegible] problem [illegible] an [illegible] This may be best illustrated by our case. [illegible] understand why horses should play a special [illegible] the patient [illegible] start the [illegible] The pat[illegible] fact [illegible] horses. Remembering the [illegible]

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[1] [illegible] the mystic saying: "Heaven above, heaven below, stars above, stars below, all this above, all this below, grasp this and rejoice."

[illegible] with experiences that [illegible] time in the [illegible] we [illegible] in [illegible] perhaps [illegible] some peculiarity in [illegible] tion.

420 The [illegible] a [illegible] We [illegible] return to that [illegible] of the [illegible] and what sort of [illegible] take a part. It had [illegible] who was going [illegible]

[illegible]

It was [illegible] ask [illegible] I attempt [illegible]

[illegible] hated and despised every [illegible] ever [illegible] reminded her [illegible] biological destiny of man and lived in a world of fantasies which had nothing in common with crude reality. Thus, up to about her twenty-fourth year, she evaded all those love adventures, hopes and expectations which ordinarily move a girl's heart at this age. In these matters women are often amazingly insincere with themselves and with the doctor.) Then she got to know two men who were destined to break through the [illegible] that had grown up around her. Mr. A was her best friend's husband, and Mr. B was his bachelor friend. She [illegible]. Nevertheless it soon began to look as though she liked Mr. B a vast deal better. An intimacy quickly sprang up between them and before long there was talk of a possible engagement. Through her relations with Mr. B and through her friend she often came into contact with Mr. A, whose [illegible] disturbed her in the most unaccountable way and made her nervous. About this time the patient went to a large party. Her friends were also there. She became lost in thought and was dreamily playing with her ring when it suddenly slipped off her finger and rolled under the table. Both gentlemen looked for it and Mr. B succeeded in finding it. He placed the ring on her finger with an arch smile and said: "You know what that means." Overcome by a strange and irresistible feeling she tore the ring from her finger and flung it through the open window. A painful moment ensued, as may be imagined, and soon she left the party in deep dejection. Not long after this a so-called chance brought it about that she should spend her summer holidays in a health resort where Mr. and Mrs. A were also staying. Mrs. A then began to grow visibly nervous and frequently stayed indoors because she felt out of sorts. The patient was thus in a position to go out for walks alone with Mr. A. On one occasion they went boating. So boisterous was she in her merriment that she suddenly fell overboard. She could not swim and it was only with great difficulty that Mr. A pulled her half unconscious into the boat. And then it was that he kissed her. With this romantic episode the bonds were tied fast. To excuse herself in her own eyes she pursued her engagement to Mr. B all the more energetically, telling herself every day that it was Mr. B whom she loved. Naturally this curious little game had not escaped the keen glances of wifely jealousy. Mrs. A, her friend, had guessed the secret and fretted accordingly, so that her nerves only got worse. Hence it became necessary for Mrs. A. to go abroad for a cure. At the farewell party the evil spirit stepped up to our patient and whispered in her ear: "Tonight he is alone. Something must happen to you so that you can go to his house." And so indeed it happened: through her own strange behaviour she came back to his house, and thus she attained her desire.

421 After this explanation everyone will probably be inclined to assume that only a devilish subtlety could devise such a chain of circumstances and set it to work. There is no doubt about the subtlety, but its moral evaluation remains a doubtful matter, because I must emphasize that the motives leading to this dramatic denouement were in no sense conscious. To the patient the whole story seemed to happen of itself, without her being conscious of any motive. But the previous history makes it perfectly clear that everything was unconsciously directed to this end, while the conscious mind was struggling to bring about the engagement to Mr. B. The unconscious drive in the other direction was stronger.

422 So once more we return to our original question, namely, whence comes the pathological (i.e., peculiar or exaggerated) nature of the reaction to the trauma? On the basis of a conclusion drawn from analogous experiences we conjectured that in this case too there must be, in addition to the trauma, a disturbance in the erotic sphere. This conjecture has been entirely confirmed, and we have learned that the trauma, the ostensible cause of the illness, is no more than an occasion for something previously not conscious to manifest itself, i.e., an important erotic conflict. Accordingly the trauma loses its pathogenic significance and is replaced by a much deeper and more comprehensive conception which sees the pathogenic agent as an erotic conflict.

[illegible] I often hear the question: why should the erotic conflict be the cause of the neurosis rather than any other conflict? To this we can only answer: no one asserts that it must be so, but in point of fact it simply is so. In spite of all indignant protestations to the contrary, the fact remains that love,[4] its problems and its conflicts, is of fundamental importance in human life and—as careful inquiry consistently shows—is of far greater significance than the individual suspects.

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[4] Using the word in the wider sense which belongs to it by right and embraces more than sexuality.

424 The trauma theory has therefore been abandoned as antiquated; for with the discovery that not the trauma but a hidden erotic conflict is the root of the neurosis, the trauma completely loses its pathogenic significance.

II

THE SEXUAL THEORY

425 In the light of this discovery the question of the trauma was solved and disposed of. But in its place stood the inquiry into the problem of the erotic conflict, which, as our example shows, contains a wealth of abnormal elements and cannot at first sight be compared with an ordinary erotic conflict. What is peculiarly striking and almost incredible is that only the pose should be conscious, while the patient's real passion remained hidden from her. In this case certainly it is beyond dispute that the real erotic relationship was shrouded in darkness and that the pose largely dominated the field of consciousness. If we formulate these facts theoretically, we arrive at the following result: there are in a neurosis two tendencies standing in strict contrast to one another, one of which at least is unconscious.

426 The growth of culture consists, as we know, in a progressive subjugation of the animal in man. It is a process of domestication which cannot be accomplished without rebellion on the part of the animal nature that thirsts for freedom. From time to time there passes as it were a wave of frenzy through the ranks of men too long constrained within the limitations of their culture. Antiquity experienced it in the Dionysian orgies that surged over from the East and became an essential and characteristic ingredient of classical culture. The spirit of these orgies contributed not a little towards the development of the stoic ideal of asceticism in the innumerable sects and philosophical schools of the last century before Christ, and produced from the polytheistic chaos of that epoch the twin ascetic religions of

Nietzsche and the Christians. A second wave of Dionysian [illegible] seems to be sweeping over the West [illegible] the Renaissance [illegible] to [illegible] the spirit [illegible] If we observe the [illegible] and [illegible] see what [illegible] what [illegible] questions [illegible] we shall [illegible] that in the long [illegible] present social questions [illegible] the [illegible] sex question. This [illegible] existing sexual morality and who seek [illegible] of moral [illegible] past centuries have [illegible] point [illegible] One cannot simply deny the existence [illegible] manifest [illegible] they exist [illegible] adequate grounds for their existence. It is [illegible] and it is more useful to examine [illegible] the [illegible] causes [illegible] these [illegible] than to [illegible] in the [illegible] of the professional moralists [illegible] for moral downfall [illegible] It is the way of [illegible] God as if they thought that the good tree of [illegible] by dint of being [illegible] tied back [illegible] a trellis, whereas in fact [illegible] Sun and Mother Earth [illegible] to grow for their delight [illegible] with deep, wise laws.

437 Secretly many people know that there is something of a sex problem [illegible]. They know that the rapid development of the towns, with the specialization of work [illegible] the extraordinary division of labour, the increasing industrialization of the countryside, and the growing sense of insecurity, deprive men of many opportunities for giving vent to their affective energies. The peasant's alternating rhythm of work secures him unconscious satisfactions through its symbolic content—satisfactions which the factory workers and office employees do not know and can never enjoy. What do these know of his life with nature, of those grand moments when, as lord and fructifier of the earth, he drives his plough through the soil, and with a kingly gesture scatters the seed for the future harvest; of his rightful fear of the destructive power of the elements, of his joy in the fruitfulness of his wife who bears him the daughters and sons who mean increased working-power and prosperity? From all this we city-dwellers, we modern machine-

pleasures are far removed. Is not the easiest and most natural of all [illegible] beginning to tax us when we can no longer [illegible] unmixed [illegible] the harvest of our own sowing, the blessing of civilization? Where shall we find satisfaction? See how men slink to work [illegible], observe the faces in trams at 7.30 in the morning? One man makes his little wheels go round, another writes things that interest him not at all. What wonder that nearly every man belongs to as many clubs as there are days in the week, or that there are flourishing little societies for women where they can pour out on the hero of the latest cult those [illegible] which the man drowns at the pub in big talk and [illegible] beer. To these sources of discontent there is added a further and graver difficulty. Nature has armed defenceless and weaponless man with a vast store of energy to enable him not only passively to endure the rigours of existence but also to overcome them. She has equipped her sons for tremendous hardships. As a rule we are protected from the immediate threat of danger, and for that reason we are daily tempted to excess, for the animal in man always becomes rampant unless hard necessity presses. But if we are high-spirited, in what orgiastic feasts and revels can we let off our surplus of energy? Our moral views forbid this outlet.

428 But why the moral restraint? Out of religious consideration for a wrathful God? Irrespective of the widespread unbelief, even the believing man might calmly ask himself whether, if he were God, he would punish every Jack and Jill's escapade with everlasting damnation. Such ideas are no longer compatible with our [illegible] conception of God. Our God is far too tolerant to make a great fuss about it. Thus the rather ascetic and markedly hypocritical sexual morality of our time is robbed of any effective background. Or can we say that we are protected from excess by our superior wisdom and our insight into the nullity of human [illegible]? Unfortunately we are very far from that. Man possesses in the unconscious a fine flair for the spirit of his age; he divines its possibilities and feels in his heart the instability of present-day morality, no longer supported by living religious conviction. Here is the source of most of our ethical conflicts. The urge to freedom beats upon the weakening barriers of morality: we are in a state of temptation, we want and do not want. And because we want and yet cannot

think out what it is we really want; the real motive is largely unconscious, and hence comes the neurosis. Neurosis is therefore intimately bound up with the problem of our time and really represents an unsuccessful attempt on the part of the individual to solve the general problem in his own person. Neurosis is self-division. In most people the cause of the division is that the conscious mind wants to hang on to its moral ideal, while the unconscious strives after its—in the contemporary sense—unmoral ideal which the conscious mind tries to deny. Men of this type want to be more respectable than they really are. But the conflict can easily be the other way about: there are men who to all appearances are very disreputable and do not put the least restraint upon themselves. Fundamentally this is only a pose of wickedness, for in the background they have their moral side which has fallen into the unconscious, just as surely as the immoral side in the case of the moral man. (Extremes should therefore be avoided as far as possible, because they always arouse suspicion of their opposite.)

429 This general discussion was necessary in order to clarify the idea of an "erotic conflict." Thence we can proceed to discuss, firstly, the technique of psychoanalysis and, secondly, the problem of therapy.

430 Obviously the great question for this technique is: How are we to arrive by the shortest and best path at a knowledge of what is happening in the unconscious of the patient? The original method was hypnotism: either interrogation in a state of hypnotic concentration or else the spontaneous production of fantasies by the patient while in this state. This method is still occasionally employed, but compared with the present technique it is too primitive and therefore unsatisfactory. A second method was evolved by the Psychiatric Clinic in Zurich, the so-called association method,[9] the value of which is primarily theoretical and experimental. Its results give one a comprehensive though superficial grasp of the unconscious conflict or "complex."[10] The more penetrating method is that of dream analysis, discovered by Freud.

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[9] Jung and others, Studies in Word Association, trans. by M. D. Eder (London, 1918; New York, 1919). Jung's papers in Coll. Works, Vol. 2.

[10] Jung, "The Psychology of Dementia Praecox," Coll. Works, Vol. 3.

481 Of the dream it may therefore be said that it is the stone which the builders rejected, and which has become the head of the corner. It is only in modern times that the dream, this fleeting and insignificant-looking product of the psyche, has met with such profound contempt. Formerly it was esteemed as a harbinger of fate, a portent and comforter, a messenger of the gods. Now we see it as an emissary of the unconscious, whose task it is to reveal the secrets that are hidden from the conscious mind; and this it does with astounding completeness.

482 From the [illegible] of the dream it was learned that the dream, as it appears to us, is only a façade which conceals the interior of the house. But if, observing certain technical rules, we induce the dreamer to talk about the details of his dream, it soon becomes evident that his associations tend in a particular direction and group themselves around particular themes. These appear to be of personal significance and yield a meaning which could never have been conjectured to lie behind the dream, but which, as careful comparison has shown, stands in an extremely delicate [illegible] exact relation to the dream façade. This particular complex of ideas wherein are united all the threads of the dream is the conflict we are looking for, or rather a [illegible] of it, conditioned by circumstances. The painful and incompatible elements in the conflict are in this way so severed or obliterated that one may speak of a wish-fulfilment. But we must at once add that the wishes fulfilled in the dream do not seem to be ours, but are of a kind that [illegible] contrary to them. Thus, for instance, a daughter loves her mother tenderly, but dreams with great distress that her mother is dead. Such dreams in which there is apparently no trace of wish-fulfilment are innumerable and are a constant source of bewilderment to our learned critics. For they still cannot grasp the elementary distinction between the manifest and the latent content of the dream. We must guard against this error: the conflict worked out in the dream is unconscious, and so is the [illegible] for a solution. Our dreamer does in fact have the wish to be rid of her mother; expressed in the language of the unconscious, she wishes her mother to die. Now we know that a certain [illegible] the [illegible] everything that has passed [illegible] among them those infantile [illegible]

pulses which could find no outlet in actual life, that is, a succession of unsuccessful desires. We must not be surprised that the bulk of what comes out of the unconscious is of an infantile character at first; so, too, this wish, which is simply this: "When Mummy dies, you will marry me, won't you, Daddy?" This expression of an infantile wish is the substitute for a recent desire to marry, a desire which in this case is painful to the dreamer for reasons still to be discovered. The idea of marriage or rather the seriousness of the corresponding impulse is, as we say, "repressed into the unconscious," and from there must necessarily express itself in an infantile fashion, because the material at the disposal of the unconscious consists largely of infantile reminiscences.

433 The dream is often occupied with apparently very silly details, thus producing an impression of absurdity, or else it is on the surface so unintelligible as to cause us to be bewildered. Hence we always have to overcome a certain resistance before we can seriously set about disentangling the intricate web through patient work. But when at last we penetrate to its real meaning, we find ourselves deep in the dreamer's secrets and discover with astonishment that an apparently quite senseless dream is in the highest degree significant, and that in reality it speaks only of extremely important and serious things of the soul. This discovery compels a rather more respect for the so-called superstition that dreams have a meaning, to which the rationalistic temper of our age has hitherto given short shrift.

434 As Freud says, dream-analysis is the via regia to the unconscious. It leads straight to the deepest personal secrets, and is, therefore, an invaluable instrument in the hands of the physician and educator of the soul. The attacks of the opponents of this method are, as might be expected, based upon [illegible] which, setting aside the [illegible] resistances of personal [illegible], derive chiefly from the very strongly scholastic [illegible] in our learned thought. Dream-analysis above all else mercilessly unmasks the lying morality and hypocritical pretences of [illegible] character in the most [illegible] way, and can we wonder if many feel that their toes have been trodden on? In this connection I am always reminded of the striking statue of "Carnal Pleasure"

[illegible] the front extolling the sweet art and smile, the back covered with toads and serpents. Dream-analysis reverses the picture and shows the other side. The healing value of this realistic corrective can scarcely be denied. It is a painful but extremely useful operation which makes great demands on both doctor and patient. Psychoanalysis considered as a therapeutic technique consists in the main of numerous dream-analyses. In the course of treatment the dreams successively throw up the contents of the unconscious in order to expose them to the disinfecting power of daylight, and in this way much that is valuable and believed lost is found again. It is a catharsis of a special kind, something like the maieutics of Socrates, the "art of the midwife." It is only to be expected that for many people who have adopted a certain pose towards themselves, in which they violently believe, psychoanalysis is a veritable torture. For in accordance with the old mystical saying, "Give up what thou hast, then shalt thou receive," they are called upon to abandon all their cherished illusions in order that something deeper, fairer, and more embracing may arise within them. Only through the mysteries of self-sacrifice can a man find himself anew. It is a genuine old wisdom that comes to light again in psychoanalytical treatment, and it is especially curious that this kind of psychic education should prove necessary in the heyday of our culture. In more than one respect it may be compared with the Socratic method, though it must be said that psychoanalysis penetrates to far greater depths.

435 We always find in the patient a conflict which at a certain point is connected with the great problems of society. Hence, when the analysis is pushed to this point, the apparently individual conflict of the patient is revealed as a universal conflict of his environment and epoch. Neurosis is thus nothing less than an individual attempt, however unsuccessful, to solve a universal problem; indeed it cannot be otherwise, for a general problem, a "question," is not an ens per se, but exists only in the hearts of individuals. The neurotic has the soul of a child who bears with ill grace the arbitrary restrictions whose meaning he does not see; he tries to make this morality his own, but falls into profound disunion and disharmony with himself: one side of him wants to suppress, the other longs to be free—and this struggle goes by the name of neurosis. Were the conflict clearly conscious

in all its purity, it would never give rise to neurotic symptoms; these only occur when we [illegible] and [illegible] of its presence. Only under these conditions does the symptom appear, and it helps to give expression to the unrecognized side of the psyche. The symptom is therefore an indirect expression of unrecognized desires which, when conscious, [illegible] moral convictions. As already observed, this shadow-side of the psyche, being withdrawn from conscious scrutiny, cannot be dealt with by the patient. He cannot correct it, cannot come to terms with it, nor yet disregard it; for in reality he does not "possess" the unconscious impulses at all. Thrust out from the hierarchy of the conscious psyche, they have become autonomous complexes which can be brought under control again only through the analysis of the unconscious, though not without great resistances. There are very many patients who boast that for them the ethical conflict does not exist; they assure us that the sexual question is nonsense, for they say they possess no sexuality whatever. These people do not see that other things of unknown origin get in their way: their hysterical moods, underhand tricks which they play on themselves and their neighbours, a nervous catarrh of the stomach, pains in various places, irritability for no reason, and a whole host of nervous symptoms.

426 Psychoanalysis has been accused of liberating man's fortunately repressed animal instincts and thus causing incalculable harm. This apprehension shows how little faith we place in the efficacy of our moral principles. People pretend that only morality holds men back from unbridled licence; but a much more effective regulator is necessity, which sets bounds far more real and persuasive than any moral precepts. It is true that analysis liberates the animal instincts, but not, as many would have it, with a view to giving them unbridled power, but to put them to higher uses, so far as this is possible for the individual concerned and so far as he requires such sublimation. It is under all circumstances an advantage to be in full possession of one's personality, otherwise the repressed portions of the personality will only crop up as a hindrance elsewhere, not just at some unimportant point, but at the very spot where we are most sensitive. This is what always [illegible]. But if men can be educated to see the lowly side of their own natures, it may

be hoped that they will also learn to understand and to love their fellow men better. A little less hypocrisy and a little more tolerance towards oneself can only have good results in respect for our neighbour, for we are all too prone to transfer to our fellows the injustice and violence we inflict upon our own natures.

2

THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS[1]

I

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PERSONAL AND THE IMPERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS

437 Since we parted company with the Viennese school upon the question of the nature of the interpretative principle in psychoanalysis, which in our view is not the *sexual impulse* but simply *energy*, our concepts have undergone considerable development. Once the dispute about the explanatory cause had been settled by accepting an abstract one the nature of which we did not postulate in advance, our interest was directed to the concept of the unconscious.

438 As we all know, the contents of the unconscious are, according to Freud's theory, reducible to infantile tendencies and desires. These are repressed during earliest infancy and their repression continues throughout life. By means of analysis the repression is removed and the repressed desires become conscious again. The unconscious should thus [illegible] emp-

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[1] Translation of "La Structure de l'inconscient," *Archives de Psychologie*, XVI (1916), 152-79. [The essay was originally translated from the German of Jung's manuscript into French by M. Marsen. For the present edition the translation into English, by Philip Mairet, has been made from the French because the original German manuscript is no longer in existence. Hence a double translation was unavoidable. The terminology has been standardized only in so far as it appears reasonably certain from a comparison of the texts that the earlier formulations corresponded to the later formulations.—EDITORS.]

tion and so to speak done away with, but in reality the production of infantile desires and fantasies of a sexual nature continues right into old age.

439 According to this theory the unconscious would contain only those elements of the personality which could just as well be conscious, and which have been suppressed solely by the educational process. It follows that the essential content of the unconscious would be of a *personal* character. Although from one point of view the infantile tendencies in the unconscious are the most obvious, it would nevertheless be a mistake to define or to evaluate the unconscious by them, for it presents a further aspect.

440 The unconscious comprises not only the repressed material but also all the other psychic components which do not attain the threshold of consciousness. The principle of repression does not suffice to explain why these components remain on the other side of the threshold of consciousness, for if that explanation were sufficient the removal of repression ought to confer upon the person concerned a prodigious memory which would henceforth forget nothing. No doubt repression plays a part, but it is not the only factor. If what we call a bad memory were always the result of repression, those who enjoy an excellent memory ought never to suffer from repression, nor in consequence be neurotic. But experience shows this is not at all the case. There are certainly cases of bad memory in which the lion's share must be attributed to repression, but these cases are relatively rare.

441 We conclude from this that besides the repressed material there are all sorts of psychic elements in the unconscious, including subliminal sense-perceptions. Moreover we know from abundant experience as well as for theoretical reasons that the unconscious must contain all the material which has *not yet* reached the threshold of consciousness. These are the origins of contents which will become conscious later on. We have also the best reasons for supposing that the unconscious never remains at rest, is never inactive, but is probably occupied ceaselessly in grouping and regrouping the so-called unconscious fantasies. This activity would be autonomous only in pathological cases; normally it would be coordinated with conscious activity.

444 It is probable that all these contents are of a personal nature inasmuch as they are acquisitions of the individual's life. Since that life is limited, the number of acquisitions of the unconscious should be correspondingly limited, and it ought to be possible to empty the unconscious by analysis. In other words the analysis should be capable of making a complete inventory of unconscious contents, the unconscious being supposed incapable of producing anything other than what has been previously known and received into consciousness. One would also have to admit, as we have already pointed out, that the productivity of the unconscious would be paralysed if by doing away with repression one could arrest the descent of conscious contents into the unconscious. But experience teaches us that this is possible only to a very limited extent. True, we do exhort our patients to retain their hold upon those repressed elements which have been brought back to consciousness and to reintegrate them into their way of life. But as we have convincing evidence every day, this procedure seems to have no effect whatever upon the unconscious, which persists no less than before in its creative activity and, as we see, produces the same infantile sexual fantasies which according to the original theory should be the effects of personal repressions. When one continues to analyse these cases one gradually uncovers [illegible] wish-fantasies of a surprising complexity. Every kind of sexual perversion and every kind of crime is there represented, as well as all the noblest deeds and the loftiest ideas imaginable, the existence of which one would never have suspected in the subject under analysis.

445 To give an example of this I will recall the case of a schizophrenic patient of Maeder's who used to declare that the world was his picture-book.[2] This was the case of a locksmith's apprentice who fell ill very young and had never been well endowed with intelligence. Now, as to his conception of the world as a picture-book, the leaves of which he was turning over while he watched what was happening around him, this is precisely Schopenhauer's "world as will and idea," but expressed in the primitive language of pictures. This conception is quite as equivalent as that of Schopenhauer, the only difference being that the expression of the patient remains at the stage of mere in-

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[2] A. Maeder, "La Langue d'un aliéné," *Archives de Psychologie*, IX (1910), [illegible]

an adequate expression, whereas in Schopenhauer the same idea is lifted up from the concreteness of intuition into the realm of abstraction and is expressed in a universally acceptable language.

444 It would be a complete mistake to think that the patient's views of things had a personal character or value, for then one would have to put the patient on the same level as the philosopher. And as I have just indicated, he alone is a philosopher who can elevate a natural [illegible] into an abstract idea and at the same time make it generally comprehensible in language. The philosophical conception in Schopenhauer represents a personal value, but the patient's conception is an impersonal value which springs up spontaneously like a natural growth, and the proprietary right belongs only to him who can translate it into an abstract idea and express it in a universally intelligible language. It would, however, be unfair to attribute to the philosopher, by exaggerating his achievement, the merit of having created or discovered an original [illegible]. It is [illegible] as natural a [illegible] to the philosopher as to the patient and is never more than an element of the common property of mankind, shared in principle by everyone. The golden apples of the Hesperides grow on the same tree, whether they are gathered by a locksmith's apprentice or by a Schopenhauer.

445 These primitive comparisons, of which I have given a great many examples in my work *The Psychology of the Unconscious*,[1] [illegible] for the usual distinction between "conscious" and the "unconscious," the legitimacy of which we do not dispute and which certainly needs to be retained and further [illegible] classification of the unconscious contents [illegible] from another point of view. [illegible] I am convinced by experience [illegible] an advanced point of view which [illegible] as far as we can see at present, it follows that we must distinguish in what is called the unconscious a layer which we might call the *personal unconscious*. The contents of this layer are personal in so far as they have the character partly of acquisitions of the individual's life and partly of psychological factors[2] which might just as well be conscious.

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[1] Later revised as *Symbols of Transformation* (Coll. Works, Vol. 5).—EDITORS.

[2] I.e., repressed desires or tendencies that are incompatible with the moral or aesthetic sentiments of the subject.

446 Certain psychological elements are subjected to repression and therefore become unconscious. But on the other hand, it is possible that some repressed elements may be returned to consciousness and can remain there once they have been recognized. We attribute a personal character to these elements because their effects, their partial appearance, or their origin can be rediscovered in our past. They constitute integral portions of the personality, they belong to it, and their loss to the conscious mind puts it in a state of inferiority. This inferiority has not at all the same psychological character as that of organic mutilation or innate defect, but rather that of a want, and it arouses a sort of *moral resentment*. An inferiority that is resented or is a moral grievance indicates that the missing element is something which, to judge by this feeling about it, ought not to be missing—in other words, it could be conscious if one took the trouble to make it so. This feeling of moral inferiority comes not from a collision with the moral law that is common to all and in a sense arbitrary, but from a conflict with the personal ego which, for reasons inherent in the mental economy, demands that the abhorred vacuum be filled. Whenever the sense of inferiority arises, it indicates not only a need to assimilate a portion of the unconscious, but also the possibility of that assimilation. There are, in the last resort, moral qualities in a human being which, because he either recognizes the necessity or senses it indirectly through a painful neurosis, oblige him to assimilate his unconscious self and retain it in consciousness. Whoever makes progress along the path of self-realization must inevitably bring into consciousness the contents of his personal unconscious, thus enlarging considerably the domain of his personality.

II

PHENOMENA RESULTING FROM THE ASSIMILATION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

447 The consequences of the assimilation of the unconscious give rise to some remarkable phenomena. It produces in certain

subjects a manifest, indeed, even a tiresome accentuation of ego-consciousness; they are full of themselves, they know everything, they imagine themselves to be fully informed of everything concerning their unconscious, and are persuaded that they understand all that arises out of it. Others, on the contrary, feel themselves more and more crushed under the contents of the unconscious; they lose their self-confidence and give themselves up in sad resignation before the extraordinary manifestations of the unconscious. The former, overflowing with feelings of their importance, identify themselves in an exaggerated way, in disregard of all reality, with whatever proceeds from their unconscious. The others, on the contrary, give up all responsibility, overcome by a sense of the ego's powerlessness against the fate working through the unconscious.[8]

448 If we analyse these two types more deeply, we find that the optimistic feeling in subjects of the former type conceals a profound sense of impotence, for which the optimism in question is but a meagre compensation, while the pessimistic resignation of the others masks a defiant will-to-power which implies a self-confidence far surpassing the conscious optimism of the former type.

449 This state of the personality is well characterized by the term "godlikeness,"[9] to which Adler in particular has drawn attention.

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[8] This duality of effect follows from the conscious attitude of the individual brought face to face with the processes of the unconscious. While some are fortified and comforted by an experience, others are depressed by that same experience. It depends upon the degree of morality and of optimism of the individual. A lower morality and an excess of optimism magnifies the importance of the ego; a lesser optimism and a higher morality diminishes it. The latter will be depressed, overwhelmed by certain tendencies, moral tendencies for example, which they encounter in the unconscious, because they feel responsible for them. The former rejoice, because the unconscious also reveals things which are very beautiful and profound, which they accept as their own property, as their own invention, and hence they regard themselves as great beings.

[9] In a certain sense the feeling of "godlikeness" exists a priori, even before analysis, not only in the neurotic but also in the normal person, the only difference being that the normal man is sufficiently shielded from any perception of his unconscious, while the neurotic is less and less so. On account of his quite peculiar sensitiveness, the latter participates to a greater extent in the life of the unconscious than does the normal person. Consequently "godlikeness" shows itself more frequently in the neurotic, and it is heightened still further by the realization of unconscious contents through analysis.

450 When the devil wrote the words of the serpent in the student's album, "Eritis sicut Deus, scientes bonum et malum," he added:

> Just follow the old advice
> And my cousin the snake,
> And one day your likeness to God
> Will make you quiver and quake.[7]

451 "Godlikeness" is evidently not a scientific conception, although it depicts perfectly the psychological state in question. It has yet to be seen, however, whence the attitude arises and why it deserves the name of godlikeness. As the expression indicates, the abnormality of the phenomenon consists in attributing to himself qualities or values which do not belong to him, for to resemble the divine is to resemble a spirit superior to the spirit of man.

452 If, with a psychological aim in view, we dissect this notion of godlikeness, we find that the term comprises not only the dynamic phenomenon which I have explained in my work *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, but also a certain psychic function having a *collective* character superordinate to the individual mentality. Just as the individual is not merely a separate and isolated being, but is part of society, so the human mind is not an isolated and entirely individual phenomenon, but also a collective function. Again, even as certain social functions or tendencies are, so to speak, opposed to the egocentric interests of the individual, so also certain functions or tendencies of the human mind are opposed, by their collective nature, to the personal mental functions.[8] Every man is born with a brain that is profoundly differentiated, and this makes him capable of very various mental functions which are neither ontogenetically developed nor acquired. But in so far as human brains are uniformly differentiated, the mental functioning thereby rendered possible at this level of differentiation is collective or universal.

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[7] *Faust*, Part I, 3rd scene in Faust's study.

[8] This [illegible] for instance, when [illegible] a case [illegible] personal desires [illegible] opinions [illegible] the [illegible] (Cf. J. J. Rousseau, *Émile*, Book [illegible] "What [illegible] one [illegible] when [illegible] himself, people want to educate him for others. Harmony is then impossible. Obliged to fight either against nature or against the social institutions, one has to choose between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make the one and the other at the same time."

[illegible] reflection [illegible] hero [illegible] personality [illegible] of [illegible] stress [illegible] unconscious sense of extraordinary inferiority.

458 Whenever, through the assimilation of the unconscious, we [illegible] the collective psyche into the sphere of the person[illegible] the opposing elements [illegible] the former [illegible] separate themselves [illegible] pairs groups each [illegible] pair of opposites. We have already mentioned one such pair of opposites, [illegible] and feeling of inferiority, which manifests itself in a very obvious manner in a neurosis. There are many other [illegible] of this kind [illegible] namely good and evil [illegible]. The formation of this pair [illegible] the exaggeration and the diminution [illegible]. The specific virtues and the vices of men are [illegible] as if they were [illegible] are as [illegible] as [illegible] elements [illegible]. That [illegible] in the case of certain primitive peoples whose [illegible] without internal contradiction and [illegible] the paradise of the collective psyche comes to an end.

453 This particular circumstance explains the remarkable analogies presented by the unconscious in the most remotely separated races and peoples, an analogy manifested by the fact, for example, that there are so many extraordinary correspondences between the themes and forms of autochthonous myths.

454 The universal similarity of human brains leads us then to admit the existence of a certain psychic function identical with itself in all individuals. This we will call the *collective psyche*. This in its turn admits a subdivision into two, the *collective mind* and the *collective soul*.* Inasmuch as there are differentiations corresponding to the race, the tribe and to the family, there are also collective psyches which limit themselves to race, tribe and family, at a level that is less deep than that of the universal collective psyche. To borrow an expression from P. Janet, the collective psyche comprises the *parties inférieures* of the mental functions, that is, the portion which is firmly established, is acquired by heredity, and exists everywhere, whose activity is as it were automatic, and which is in consequence transpersonal or impersonal. The personal conscious and unconscious comprise the *parties supérieures* of the mental functions, that is, the portion that has been ontogenetically acquired and developed and is the result of personal differentiation.

455 The individual who attaches to himself as his own the collective psyche which was previously *a priori* and unconscious, thus extends the domain of his personality in an illegitimate way and suffers the consequences. These consequences are as follows: on the one hand the collective psyche, inasmuch as it constitutes the inferior portion of the mental functions and is consequently the foundation of every personality, has the effect of crushing and devaluating the personality. This appears in the extreme case in a loss of self-consciousness and in an unconscious exaggeration of self-importance to the point of a morbid desire for domination (?). On the other, the moment the collective psyche is superimposed on the personality, the being is in a state in which all the personal differentiations grow dim and the psychic function common to all

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* By the *collective mind* I mean the activity of collective thinking; by the *collective soul*, collective feeling; and by the *collective psyche* the collective psychological functions as a whole.

457 When the collective psyche becomes conscious, its repression is necessary for the development of the personality, since collective and personal psychology exclude one another up to a point. History teaches us that as soon as a psychological attitude acquires a collective value, schisms begin to break out. Nowhere is this more evident than in the history of religion. A collective attitude is always dangerous to the individual, even when it is the response to a necessity. It is dangerous because it checks personal differentiation and very readily suppresses it. It derives this characteristic from the collective psyche, which is itself a product of psychological differentiation from the powerful gregarious instinct of man. Collective thought and feeling and collective effort are relatively easy in comparison with the exercise of the individual functions or with individual effort; and from this may arise, all too easily, a great threat to the development of personality through enfeeblement of the personal function. The damage done to the personality is compensated (for everything is compensated in psychology) by a forced union and unconscious identification with the collective psyche.

458 But one cannot too much insist on this: analysis of the unconscious does effect a fusion of the collective psychology with the personal psychology, a phenomenon which brings about the awkward consequences mentioned above. These consequences may be prejudicial to the vital feelings of the subject or to those nearest the patient, if he exercises any authority in his surroundings. His sense of identity with the collective psyche may, for example, make him try continually to impose the pretensions of his unconscious upon other people, for such an identification produces in him a feeling of universal validity (godlikeness), which impels him completely to disregard the different psychological feelings of others.

459 The gravest mistakes can be avoided by an understanding, by the correct and clear appreciation of this fact: that there are personal types, variously orientated, whose mentality we ought never to try to constrain to the point of view proper to our own type. It is hard enough for one type completely to understand another type, but the perfect comprehension of another individual is quite impossible. In analysis one should always advise respect for the personality of others; such respect

is absolutely indispensable if one would avoid arresting the development of the subject's personality.

460 Here it is to be observed that for a certain type of individual to show respect for their freedom is to allow them liberty of action, while for another type it is to give them liberty of *thought*. In analysis both these needs should be observed so far as the analyst sees the need for them, having due regard to the patient's personal integrity. An excessive desire to [illegible] and the patient or to enlighten him would be as harmful as a lack of understanding.

461 The instincts and the fundamental collective forms of thought and of human feeling whose activity is revealed by the analysis of unconsciousness constitute for the conscious personality an acquisition which it cannot completely assimilate without detriment to itself.[10]

462 That is why it is of such great importance in practical treatment to keep the aim of the individual's development

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[10] Here I would like to remark that I have not made any attempt [illegible] the question of how the problem presents itself from the point of view of the psychology of types. A special and somewhat complicated study would be required to formulate this in the language of typology. [illegible] for instance, [illegible] one [illegible] the [illegible] and another for the extravert. Here I am content to indicate the difficulties that such a task would raise. In the type the function of adaptation [illegible] is conscious is collective during childhood but soon acquires a personal character which it maintains henceforth. If, for example, the individual feels no need to develop his type towards the ideal. But in that case the conscious function of adaptation to reality acquires a [illegible] which may presume to universality and is thereby stamped with a character of collectivity opposed to the personal [illegible] character. To put it another way: [illegible] psyche [illegible] then [illegible] for the [illegible] 'mass psychology,' and the collective mentality would then be a highly differentiated adaptation to society.

But in the introvert the conscious function of adaptation to reality is thinking which in the early stages of development is personal but which tends to acquire a universal character of a collective nature, while his *feeling* remains purely personal in so far as it is unconscious. In the extravert precisely the reverse occurs: from being personal, feeling becomes impersonal, while thinking follows the opposite course.

Besides this important difference there is another and one that is also more profound, between the role and meaning of the persona for the extravert and for the introvert. All the effort of the introvert is directed to the maintenance of the integrity of the ego, which makes him assume an attitude towards his own persona entirely different from that of the extravert, whose attitude towards himself is based entirely upon his feeling even to the detriment of his person-

[illegible] When the [illegible] psyche is [illegible] at [illegible] the result is [illegible] impossible [illegible] with [illegible] a very [illegible] personal psyche and [illegible] persons [illegible] which are [illegible] which are so [illegible] fantasies or dreams are [illegible] in regarding [illegible] One [illegible] more [illegible] from [illegible] [illegible] is an [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] The [illegible] is [illegible] can never [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] suggestion and moral contagion.

[illegible] [illegible] how people [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] what extraordinary [illegible]

[illegible] was given up.—Editors

they are content to imitate some eminent personality, some one quality or a single striking mode of behaviour, thereby achieving an apparent distinction from the circle in which they move. The consequence—one might almost say the punishment—of this is that the uniformity of the subject's mentality with that of his neighbours, already real enough, is increased to the point of unconscious enslavement to his surroundings. As a rule these specious attempts at individual differentiation stiffen into affectations, and the subject remains at the same level as he always was, but several degrees more sterile than before.

465 To find out what is truly individual in ourselves, the first necessity is profound reflection; we may then suddenly realize what extraordinary difficulties this discovery of individuality presents.

III

THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE

466 Here we touch upon a problem which if overlooked may land us in extreme confusion.

467 I have already said that, through the analysis of the unconscious, some of the disconnected personal fragments are re-attached to the conscious mind, and I said I would call these elements, repressed but capable of reintegration, the *personal unconscious*. I showed further how contact with the deeper layers of the unconscious, which I call the *impersonal unconscious*, produces an enlargement of the personality and tends to bring about the state of mind known as godlikeness. We arrive at this state of mind by simply continuing the analytical work which has restored to consciousness the repressed portions of the personality. By pursuing the analysis we further join to the personal consciousness certain fundamental, general, and impersonal characteristics of humanity, and this causes the accentuation of consciousness we have mentioned, which may in some respects be accompanied by troublesome consequences.

458 From this point of view the personality looks to us like a piece cut off, more or less arbitrarily, from the collective psyche. It is produced in fact by an *a priori* ignorance of all the fundamental and human facts, followed by the more or less voluntary repression of tendencies and elements which could just as well be conscious: a repression whose purpose is precisely to establish that portion of the collective unconscious which we call the persona. The word *persona* is an excellent expression for this, for originally it meant the *mask* once worn by actors to indicate the role in which each appeared on the scene. If we endeavour to draw a precise distinction between the personal and the impersonal elements, it is not long before we find ourselves in the greatest confusion. [illegible] we have to say of the contents of the persona what we have said of the personal unconscious, namely, that it is *collective*; and we cannot ascribe individuality to anything except the mere limits of the person, and that only in a restricted sense. Only the fact that the persona is a segment more or less arbitrarily cut off from the collective psyche can explain why we are in danger of taking it altogether wrongly for something individual. For, as its name implies, it is nothing but a mask for the collective psyche, a mask which simulates individuality, pretending to others and to itself that it is individual, while it simply plays a part in which the collective psyche speaks.

469 When we analyse the person, we dissolve the mask, and discover that what appeared to us as individuality is after all only collective. We have thus traced the petty god of this world back to its origin in the universal god who perfectly personifies the collective psyche, and we come to the surprising conclusion that the person is merely a mask for the collective psyche. Whether we reduce the individual urge or drive to the sexual impulse like Freud, or like Adler to the ego's primitive will to power, or again to the universal principle of the collective psyche which includes both the Freudian and Adlerian principles, we arrive at the same result, namely the dissolution of the personality in the collective. That is why, in any analysis that is pushed far enough, there comes a moment when the subject experiences that feeling of godlikeness of which we have spoken. This condition frequently announces itself by certain singular symptoms: by dreams, for example, in which the

subject seems to be flying through space like a comet, or feels that he is the earth, the sun, or a star; or that he is of immense size, or is extremely small; or that he is dead, etc. He may also experience certain *physical* sensations of being too small or too big for his skin, or certain *hypnagogic* sensations of falling downward or rising upward endlessly, of the body growing larger, or of vertigo. Psychologically this state is characterized by disorientation of the personality: one no longer knows who one is, or one is absolutely certain of being now the person one is going to become. Intolerant dogmatism, an exaggerated opinion or depreciation of oneself, contempt or adulation for those who have not been analysed, are common manifestations. Often enough I have observed increase in the liability to physical illness, but only when the subjects relish their condition and dwell on it too long.

470 The abundant potentialities of the collective psyche are confusing and blinding. One result of the dissolution of the persona is the release of fantasy, which is apparently nothing less than the specific activity of the collective psyche. This release throws up into consciousness elements whose existence had not previously been suspected. It reveals all the riches of mythological thought and feeling. The overwhelming impression that this makes is by no means easy to bear. This phase constitutes one of the real dangers of analysis, a danger that one ought not to dissimulate.

471 It will readily be understood that this condition is insupportable and one ought to put an end to it as promptly as possible, for it bears too close an analogy to mental derangement. The most common form of madness, dementia praecox or schizophrenia, is, as we know, characterized precisely by the fact that the unconscious almost entirely suppresses the function of the conscious mind and supplants it. The unconscious usurps the reality function and attributes the value of reality to its own productions. The thoughts of the unconscious make themselves heard as voices, become visible in the form of apparitions or perceptible as physical hallucinations, or they may even manifest themselves in senseless, unshakable judgments upheld in the face of reality.

472 In a similar but not quite identical manner, the unconscious is pushed into consciousness when the persona is dis-

solved in the collective psyche. The one difference between this state and that of mental alienation is that here the unconscious is brought to the surface by the method of conscious analysis—at least, that is how things go at the beginning of analysis, when serious obstacles of a collective origin are still opposed to the unconscious. Later, when the barriers that had been accumulating for years have disappeared, the unconscious intrudes irresistibly and sometimes irrupts into consciousness like a torrent. The analogy of this phase with mental disorder is almost complete. But there is no actual insanity unless the contents of the unconscious become a reality which usurps the place of conscious reality, in other words, unless one believes without reservation in the contents of the unconscious.

IV

NEGATIVE ATTEMPTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE

a. *The Regressive Restoration of the Persona*

473 The unbearable feeling of identity with the collective psyche drives the patient, as we have just said, to some radical solution.

474 Two ways are open to him. The first possibility is to try to re-establish regressively the primitive persona, seeking to control the unconscious by the application of a reductive theory—by, for example, declaring that it is "nothing but" a manifestation of the repressed sexual tendencies of early infancy, for which normal sexual activity would be an advantageous substitute. This explanation is based on the undeniably sexual symbolism of the language of the unconscious and on its concretistic interpretation. Alternatively the theory of the will to power may be invoked and, relying upon the equally undeniable power tendencies of the unconscious, the feeling of "godlikeness" may be interpreted as a "masculine protest," the infantile desire for omnipotence and need for security. Lastly, the un-

conscious may be regarded as it manifests itself in the collective archaic psychology of the primitive, which would explain not only the sexual symbolism and the godlike will-to-power, but also the religious, philosophical, and mythological aspects and tendencies inherent in the unconscious contents.

475 In each case the consequences will be the same, for what it amounts to is a repudiation of the unconscious as something useless, infantile, and devoid of sense, impossible and obsolete. To deny it any value, to shrug our shoulders resignedly: that is all one can do about it. If one wants to go on living reasonably one must reconstitute as well as one can that segment of the collective psyche which we call the persona, and quietly give up analysis, trying to forget if possible that one has an unconscious at all. One must look at the matter like Faust, when he says:

This earthly circle I know well enough.
Towards the beyond the view has been cut off;
Fool—who directs that way his dazzled eye,
Contrives himself a double in the sky!
Let him look round, and here not stray beyond;
To a sound man this world must needs respond.
To roam into eternity is vain!
What he perceives, he can attain.
Thus let him walk along his earthlong day;
Though phantoms haunt him, let him go his way,
And, moving on, to weal and woe assent—
He, at each moment ever discontent![14]

476 That solution would be perfect if a man were really able to shake off his unconscious, to drain the libido from it and render it inactive. But experience demonstrates that it is not possible to drain the energy from the unconscious: it continues to act. For it contains in itself the source of libido, whence all the psychic elements flow into us, the thought-feelings and the feeling-thoughts, the still undifferentiated germs of ideation and feeling. It would be a mistake, then, to believe that by a theory or by, so to speak, a magical recipe, one could finally empty the unconscious of libido and in some degree disembarrass oneself of it. One may for a while play with this illusion, but the day comes when one is forced to say with Faust:

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[14] *Faust*, trans. by Louis MacNeice (London, 1951), p. 283 (Part II, Act V).

But now such spectredom so throngs the air
That none knows how to dodge it, none knows where.
Though one day greet us with a rational gleam,
The night entangles us in webs of dream.
We come back happy from the fields of spring—
And a bird croaks. Croaks what? Some evil thing.
Enmeshed in superstition night and morn,
It forms and shows itself and comes to warn.
And we, so scared, stand without friend or kin,
And the door creaks—and nobody comes in.
  Anyone here?
CARE: The answer should be clear.
FAUST: And you, who are you then?
CARE: I am just here.
FAUST: Take yourself off!
CARE: This is where I belong.
FAUST: Take care, Faust, speak no magic spell, be strong.
CARE: Unheard by the outward ear
  In the heart I whisper fear;
  Changing shape from hour to hour
  I employ my savage power.[13]

477 It is not possible to exhaust the unconscious by analysis, or thus to reduce it to inactivity. Nothing can deprive it of its power for however brief a space of time. To attempt to do so is to deceive ourselves, re-editing for our purpose the ordinary procedure of repression.

b. *Identification with the Collective Psyche*

478 The second way leads to identification with the collective psyche. This is equivalent to the symptoms of deification, but erected into a system, that is to say, one believes oneself to be the happy possessor of the great truth which was only waiting to be discovered, of that final knowledge which spells the salvation of all people. This attitude is not necessarily megalomania in its common form, but in the mitigated and well-known form of *prophetic inspiration*. For weaklings who, as is often the case, possess more than their fair share of pride, vanity, and misplaced naïveté, the danger of yielding to this temptation is very great. Access to the collective psyche pro-

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[13] Ibid., pp. 281-82 (Part II, Act V), modified.

duces a renewal of life in the individual, which he feels as a sensation in [illegible] agreeable or disagreeable. One would like [illegible] renewal, in some cases because the vital feelings had themselves been [illegible], in others because it promises the mind a rich harvest of new knowledge. In such cases those who are now living [illegible] the treasures [illegible] in the collective psyche will try to regain by any means possible the new elements whose advent has added something to their primary reason for living. The best means would seem to be identification with the collective psyche, for the dissolution of the persona positively invites one to plunge into that ocean of divinity and, losing all memory, to merge oneself with it. This mystical phenomenon, which is a peculiarity of all mankind, is as innate in every one of us as the "desire for the mother," the longing to return to the source from whence we came.

479 As I have shown elsewhere,[11] there lies at the root of the regressive nostalgia, which Freud regards as "infantile fixation" or incestuous desire, an essential value to which the myths, for example, bear witness. It is precisely the best and the strongest among men, the heroes, who give way to their regressive nostalgia and purposely expose themselves to the danger of being devoured by the monster of the primal cause. But if a man is a hero, he is a hero because in the final reckoning he did not let the monster devour him, but subdued it not once but many times. It is in the achievement of victory over the collective psyche that the true value lies, and this is the meaning of the conquest of the treasure, of the invincible weapon, the magic talisman, in short of all those desirable goods that the myths tell of. Anyone who identifies himself with the collective psyche—or, in symbolic language, lets himself be devoured by the monster—and becomes also identified with it, also attains the treasure defended by the dragon, but he does so in spite of himself and to his own great loss.

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[11] Cf. *The Psychology of the Unconscious* (trans. by Beatrice M. Hinkle, New York, 1916; London, 1917).

V

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF TREATMENT

480 In fixing a [illegible] the other can lead to good results.

481 The first [illegible] the [illegible]

482 The [illegible] which everywhere and always [illegible] possibility of development.

483 The [illegible] is encouraged no less by [illegible]

from the logic of the [illegible] from the logic of feeling. In regard to [illegible] irrational. We [illegible] to be [illegible] Bergson for having [illegible] in [illegible] of the irrational. Al[illegible] may not be [illegible] of [illegible] scientific [illegible] psychology will none the less [illegible] a plurality of principles [illegible] is the only way to prevent psychology from getting stranded.

484 From [illegible] science [illegible] in fact [illegible] to speak [illegible] of individual psychology [illegible] terms. It [illegible] collective [illegible] that constitutes an [illegible] psychology [illegible] expresses [illegible] psychology [illegible] deal with collective psychology.

485 These observations [illegible] as preparation for what I [illegible] mentioned a [illegible] of the two [illegible] has its theory [illegible] in the sense [illegible] the collective [illegible] We must [illegible] separate [illegible] the personal. For the [illegible] But the [illegible] into [illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] he [illegible] to segregate [illegible] disease.

486 As I have already [illegible] of the [illegible] however [illegible] of a certain

[illegible] make [illegible] an exemplary pattern [illegible] individual [illegible] dissimulated by the persona. [illegible] mask [illegible] in the [illegible] differentiation of his persona that the individual [illegible] exhausts his resistance to the collective psyche. By analysing the persona we confer a greater value upon the individual and thus accentuate its conflict with collectivity. [illegible] naturally consists in a psychological opposition within the subject. The dissolution of the compromise between the two halves of a pair of opposites renders the conflict more intense. [illegible] purely conscious [illegible] does not take place at all [illegible] the purely psychological [illegible] individual and collective requirements equally. The natural and unconscious [illegible] harmonious [illegible]. The body, its faculties and its needs [illegible] natural rules and [illegible] that prevent any excess or disproportion [illegible] of the question. Because of its exclusive character a differentiated psychological function always tends to [illegible] which reason [illegible] consciousness [illegible] never the less [illegible] for the mental individuality, too, is an expression of the corporeal individuality and is so to speak at one with it. [illegible] is no less true from the spiritual standpoint [illegible] one sees no reason to doubt the psychological fact that the individuality and the persona [illegible]. At the same time it is [illegible] that the subject is in the [illegible] degree similar to other individuals, although [illegible] bodily distinguishable from other bodies. Every mental or moral individuality is different from all the others, and yet is so constituted as to render every man similar to all other men. The living being [illegible] free from all constraint is able to develop him [illegible] best realize by the very perfection of his own [illegible] type of his species and by [illegible] value.

487 The persona is always identical with a typical attitude dominated by a single psychological function, for example by feeling, thinking, or intuition. Consequently, this exclusive character always causes a relative repression of the other functions. For this reason the persona is [illegible] to the individual development. The dissolution of the persona is therefore absolutely necessary for individuation. However, it is impossible [illegible] as its goal by conscious intention, for con-

scious intention leads, ultimately, to a conscious attitude which excludes whatever does not fit in with it. The assimilation of the content of the unconscious produces, on the contrary, a state of mind from which conscious intention is excluded, having been displaced by a development that appears to be irrational. Such a procedure in itself constitutes individuation, and the result of it is individuality as we have previously defined it: particular and universal at once. So long as the persona persists, individuality is repressed and hardly betrays its existence except in the choice of its personal accessories—its actor's wardrobe, one might say. It is only through the assimilation of the unconscious that the individuality can manifest itself more clearly, together with that psychological phenomenon which links the ego with the non-ego and is designated by the word *attitude*. But this time we have to do with an attitude that is not typical but individual.

488 The paradox in this formulation of the case is of the same origin as the ancient dispute about universals. The phrase *animal namque animal genus est* illuminates and explains the fundamental paradox. The *realia*: these are the particulars; the universal exists psychologically, for it is based upon a real resemblance between particular things. The individual is here the particular thing which always possesses in a greater or lesser degree the qualities upon which we base the general conception of a collectivity; and the more the characteristic of individuality is accentuated, the more it develops those qualities which are fundamental to the collective notion of humanity.

489 If I might be forgiven a humorous illustration which pretty well suggests the last phase in the solution of our problem, I would cite Buridan's ass between the two bundles of hay. Obviously the entire mistake was in the manner in which the ass posed the well-known question. It was of little importance to know whether the bundle on the right or the one on the left was the better, or which one he ought to start eating. What he ought to have asked himself is what he wanted in the depths of his being: which did he feel pushed towards? He was thinking about the hay and not about himself—that is why he did not know what he wanted.

490 What is at once permanent and personal and individual, that represents the natural urge of life. That is the question.

[illegible] In [illegible] present [illegible] state of science [illegible] neither would be relevant to the [illegible]. The resolution will be attained only by absolute[illegible] observation of those germs of psychic life which are born on the one hand from the [illegible] of the conscious and the unconscious, and on the other hand from the individual elements and the collective elements. Where do we find those germs of life? One man seeks them in the conscious mind, another in the unconscious. But the conscious mind only represents one side of man's psychology, and the unconscious is only the reverse of it. We must never forget that dreams are the compensations of the conscious mind. If it were not so, one would have to regard them as a source of knowledge superior to consciousness; we should then be degraded to the mental level of fortune-tellers, and should be obliged to respect the incoherence of superstition, or else, in accord with crass opinion, to deny any value at all to dreams.

[illegible] It is in the creation of *fantasies* that we find the unitive function we are seeking. All the elements engaged by the active tendencies flow into the imagination. The imagination has, it is true, a poor reputation among psychologists, and up to the present psychoanalytic theories have treated it accordingly. For Freud as for Adler it is only a so-called "symbolic" veil disguising the tendencies or the primitive desires presupposed by these two investigators. But one can set against this opinion, not upon theoretical principle but essentially for practical reasons, the fact that though it is possible to explain and to depreciate imagination in respect of its causality, imagination is nevertheless the creative source of all that has made progress possible to humanity. Imagination holds in itself an irreducible value, for it is the psychic function whose roots ramify at the same time in the contents of the conscious mind and of the unconscious, in the collective as in the individual.

[illegible] But whence has the imagination acquired its bad reputation? Above all from the circumstance that its manifestations cannot be taken at their face value. If one takes them concretely, they are of no value; if, like Freud, one attributes semiotic significance to them, then they are interesting from the scientific point of view; but if we regard them according to the *hermeneutic* conception as authentic symbols, then they provide the directions which we need in order to carry on our lives in harmony with ourselves.

494 The symbol is not a sign that veils something everybody knows.[10] Such is not its significance: on the contrary, it represents an attempt to elucidate, by means of analogy, something that still belongs entirely to the domain of the unknown or something that is yet to be. Imagination reveals to us, in the form of a more or less striking analogy, what is in process of becoming. If we reduce this by analysis to something else universally known, we destroy the authentic value of the symbol; but to attribute hermeneutic significance to it conforms to its value and its meaning.

495 The essential character of hermeneutics, a science which was widely practised in former times, consists in making successive additions of other analogies to the analogy given in the symbol: in the first place subjective analogies produced at random by the patient, then objective analogies provided by the analyst out of his general knowledge. This procedure widens and enriches the initial symbol, and the final outcome is an infinitely complex and variegated picture in which certain lines of psychological development stand out as possibilities that are at once individual and collective. There is no science on earth by which these lines could be proved "right"; on the contrary, rationalism could very easily prove that they are not right. Their validity is proved by their intense value for life. And that is what matters from the point of view of practical treatment: the important thing is that men should have life, not that the principles by which they live should be demonstrable rationally as "right."

496 True to the spirit of scientific superstition, someone may now begin to talk about suggestion. But we ought to have realized long ago that a suggestion is not accepted unless it is agreeable to the person receiving it. Unless it is acceptable, a suggestion is futile; otherwise the treatment of the neuroses would be an extremely simple affair: one would merely have to suggest the state of health. These pseudo-scientific assertions about suggestion are based upon the unconscious superstition that suggestion is possessed of some self-generating magical power. But in the case of anyone who is committed to the

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[10] As, for example, the primal incest wish or the universal elemental desire

depths of his own being to acquiesce in it, all suggestion is powerless.

497 Hermeneutic treatment of imaginative ideas leads to the synthesis of the individual and the collective psyche. This is true enough in theory, but in practice another indispensable condition must be fulfilled. One characteristic of the essentially regressive nature of the neurotic, which moreover is partly acquired in the course of his illness, is his refusal to take either himself or the world seriously: he seeks to be cured first by one doctor and then by another, now by such and such a method, or in such and such circumstances, irrespective of any serious co-operation on his own part. Now no one can be washed without getting wet. Without the most perfect goodwill and the absolutely serious intentions of the patient no recovery is possible. As soon as ever we begin to map out the lines of advance that are symbolically indicated, the patient must begin to proceed along them. If he remains a spectator or expert, his own inaction precludes any cure. He is in truth obliged to take the way of individual life which is revealed to him, and to persist in it until and unless an unmistakable reaction from his unconscious warns him that he is on the wrong track.

498 Whoever is incapable of this moral determination, of this loyalty to himself, will never be relieved of his neurosis. On the other hand, whoever is capable of it will certainly find the way to cure himself.

499 Neither the doctor nor the patient, therefore, ought to let himself slip into a belief that analysis is by itself sufficient to dispel a neurosis. That would be a mistake and a self-deception. Brutally, in the last resort, it is the *moral factor* which is decisive for health or for disease.

500 The elaboration of the life-lines reveals to consciousness the true direction of the currents of the libido. These life-lines are by no means identical with the guiding fictions discovered by Adler; the latter are only arbitrary efforts to separate the persona from the collective psyche and lend it an independent existence. One might rather say that the guiding fiction is nothing but an unsuccessful attempt to constitute a life-line. Moreover—and this shows the uselessness of a fiction—such a line as it does produce persists far too long: it has the tenacity of a cramp.

The line [illegible] by the [illegible] is on the contrary [illegible] does [illegible] lines that are strong [illegible] can be [illegible] taken in advance. "All [illegible]," said Nietzsche. These lines [illegible] recognized principles or ideas, but [illegible] that have a provisional value. [illegible] a more or less [illegible] moment when one has [illegible] rather [illegible] to have [illegible] is not always able to [illegible] although [illegible] the [illegible] these [illegible] the [illegible] imperfect [illegible] necessary [illegible] even after analysis [illegible] I am persuaded [illegible] when the patient [illegible]

A [illegible] of dreams [illegible] having a [illegible] which [illegible] in the first place [illegible] would [illegible] the [illegible] meaning [illegible] the [illegible] phenomenon we [illegible] were a [illegible] absolutely [illegible] in [illegible] conscious, and also a psychological understanding broad enough for him to discern as far as possible and whenever necessary the direction of his life-line, for without this his conscious mind will not be able to follow the flow of the libido and consciously sustain the individuality he has achieved. A patient who has had any serious neurosis needs to be morally equipped in this way if he is to be sure of persevering in his cure.

502 Analysis, thus understood, is by no means a therapeutic method of which the medical profession holds a monopoly. It is an art, a technique, a science of psychological life, which the patient, when cured, should continue to practise for his own good and for the good of those amongst whom he lives. If he understands it in this way, he will not set himself up as a prophet, nor as a world reformer, but, with a sound sense of the general good, he will profit by the knowledge he has acquired during treatment, and his influence will make itself felt by the example of his own life rather than any high discourse or missionary propaganda.]

VI

SUMMARY

503 *A.* It is considered advisable to subdivide the psychological processes into *conscious* contents and *unconscious* contents.

1. The *conscious contents* are in part *personal*, inasmuch as their universal validity is not recognized, and in part *impersonal*, that is *collective*, inasmuch as their universal validity is recognized.

2. The *unconscious* contents are in part *personal*, in so far as we have to deal with components of a personal nature which were once relatively conscious and were then simply repressed; their universal validity is in consequence wholly unrecognized when they become conscious again. They are in part *impersonal*, in so far as we have to do with components that are recognized as impersonal, as having quite general value, and of which it is

impossible to prove any anterior or even relative consciousness.

504 *B. The Constitution of the Persona*

1. The conscious personal components constitute the conscious personality, the *conscious* ego.

2. The unconscious personal components constitute the "self," the *unconscious* or subconscious ego.

3. The conscious and unconscious components of a personal nature constitute the persona.

505 *C. Constitution of the Collective Psyche*

1. The conscious and unconscious components of an *impersonal*, i.e., collective nature constitute the psychological non-*ego*, the image of the objective world (the "object-imago"). These components may appear in analysis as projections of either feeling or judgment, but they are *a priori* collective and identical with the object-imago, that is, they appear to be qualities of the object, and it is only *a posteriori* that they are recognized as subjective psychological qualities.

2. The persona is the grouping of conscious and unconscious components that are opposed to the non-ego and constitute the ego. A general comparison of the personal elements belonging to different individuals shows the great resemblance between these components, which may even amount to identity, and largely cancels out the *individual* nature of the persona components and of the persona at the same time. To the degree that it does so the persona must be considered as a segment of the collective psyche and to that same degree the persona is a component of the collective psyche.

3. The collective psyche, then, is composed of the object-imago and of the persona.

506 *D. Individuality*

1. Individuality manifests itself partly as the principle which selects and sets limits to the components adopted as personal.

2. Individuality is the principle which makes possible, and if need be compels, a progressive differentiation of the collective psyche.

3. Individuality manifests itself partly as an obstacle to col lective productivity and partly as resistance to collective thinking and feeling.

4. Individuality is that which is peculiar and unique in combinations of general, collective, psychological components.

507 *E.* The conscious and unconscious contents are sub-divided into *individual* components and *collective* components.

1. A component whose developmental tendency is towards differentiation from the collective is individual.

2. A component whose developmental tendency is towards a general value is collective.

3. We lack adequate criteria to characterize a given component as purely individual or purely collective, for the characteristic of individuality is very difficult to determine, although always and everywhere present.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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